

THE HISTORY OF
GEORGE CATLETT MARSHALL

Mr. McCARTHY obtained the floor.
Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield so that I may suggest the absence of a quorum?

Mr. McCARTHY. I will if the Senator insists, but would rather not yield for that purpose, because I have informed many Senators that in view of the fact that this speech is approximately 60,000 words, I do not expect them to sit and listen to it as I deliver it, but I hope they will read it when I have concluded.

While I normally will yield for questions at any time, I hope Senators will refrain from interrupting until I have developed a part of the evidence in this matter.

Mr. President, in closely following the testimony before the joint committee on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, sitting jointly, which is conducting an investigation of the dismissal of Douglas MacArthur, I have become more and more impressed by two inescapable facts:

First. That it is impossible to develop the facts in the MacArthur inquiry without at the same time bringing to light some of the facts which bear on the question of why we fell from our position as the most powerful Nation on earth at the end of World War II to a position of declared weakness by our leadership.

Second. That it will be equally impossible to obtain the answers to the above without uncovering a conspiracy so immense and an infamy so black as to dwarf any previous such venture in the history of man. During the Marshall testimony, one of the Senators, obviously troubled by the odor of the conspiracy which was commencing to rise as a result of the constant probing by the members of the committee—troubled by the fringes of the conspiracy which were commencing to show—came to my office and asked me for information on a subject which was troubling and puzzling him greatly. While I cannot quote him verbatim, the questions he asked were substantially as follows:

First. Who was close to Marshall and succeeded in deceiving this great American at Yalta when his military advice was that we turn Manchuria over to Russia, thereby signing at least the first section in the death warrant of the Republic of China?

Second. Who twisted and perverted the thinking of this great American and misguided him into the folly of his disastrous mission to China?

Third. Who, of tortured disloyalty to America, succeeded in deceiving this great general during the course of World War II to the end that he always sided with Stalin and against Churchill when history's great decisions were being made—decisions which turned out so bad for the free world and so good for international communism?

Upon searching for the answers for the Senator, I found to my surprise that Marshall, who, by the alchemy of propaganda, became the "greatest living American," and the recently proclaimed "master of global strategy" for the party in power, has never had his record sub-

jected to the searching light of any historian. In view of the fact that the committee, the Congress, and the American people are being called upon either to indorse or reject Marshall's global strategy, I felt that it was urgent that such a study be made and submitted to the Russell committee.

MARSHALL'S RECORD FROM FRIENDLY SOURCES

I decided that the record of Marshall's unbroken series of decisions and acts, contributing so greatly to the strategy of defeat, should be given not from the pens and lips of his critics but from sources friendly to him. In view of the fact that the archives of this Nation and other nations are not available to me, I have been unable to document all of the important details of his record. However, sufficient evidence is available to give a picture which is complete in its general outline. I have drawn on the written record; on the memoirs of the principal actors in the great events of the last 10 years; I have drawn heavily from the books out of which the history of these times will be written for the next 500 years; I have drawn from the pens of Admiral Leahy, Winston Churchill, Mark Clark, Robert Sherwood speaking for Harry Hopkins, Henry L. Stimson, James F. Byrnes, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Sumner Wells, Cordell Hull, General Arnold, General Deane, General Chennault, and Jonathan Daniels. No one of them alone was trying to or did give anything remotely approaching a complete record of Marshall. The picture emerges, however, as we piece together their recollection of the events in which he figures—often-times fragmentary, never directly complimentary, but when fitted together, pointing unerringly to one conclusion.

It is from those sources, plus the State Department's record taken from Marshall's own files, that the picture becomes generally complete.

It is needless to tell you that this was a monumental task, but one which I felt had to be done, for unless we understand the record of Marshall it will be impossible to even remotely grasp the planned steady retreat from victory which commenced long before World War II ended. Unless we carefully study the records of Marshall and Acheson, who have worked together so closely, it will be impossible to foretell the next move on the timetable of the great conspiracy.

I realize full well how unpopular it is to lay hands on the laurels of a man who has been built into a great hero. I very much dislike this unpleasant task, but I feel that it must be done if we are to intelligently make the proper decisions in the issues of life and death before us.

ELEMENTS OF AMERICA'S STRENGTH

Before embarking upon the documentation of the history of Marshall, let us first briefly review the elements of our strength. Primarily, of course, we have the great industrial potential of this the mightiest of industrial lands—a potential which during the late hostilities poured forth the weapons of war to such an extent that in the closing months the enemy was hopelessly overmastered. That is one element we may

take for granted unless the Russians by, among other things, gaining command of the western Pacific could successfully threaten it from air bases in Alaska and northern Canada. We may assume our industrial potential for the time being.

The other great constant factor is the will of the American people to resist. I think that will is not weakened, and I am proud, as other Senators are, of the magnificent evidence of that will which we have seen in Korea. And yet will and arms are not in themselves entirely sufficient. The mountains of materials which we may produce and the valor of American arms, as it has been demonstrated on a thousand battlefields in every corner of the globe from King Philip's War to the current engagements in Korea, are not enough.

The variable factor in all this is politics and military strategy. What is strategy? Webster tells us that it is "the science or art of projecting and directing great military movements." In our case those military movements must be projected on a world-wide scale.

It is here that we come to the enigmatic, powerful figure of General Marshall. Why should we seek, as we shall, to understand General Marshall's strategic decisions in World War II? Because we are asked today to accept General Marshall as the paramount strategist of the present and the oncoming wars. The issue of these times has been partly framed in terms of the widely contrasted personalities and judgments of General MacArthur and General Marshall. We are asked to make the choice between MacArthur and Marshall. The issue in the great controversy that ensued upon the dismissal of General MacArthur by President Truman "in the dead, vast, and middle of the night" is at bottom a strategical issue.

THE STRANGE WAR OF 1951

As a backdrop to the investigation being conducted by the joint committee there is being waged a strange war, an undeclared and unacknowledged war; a war such as never before has been seen on sea or land. It is a war into which we were launched on the impulse of a President in the name of the United Nations, which has been striving ever since to disavow its paternity. If we are to believe the administration's spokesmen, it is a war without point or objective, a war without meaning except in the high personal and tragic sense in which it appears to the men who are consecrating the hills and valleys of Korea with their blood and to the wives and families of those men.

There is a nightmare quality about this war. In the eyes of the distinguished General Bradley it is a war fought against the "wrong enemy." The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it is clear, has succumbed to the general confusion, and while it is not given to General Bradley to know that in Korea we are fighting the Russian Empire, we in this Chamber may be supposed to know better. This being an unacknowledged war, we endure all the disadvantages of war without any of the advantages. We are powerless to exercise the

political or military initiatives customary to a belligerent.

In everything that concerns the deadly and ruinous aspects of war—the casualty rolls, the immense cost in treasure, the domestic strains, the fears—we are at war. In everything that has to do with the constructive, hopeful aspect of war—for war has those aspects too—we are not at war. Because of the maddening ambiguity of the administration's policy, we cannot pursue intelligent policies that would bring victory, nor can we make use of sound military principles which might minimize bloodshed and prevent the appalling destruction of Korea. We are in a war of alliance, yet our allies are at best of nominal assistance and at worst a conflicting hindrance. When they could really support us, then we and we alone are at war. Nor are we willing to make use of true friends, such as the Chinese Nationalists, who never have swerved in purpose.

WHO IS RUNNING THE WAR?

As the hearings progress, the question of what power is making decisions is becoming more and more confused. In one breath we hear that we, as the agent of the United Nations, can do all that is necessary to bring the war to a speedy and victorious conclusion. In the next breath we hear that actions which our military leaders consider necessary cannot be taken because the United Nations is running the war. The best example is found in the testimony of the Joint Chiefs and Acheson in regard to the hot pursuit of enemy planes. It was the unanimous opinion of General MacArthur, General Stratemeyer, the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs that our Air Force be allowed to engage in hot pursuit. The testimony was that Acheson was instructed to take the necessary steps to get the consent of our 13 "allies." He testified, however, that he only contacted six of them. When asked why he did not present this question to the United Nations in view of the fact that the United Nations is allegedly the final authority in the operation of this war, he stated—and listen to this—that could not be done because Russia as a member of the United Nations would veto this military action. From this it would appear that we are in the fantastically incredible position of supplying a vast majority of the manpower (outside of Korean manpower) and the weapons of war, while at the same time we are in the position of having the war run by an organization in which our principal enemy, in the words of our Secretary of State, can veto any action which would promise us victory.

There will be found among us, Mr. President, many views regarding the United Nations. Some may see it with the infatuated and cloudy vision of President Truman and Secretary Acheson, as the only hope of mankind. Others, taking a moderate view, may see in it a still hopeful instrument for future peace and world order. Still others look upon the United Nations, so hastily improvised by the late President Roosevelt, the late Secretary Stettinius, and the presently incarcerated Alger Hiss, as a misbegotten fraud. All must admit that it is sown with our enemies and with

false friends. It is, nevertheless, in the name of the United Nations that our sons and brothers are committed to the carnage of Korea.

DANGER OF A SUDDEN SELL-OUT

Worst of all, we cannot be sure as we sit here that suddenly behind the screen of chicanery and evil purpose we may not be committed to an ignominious peace. In January the Messrs. Truman, Acheson, and Marshall were ready to negotiate a truce that would have rewarded the Chinese hirelings of the Kremlin with a seat in the United Nations and the island bastion of Formosa. As recently as last March, these same gentlemen, in collaboration with the British, with the impudent National Socialist, Nehru, and their tools and minions throughout Europe and the Middle East, were on the verge again of surrendering to the Asiatic power drive of Moscow. It is not a pleasant sight to see Uncle Sam, with purse in one hand and hat in the other, begging on bended knee for the things which are ours. But it was to be done cleverly, so that we would appear to be opposing what by our actions would have been inescapable results. Let me explain that the future of our allies on Formosa and the question of unseating the Republic of China in the United Nations and replacing her with Red China was to be settled by a jury composed of Red China, Red Russia, Socialist Britain, and the United States—a packed jury, if I ever heard of one.

There was no question about how three of the four would vote. There was no possible question about how the Attlee government's representative would vote, because they have long stood 100 percent with Red China in her claims to Formosa and her claims to a seat in the United Nations. Our State Department had instructed our delegate to the United Nations to vote to settle the fate of our friends by a fixed jury—a jury stacked with the enemies of the Republic of China; a jury which had the wholehearted and publicly expressed approval of the great Marshall, of course.

We are told that only the prompt action of General MacArthur in issuing a field ultimatum to the bloody pawns of Peiping forestalled that disaster. The President of the United States has explained that it was this act of General MacArthur that precipitated his dismissal. If that is indeed true, this single deed of MacArthur's, preserving for yet a little while our vital position in the Western Pacific, may well be regarded by history as the foremost among his many services to his country.

We cannot rest secure today in the confidence that this administration will not again put our security in the Pacific to the hazard of its muddy and perverted purposes. Certainly Dean Acheson will not forego the high-minded executioners of the Kremlin who are turning the public squares of Chinese city after Chinese city into charnel houses. The administration, which procured the surrender of China to Russia, is obviously well pleased with the results of its endeavors and has no desire to disturb the Russian Empire in its possession of the mainland of China. And among the

journalistic voices that invariably echo the administration's will, we have had fresh evidence within recent days of their eagerness that Russia be not molested in Asia. Many of those journalistic satraps have been demanding the punishment of Dean Rusk for his belated and partial acknowledgement that American policy has been betrayed in China.

I hope the press will understand that I am only referring to the left-wing, bleeding-heart elements of the press, because, thank God, we do have essentially a good press in this Nation.

POLICY OF FEAR

This administration, which has given us this caricature of a war, is now bent on an even worse horror—a phony and fraudulent peace. It is planned by Secretary Marshall and the elegant and alien Acheson—Russian as to heart, British as to manner. We even hear cries for a fraudulent peace within this Chamber. In support of their campaign for a fraudulent peace, its advocates wage a campaign of fear.

The President threatens us with the destruction of our cities by Russian bombs unless we continue to pursue his empty, defeatist strategy in the Far East. The President's only answer to the splendid counsel of General MacArthur is that we must on no account offend the Soviet Union. One of the administration's two principal spokesmen on this matter seeks to frighten us with the admonition that unless we mind our P's and Q's in Korea, "This very Capitol Building, this very Senate Chamber may be blown to smithereens next week or the week after." Mr. President, that is not the great heart of America speaking.

I do not think we need fear too much about the Communists dropping atomic bombs on Washington. They would kill too many of their friends that way.

I never thought that I would live to see the day that Senators representing sovereign States would rise on the floor of the Senate and actually debate and argue to the effect that we should not protect the lives of our young men, whom we ourselves have sent into battle, merely because, if we were to fight back, we might make someone angry.

In my boyhood in Wisconsin, we had a deep pride in our country, in its strength as well as its wealth, in its high destiny as a great free society as well as in its opportunities for individual riches or position. We were simple, uncomplicated Americans, not above dying, if need be, for the land we love. We had self-assurance, too, and we assumed that whenever our security, our way of life, and our ideals were threatened by a hostile force, we would have the physical strength, and also the strength of character, to defend those values by force of arms, and to the utmost, regardless of consequences. We were not misled and enfeebled by abstractions such as collective security and by the tortured, twisted reasoning of men of little minds and less morals who for the first time in the history of this Nation argue that we should not vigorously fight back when attacked and in every way possible protect the lives of our men for fear of making an enemy or potential enemy mad, and that

we dare not win a war. We hear the President in a Nation-wide broadcast saying, "Even if we win." Mr. President, listen to those words—"even"—"even if we win." When before in the history of this Nation has a President been so craven? Imagine George Washington, when he was leading this small, physically weak Nation against mighty and powerful England, saying to his troops, "Even if we win." Imagine Lincoln, in even the darkest days of the Civil War, saying, "Even if we win." Imagine Churchill, in England's darkest days during World War II when invasion was imminent, saying, "Even if we win." Imagine what might well have happened to England if those had been his words instead of his immortal words, "We shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender." Imagine Roosevelt, when he addressed the Congress on that fateful December 8, saying, "Even if we win."

As I listen to the debates in this Chamber and hear the testimony of the President's spokesmen, it makes me sick down deep inside. But when I get out of Washington into the United States, it is a healthy feeling—for then is answered the question: Where stand the people? Not with the Gospel of fear which is being preached to us. Not with the craven fears of the President and his spokesmen but rather with the wholesome American view regarding the integrity and self-reliance of America.

WHY ARE WE WEAK?

The administration explicitly announces to the world that we are too weak to resist the Soviet Empire.

When World War II ended, the United States had the most powerful military machine the world has ever witnessed. It could have rolled across Asia, over the Ural Mountains, and on to the Pacific Ocean, and Korea would not have even been considered a minor mopping up operation by one of Patton's armored divisions. Since then the administration has been given every cent that it has asked, and more, to maintain a powerful military machine. Yet during the hearings, Chief of the Air Force General Vandenberg testified—page 3630 of the MacArthur hearings—that the United States is operating a shoestring air force, and Secretary Marshall testified—page 880 of the MacArthur hearings—that we had almost nothing in the summer of 1950 in the way of available troops in this country other than one airborne division and a part of a Marine division.

This is the same administration which, as we shall again demonstrate today, deliberately—and I use the word "deliberately" advisedly—assisted the Russian conquest of China—a conquest that General Marshall conceded in his recent testimony had taken place—and in so doing reversed the American policy toward the Far East that had been maintained by every President, Republican or Democrat, for the last half a century. This is the administration which has sheltered the friends and puppets of the Russian Empire high in its own councils

and, when challenged, has turned the batteries of its anger and its camp-following propaganda agents, not upon the enemies of our country in its ranks, but turned them upon the enemies of those enemies.

This is the administration that has allowed priceless atomic secrets to slip through its dubiously loyal fingers—stolen by spies who, according to the President, never existed, and to make the very bombs with which it now threatens us. Moreover—and this is a fact of equal significance which I propose to reveal if you will forgive the lengthy exposition required by the evidence—the administration preceding this one, by its pursuit of a fateful high strategy in World War II itself produced the might of the Russian Empire which General Marshall now so greatly fears.

MARSHALL'S ROLE IN THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN CHURCHILL AND STALIN

In order to draw clearly the picture of Marshall, it is necessary to sketch in some detail the vast, history-making struggle between Churchill and Stalin and the decisive role which Marshall played in that struggle. During those wartime days, Marshall sometimes overbore Churchill; he was sometimes overborne by Churchill. Each was striving to guide the decisions of Roosevelt, who, because of the great weight of American military and industrial power, had the last word. The President moderated between these two men, as we shall see, but I think it entirely fair to say that in those procedures General Marshall more often than not swayed the historic decisions.

That estimate may strike some of us as novel. It does not accord with the accepted and popular view of those times, which places Roosevelt as the all-powerful voice, only modified, often to America's hurt, by the strong desires of Churchill. We have not been properly instructed. The truth is that among the three great powers of that day, Stalin had a policy, Churchill had a policy, and we operated between the two, almost invariably in support of the Russian line rather than the British.

If Senators will bear with me I shall document the fact in detail. We had no discernible policy except the superficial one of defeating the enemy in battle as fast as possible. This will become more manifest as we proceed to review the high strategy of World War II.

THE NATION'S PERIL

The history of those events would not deserve extended treatment in this Chamber at this time unless its lessons afforded us insight into our present perils. I think we are in the greatest danger ever faced by this Republic. I think that for the first time in our history we are in a danger from which we may not be able to escape as a distinguishable, a free, and a hopeful society. The continued existence of this country has never before been called into question. Even had the Confederate States succeeded in establishing their independence we would be today two countries instead of one, but they would be countries of a common civilization and way of life.

The danger we face today is different not only in its magnitude but in its intrinsic nature. If the Communist empire, which alone threatens us and which alone is the only power able so to do, were to accomplish the objective it seeks—and which so many Americans in high places either consciously or unconsciously assist—we will not only cease to be the country we have known and loved, but those of us who are allowed to stay alive will no longer be allowed to exist as civilized men.

While the peril is great, the great and shining hope of ultimate victory for the free half of the world lies in the fact that the people of this Nation do not subscribe to the craven, whining, whimpering policy of fear of those who, because of an accident of history, are in a position of leadership.

What the Communist Empire is trying to do, of course, is so to arrange world events, and through her stooges to shape American policy so that in the not distant future they will feel themselves strong enough to destroy us. Lest there be any doubt about the aims of world communism, let me quote the leader of world communism, Stalin himself. Here are his words, spoken not 10 years ago, not before World War II, but in 1947. Listen:

The existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with capitalistic states for a long time is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end.

His words represent no new thought on the part of the leader of communism. It was part of the Communist credo since the days of its founder. It was the principle which guided Stalin during all of his titanic struggles with Churchill, in which Marshall played such an important part.

THE MASTER OF GLOBAL STRATEGY

Let us, therefore, discuss for a time what is perhaps the most significant aspect of our situation as we face this Communist public promise to enslave us. Let us, therefore, discuss the history of Marshall as the master of our world-wide strategy. I do not myself so describe him, although I have no doubt that he is one of its architects. He has recently been so described in a partisan sense. Recently a Democratic Party gathering at Denver, laying the groundwork for the campaign of 1952, summed up what it believed to be the party's assets in a resolution with which they were prepared to enter that campaign. These assets included the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. They termed the Secretary of State a man of "broad vision and knowledge of world affairs." It is not so much that I disagree with what they said; it is that I would question what they left unsaid. I do not doubt Acheson's vision and knowledge. I pause to observe in passing that his conduct of his high office serves the interests of Russia, not the interests of the United States.

We come to that other political asset of the Democratic Party, Secretary Marshall. Him they describe as a "master of global strategy." It is, therefore, both as a professional military man and as a partisan that we must view Secretary

Marshall. Were he merely a professional soldier who had given his lifetime to the service of his country, I should hesitate to lay hands on his laurels. We cannot too much honor the men who have dedicated their lives to our military services. We can afford to deal lightly with their mistakes of judgment, but not with their lapses of honor. Had General Marshall been content at the end of World War II to rest upon his laurels, instead of assuming command of our military and political decisions and ranging himself with stubborn zeal at the side of the old Acheson-Hiss-Yalta crowd, we might never have found occasion to audit what he did in World War II.

It is now necessary in the public interest to examine with care and detail the record of General Marshall in the recent war. I myself am a little handicapped in this examination because during the events of those days I was segregated in a small area of the Pacific Ocean. I was not here in Washington where I might have passed judgment as the scene unfolded. Had I been, it is unlikely that I would have been admitted to the august circles where the great decisions of the war were made.

So, lacking first-hand access to those meetings where the great decisions were taken, I have had recourse, as could anyone, to what has been written of them by the principals. I have consulted the memoirs of the associates of General Marshall in that war. They are voluminous and revelatory. Those sources I might remind you, are friendly. None of the great leaders of the English-speaking peoples who have written of the war have been noticeably unfriendly to General Marshall.

Mr. President, there are various ways in which to arrive at an estimate of a wartime figure. It is helpful if he will write his own recollections, but that General Marshall has declined to do, giving, as I understand it, the explanation that to do so would injure certain reputations. If all public figures accepted that thesis, I may remark in passing, the public would be even less enlightened than it is at present. In pursuit of an estimate, one may also gain information from official records. The records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff are not open to my perusal. In the end the inquirer will also find in the archives of the enemy, when they become available, evidence regarding the behavior of his own leaders. If the archives of the Kremlin are ever open to us, we shall have even deeper insight than we have today concerning the conduct of our current leaders. But as matters now stand, I have been forced to rely upon the memoirs and upon some other contemporary sources. I repeat that all these are friendly sources, and cannot be charged with attempts to injure General Marshall.

1941 TO 1942

I have begun my review with the winter of 1941 and 1942, when the comprehensive outlines of Anglo-American strategy were drawn. I must ask my colleagues to go back with me to those

days. During the Christmas holidays of 1941, we recall that Winston Churchill, attended by his military advisers, came to Washington and held a series of conferences at the White House with President Roosevelt and his military advisers. Japan had struck at Pearl Harbor on the 7th of December. Our fortunes were then joined with those of the British and the lesser powers engaged against Japan and Germany. We faced, for the first time in our history, global responsibilities. We were everywhere on the defensive. The British occupied a precarious foothold in Egypt. We still held Corregidor and Bataan, although the end there was in sight. Singapore had not yet fallen, but the Japanese were well advanced in their southward drive. Germany, master of the Continent as far as the Pyrenees and the North Cape, was still marching toward the east into Russia.

THE SECOND FRONT NOW

The President and the Prime Minister, with their military counselors, agreed then upon a strategic plan embracing the globe. Included in this plan was a provision for the invasion of the mainland of Europe at some time during 1943. It was rightly considered that we would lack the men and the equipment to cross the Channel before 1943. What came to be known as the second front was allotted the appropriate place in the world-wide scale as this conference came to a close in the middle of January. It was at this time that the enormously destructive battle of the Atlantic began—the ruthless submarine warfare aimed at our shipping, which was to hamper our war effort far more than the conferees at the White House had expected.

The Soviet Union, its armies reeling back, had been beseeching the British since the preceding summer to attack Germany in Europe as a means of relieving their dire pressure. After the White House conference, known as the Arcadia Conference, ended, the efforts of the Russians to promote a diversion in Western Europe were redoubled. The pressure was not alone maintained against our governments; it took the form of public propaganda, in which the Communists both of England and America, and their friends and well-wishers, took a leading part.

Sometime between the end of the Arcadia Conference and the 1st of April General Marshall, who was then, as you will recall, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, had prepared in the War Department Planning Section a plan for the invasion of Western Europe in 1942. This planning section was under the command of Col. Dwight D. Eisenhower. I might say, parenthetically, that at the Arcadia Conference in a closed session among the President, the Prime Minister, and Ambassador Litvinoff, the President had, with characteristic impulsiveness, given Litvinov some cause to hope that the western allies might find it possible to mount this invasion in 1942. At Arcadia the President had proposed an intermediate attack in North Africa for the purpose of gaining command of the Mediterranean and threatening

Europe from the south. It was over these two projects that the violent disputes of the next 3 months were to wage, disputes largely hidden from the public at the time, but in which General Marshall and the Prime Minister played the leading roles.

MARSHALL AND STALIN VERSUS CHURCHILL ON QUESTION OF SECOND FRONT

The plan for a "second front now" has been described by the late Secretary Stimson as "the brain child of the American Army." There can be no doubt but that it was General Marshall's plan. He fought for it with the utmost vigor, a vigor bespeaking an interest that went far beyond the call of duty of a purely military adviser. As Mr. Churchill once put it in a cable to Mr. Roosevelt, the matter was a political, more than a military, issue. The text of this cable may be found on page 43 of Mr. Churchill's book, *The Hinge of Fate*. By March 9, 1942, we are told by Mr. Sherwood, the President had fallen in to some extent with the Marshall plan, cabling Churchill on that date:

I am becoming more and more interested in the establishment of a new front (on the European Continent) this summer.

By the first of April, Mr. Roosevelt had been induced, as Sherwood explains on page 521, by Stimson, Marshall, and Hopkins, to supersede the North African venture known as Gymnast in favor of the transchannel operation. By then, as Sherwood puts it, "Roosevelt was attaching great importance to the political importance of this in relation to Russia." Hopkins and Marshall were sent to London to persuade Churchill. The Americans found Churchill reluctant. With his customary eloquence, the Prime Minister explored the difficulties of the operation. They lacked the landing craft necessary, they lacked the air cover, and the naval support. The venture would be costly, the Prime Minister believed, and he foresaw the channel turned into a "river of Allied blood." Should it fail, said Churchill, it would not only expose our friends on the Continent to great disappointment, it would hearten the Nazis and prejudice subsequent attempts to invade the Continent. However, the British agreed to give the matter careful study, which they did.

The American strategists continued hurriedly and confidently to plan for a "second front now" until early in June, when disquieting news reached Washington with the arrival of Lord Louis Mountbatten. He reported to the President that the British military experts could find no feasible method by which the invasion could be mounted. By this time the invasion bore the name Sledgehammer. Churchill followed Mountbatten to Washington, and under his representations of the difficulties, the President weakened, returning to his predilection for Gymnast. When the President sought to moderate Marshall's views, "he met with," as Mr. Stimson put it, on page 424 of his book, *On Active Service in Peace and War*, "a rather robust opposition." The general quickly submitted a new paper in support of the "second front now" and against Gymnast.

On July 10, as Stimson reports it, Marshall returned from a White House conference "very stirred up and emphatic over a British War Cabinet paper vetoing Sledgehammer and calling for Gymnast." Still following Mr. Stimson's version of the occasion, Marshall "proposed a show-down which I cordially endorsed. As the British will not go through with what they agreed to, we will turn our back on them and take up the war with Japan."

Although Stimson in retrospect was "not entirely pleased with his part in this venture," he went along with Marshall at the time. The Army Chief of Staff acquired the support of his colleagues, Admiral King and General Arnold. This is the appropriate time to point out that during the war Admiral King's preoccupations were almost wholly with the Pacific theater. He had little or no interest in the strategy of the war in Europe and Asia and only exercised himself there when the claims of those theaters infringed on his own supply of ships and men. I find no evidence in the sources I have consulted that General Arnold ever took a leading part in these strategical questions. To all intents and purposes it is quite clear that General Marshall spoke the voice of the Joint Chiefs in matters of over-all strategy. Returning to the Sledgehammer quarrel, Marshall submitted to the President a paper, signed by all three chiefs, proposing that we withdraw from the war in Europe unless the British acceded to his plan. Here I quote Mr. Stimson, page 425:

The President asserted that he himself was absolutely sound on Bolero (Sledgehammer) which must go ahead unremittably, but he did not like the manner of the memorandum in regard to the Pacific, saying that it was a little like "taking up your dishes and going away."

Mr. Roosevelt was not persuaded and the bluff was never tried. It would not have worked in any case, for there was no real intention of carrying it out and Stimson supposed that the British knew this as well as he did.

Furthermore, Stimson knew that the President had a "lingering predilection for the Mediterranean," and the Prime Minister had shown on his last visit that he, too, knew the President's feeling; back on June 21 he "had taken up Gymnast, knowing full well I am sure that it was the President's great secret baby." The quotation is from Stimson.

Mr. Sherwood, in commenting on these events—page 594—recalls that Roosevelt described the Marshall show-down as "a red herring," a phrase that has a familiar ring. Sherwood does not agree with Stimson that it was a tactical maneuver in the struggle between Marshall and Churchill, saying, "It is my impression that the plan was far more than a bluff in General Marshall's mind and certainly in Admiral King's. Indeed, the first step in it—the assault of Guadalcanal was approved on June 25, the last day of Churchill's stay in Washington."

The President resolved the crisis by dispatching Marshall, Hopkins, and King to London to have it finally out with the Prime Minister and his advisers. They arrived in Scotland on a

Saturday, finding the Prime Minister's train and an invitation to Chequers, the Prime Minister's country place, awaiting them. Rather mystifyingly Marshall, who was so obviously the guest of the Prime Minister, bluntly declined his invitation to stop at Chequers and insisted on proceeding directly to London. Churchill protested this "rudeness" in talks with Hopkins. Marshall, it was clear, did not want to put himself under the persuasive fire of Churchill. Sherwood testifies that those were tense days for the Anglo-American Alliance both at the White House and in London. General Marshall found heavy going in London. Before long Admiral King had been alienated from Marshall by representations of the Royal Navy that the French coast would become a lee shore in September and hence difficult to invade.

CLARK SIDES WITH CHURCHILL AGAINST MARSHALL AND STALIN

What was perhaps the most crushing argument against Sledgehammer was dealt by a general who was taking no sides in the political question, Mark Clark. Clark was then in command of all American Army forces in the British Isles. Rather belatedly, it seems, he was called before the combined Chiefs of Staff and asked by Marshall what American forces could be contributed to a "second front now." I quote from page 34 of Clark's book, *Calculated Risk*, his version of that occasion:

I pointed out that all we could count on using would be the Thirty-fourth Division then in North Ireland. . . . The Thirty-fourth, however, had little amphibious training, it lacked antiaircraft support and it had no tanks. The First Armored Division also in Ireland, was not yet fully equipped, nor would any other units scheduled to arrive before September 15 be prepared for battle. . . . There would be a difficult problem getting the men and equipment together and . . . there seemed to be no possibility that invasion boats would be ready by midspring—to say nothing of bad weather conditions prevailing at that time of year . . . the American forces will be ready to contribute comparatively little until spring of 1943.

With Clark's report it at once becomes evident that Marshall had virtually nothing to contribute in support of his plan. What he was, in effect, doing was calling upon the British to execute an operation in which they firmly disbelieved with scarcely any support from his own forces.

I leave it to you to characterize the general's zeal. We were to learn later that as late as the spring of 1943, the Nazis had 1,300,000 troops in France and the Low Countries.

MARSHALL'S TRAINING OF TROOPS

It should also be noted that the first troops that we sent abroad in 1942 were, as we discovered in North Africa, insufficiently trained for combat. It is no reflection upon them to say that in the first weeks of the American Corps' venture into battle they did not behave as hardened veterans. Indeed, General McNair, who, as you know, unhappily lost his life by misdirected American fire in the Normandy invasion, observed to General Clark after a visit to the

North African front, "The American soldiers are not fighting in Tunisia." This may be found on page 168 of General Clark's memoirs. He qualified that in favor of the First Division. McNair attributed their lack of battle stability to the failure to inculcate discipline in their training here at home.

It is noteworthy that we have been assured times without number that General Marshall's greatest achievement in World War II was the organization and training of our armies. When our forces in North Africa had become battle-hardened and General Clark and General Patton had put them under advanced training, they, as you all know, behaved in the best tradition of the American Army. But what would have happened had we thrown the green troops of Kasserine Pass against Hitler's Panzers in the fall of 1942? We find a curious retrospective glance at that incident in Sherwood's recollections, where, on page 807, he quotes Hopkins to this effect:

In trying to figure out whether we could have gotten across the channel successfully in 1942 or 1943, you have got to answer the unanswerable question as to whether Eisenhower, Bradley, Spaatz, Patton, Beedie Smith, and also Montgomery and Tedder and a lot of others could have handled the big show as they would if they hadn't had the experience fighting Germany in North Africa and Sicily.

So at London in July of 1942, the plan of the "master of global strategy" went awry and the Combined Chiefs settled on Gymnast. Sherwood recalls that "General Marshall had firmly opposed it and so had General Eisenhower, who is quoted as having described the day when the decision was made by Roosevelt as possibly the blackest day in history."

HANSON BALDWIN'S ESTIMATE OF MARSHALL'S PLAN

If I may, in this connection, I should like to summon as a witness Hanson W. Baldwin, the distinguished military critic of the New York Times, whose strategic insights are universally recognized.

I think it goes without saying that Marshall's fervent determination to cross the Channel in the fall of 1942 or the spring of 1943 is open to grave doubts. It was, in fact, the first of a series of grave decisions made by this "master of global strategy," some of them producing consequences which today increasingly threaten the well-being and survival of the West. In his book, *Great Mistakes of the War*, Baldwin says on page 33, "In retrospect it is now obvious that our concept of invading Western Europe in 1942 was fantastic; our deficiencies in North Africa, which was a much-needed training school for our troops, proved that. The British objection to a 1943 cross-channel operation was also soundly taken militarily; we would have had in that year neither the trained divisions, the equipment, the planes, the experience, nor (particularly) the landing craft to have invaded the most strongly held part of the Continent against an enemy whose strength was far greater than it was a year later." Baldwin's estimate goes far to support

Churchill's objections that a disaster on the French coast due to a hasty, reckless invasion might have proved "the only way in which we could possibly lose this war." That Churchillian remark appears on page 590 of Sherwood.

It was at this time, whether or not because of the unmitigated fervor with which Marshall pushed his plan, that Roosevelt superseded him in the military circle around the White House. The President chose Admiral Leahy, a naval officer of eminent achievements and the saltiest of common sense, as his personal Chief of Staff. Leahy became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and thus, nominally, Marshall's superior, although, as we shall see, Marshall overcame him at several of the most critical junctions. Although Leahy came on the scene, having been our Ambassador at Vichy, too late to participate in the discussions of Sledgehammer, he was familiar with their general setting. He wrote on page 110 of his valuable book of memoirs, *I Was There*, his own judgment of that sorry and provocative incident. Leahy wrote:

The Russians could not have been more disappointed than our own Army people. . . . There was much grumbling about Britain and much criticism of Winston Churchill. The Prime Minister was convinced that England was not ready to undertake such a major effort and I did not think that we were either. He (Winston Churchill) wanted to have much more assurance of success than General Marshall could give him.

Our subsequent history would have been happier had Leahy, rather than Marshall, prevailed at Yalta—a chapter which we shall soon open.

THE OPPOSITION OF MARSHALL AND STALIN TO THE MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONS

It became evident with the Sledgehammer quarrel that Marshall intended to make his mark on the political and strategic decisions of World War II. The next assertion of his will came late in August when, without advance notice, the American Chiefs of Staff—meaning Marshall—served notice on the British that they opposed the hitherto agreed upon plans to invade North Africa by way of the Mediterranean as well as the Atlantic coast of Morocco. "The Army," as Admiral Leahy wrote in the above connection, "was not well disposed toward the adventure." The North African expedition had by now been christened Torch. The news reached Churchill on the 25th of August. Until that moment plans had been proceeding full speed ahead for landings at Casablanca on the Atlantic, Oran, which is the western end of the Mediterranean coast of Algiers, and at a point or points farther east toward Tunisia. Suddenly the American chiefs notified the British that they now believed the Mediterranean landings too hazardous to undertake.

Stalin had been vigorously opposed to the Mediterranean landings, urging a second front in France.

Upon receipt of the advice from Washington that Torch had been ditched by Marshall and his associates, Churchill wrote a disparaging letter to Hopkins. This was on the 4th of September and the text of the letter appears on page

540 of the volume of Churchill's memoirs known as *The Hinge of Fate*. He wrote Hopkins:

Frankly, I do not understand what is at the back of all this. I thought there was agreement with Marshall and that King had been paid off with what he needed for his Pacific war. But now it seems there is a bad comeback from the professional circles in the American Army and I have a deep and growing fear that the whole of the President's enterprise may be wrecked bit by bit. With it will fall the brightest hope of the Allies and the only hope this year.

When Churchill refers in his book to the professional circles of the Army, he is generally denoting Marshall and his principal strategical planners of that time.

ROOSEVELT SIDES WITH CHURCHILL

The Prime Minister's letter was never mailed. Before it could reach the letter box he had a cablegram from the President announcing that he had overcome the opposition of his staff and that the bell could again be rung for full speed ahead on Torch. Had Roosevelt not overruled Marshall at this critical time, undoubtedly Russia would enjoy the same complete domination over the Mediterranean area which she now enjoys over the other unhappy areas behind the Iron curtain. As early as the White House conference known as Arcadia, the President had given his full support to North Africa, saying at that time, as quoted by the late Gen. H. H. (Hap) Arnold in his memoirs, *Global Mission*, "We must get into North Africa before the Germans." In this connection it may be mentioned that Stimson remarked in his book that "The Mediterranean Basin always fascinated Roosevelt." Sherwood likewise recalls the President's strong preference for this operation, basing it upon Roosevelt's "naval mindedness," and his knowledge that by ridding North Africa of the Nazis we would free the lifeline to the Middle East and the Far East by way of Suez thus obviating the long voyages around the cape and providing for ourselves a whole new theater from which the assault against the Nazis could be carried out.

It is an interesting speculation as to the future of World War II had we abandoned Torch or curtailed it by landing on the Atlantic alone. There was strong British sentiment to land in Tunisia as well as Tangiers at that time. A proposal from British quarters suggested that several thousand soldiers could be flown from Malta into Tunisia, which was only weakly garrisoned by the French, to coincide with the landings in Morocco and Algiers. This was vetoed. As it turned out, Hitler was able to send more than 100,000 of his best troops into Tunis. These forces, with Rommel's army re-treating before Montgomery, made a formidable opposition, and it may be assumed that without the overpowering strength in the air which the Allies were able to command, the war in North Africa might have dragged on indefinitely. Suppose we had not landed in Algeria, suppose that the battle of North Africa had continued for months on end and engaged ever larger numbers of our forces, in whose interest would that have

been? By winning the war in North Africa and by our subsequent conquest of Sicily and Italy—enterprises which were unflinchingly opposed by Marshall—we, instead of Russia, were able to hold postwar command of at least the Mediterranean away from the Red armies. The European picture as of today would have been far different if the Red armies had themselves received the surrender of Italy. As it stands, we have Italy and a foothold on the opposite shore of the Adriatic at Trieste, a foothold which is no doubt today a reassurance to Tito.

We are all familiar with the developments in the North African war. No sooner had it been launched than Marshall again began to press his views in opposition to what Churchill called the exploitation of the prospective victory. In spite of Churchill's most eloquent pleading, Marshall only very reluctantly agreed to the attack on Sicily and with even greater reluctance to the further assault on the Italian mainland as a possible step toward the Churchill aim of invasion through the Balkans. In all these attitudes, Eisenhower, who had become commander in chief in North Africa, was Marshall's firm supporter.

STALIN WINS EASTERN EUROPE

We now come to what was without question the most significant decision of the war in Europe: the decision by Marshall, which was made against Roosevelt's half-hearted wishes and Churchill's bulldog determination, to concentrate on France and leave the whole of Eastern Europe to the Red armies. This was a strategical struggle in the classic manner. It was pursued with great vigor, sometimes becoming very violent on both sides. It only reached its terminal point at Tehran, as we shall see, where the great combined weight of Stalin and Marshall defeated Churchill. I cannot dwell too urgently on this great decision. Its military effects were of no very great importance although the unnecessary invasion of southern France, enjoined by Stalin and Marshall, gave Kesselring a welcome breathing spell in northern Italy and protracted Mark Clark's campaign for the Po with an attendant greater loss of American lives. It is the political consequences of this controversy which stand forth in all their stark implications for us today. I will attempt to summarize the debate briefly.

The British, from the beginning of the Italian strategical discussions, had been intent on carrying the war into the Mediterranean. Their motives were mixed. Foremost perhaps was their desire to relieve their forces in Egypt, which had suffered several crushing blows. Secondly, they wanted the use of the Mediterranean for very obvious purposes of communication. Thirdly, the British have had for many generations a paramount position in the eastern Mediterranean and had wide interests both in those lands and in the Suez Canal as a gateway to India and their great possessions and dependencies in the Orient and the Southern Seas. There was a further and personal factor, which Marshall frequently characterized as the Prime Minister's preoccupation with eccentric operations, such as the ill-fated Dardanelles' campaign in

World War I with which Churchill's name will be forever associated. Over-shadowing and of much more importance, of course, as we see it now and as we get glimpses in the writings of the principal actors of those times, was a steady desire on the part of the British to reach Eastern Europe and the Balkans before the Red armies.

HANSON BALDWIN LABELS OUR DESERTION OF CHURCHILL AND SUPPORT OF STALIN AS SHORT-SIGHTED

I think there can be no question that Hanson Baldwin is correct when he stigmatizes our military planning in this connection as short-sighted. Churchill, with his intimate and profound knowledge of the continuing drama of Europe, knew that a war is only a phase of history. Victory is one thing; where you stand at the end of war is another. He had the ability to foresee what Europe would look like as a result of certain policies.

THE GREAT BLUNDER OF THE WAR IN EUROPE

My own feeling, and I believe the Senate will agree with me, is that our failure to place ourselves in a position of strength in Austria, Czechoslovakia and the Balkans was perhaps our greatest single blunder of the war in Europe. The Allied debate on this question has further significance for us. Marshall triumphed over Churchill at the First Quebec Conference in August 1943 with reference to this question.

CHURCHILL'S SWAY ENDED

That conference marked the end of Churchill's sway over the great decisions of war—a sway always modified by Marshall. Thereafter, Mr. President, the policy of the United States in the European war was wholly and without deviation the policy announced by Joseph Stalin. There was a break in the relations between the two English-speaking powers, which were carrying the brunt of the war, and the United States thereafter was found always on the side of Stalin. To obtain this result, Marshall bore down on British preoccupation with the Mediterranean. I have enumerated some of the reasons which led to the British position. Marshall ignored all of these except the one addressed to British self-interest. He minimized and derided the British position, ridiculing the Prime Minister's strategical judgment by frequent references to the Dardanelles.

THE FATAL RUPTURE

I cannot help believing that the rupture of interest between the United States and Great Britain signified by this decision was one of the most fateful ruptures between allies in modern times. It embittered our relationships at the first Quebec meeting, at Cairo, and at Tehran. I intend, if I am not exhausting the Senate's patience, to go into these matters in detail.

At the moment let me generalize that the year 1943 was by all odds the critical year of the war, casting its shadow over the whole postwar period in which we now find ourselves convulsed by anxiety and doubt. It was in February of 1943 that the Russians achieved victory over the Germans at Stalingrad. In fact, it

can, I believe, be safely stated that world war III started with the Russian victory at Stalingrad. Thereafter, they opened their diplomatic war against the West when they gave every evidence of turning upon the Polish armies, the Polish people and the loyal and devoted Polish government in exile in London.

ONE OF THE WAR'S MOST IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS

The Kremlin's treatment of the Poles, beginning in the spring of 1943, has been the touchstone of this whole period, and it was at the Quebec Conference that the whole dangerous policy of the United States toward the Soviet Union was forecast and prefigured. At Quebec the decision was made to invade southern France and keep the weakened American Fifth Army and the British Eighth Army indecisively engaged in Italy. It was at Quebec also that the most amazing and indicative document that has so far emerged from the voluminous records of World War II was brought to bear. This document, a memorandum entitled "Russia's Position," affords us clear insight into our subsequent surrenders at Tehran and Yalta as well as at Potsdam. The document appears, and only there, in Sherwood's book about Hopkins. It appears on page 748. The memorandum is ascribed there to "a very high-level United States military strategic estimate." Sherwood reports that Hopkins had it with him at Quebec. Can it be doubted that this document emanated from General Marshall, whoever drafted it? The question of its authorship is extremely important and I hope that some day this body, or some other, will be able to fix that authorship.

No document of World War II was more controlling on our fate. I am going to read it in full as it appears in Sherwood's book. I read:

Russia's postwar position in Europe will be a dominant one. With Germany crushed, there is no power in Europe to oppose her tremendous military forces. It is true that Great Britain is building up a position in the Mediterranean vis-à-vis Russia that she may find useful in balancing power in Europe. However, even here she may not be able to oppose Russia unless she is otherwise supported.

The conclusions from the foregoing are obvious. Since Russia is the decisive factor in the war, she must be given every assistance and every effort must be made to obtain her friendship. Likewise, since without question she will dominate Europe on the defeat of the Axis, it is even more essential to develop and maintain the most friendly relations with Russia.

Finally, the most important factor the United States has to consider in relation to Russia is the prosecution of the war in the Pacific. With Russia as an ally in the war against Japan, the war can be terminated in less time and at less expense in life and resources than if the reverse were the case. Should the war in the Pacific have to be carried on with an unfriendly or negative attitude on the part of Russia, the difficulties will be immeasurably increased and operations might become abortive.

Sherwood, himself, while passing no adverse judgment on the conclusions therein, did understand its great significance. He wrote, "This estimate was obviously of great importance as indicating the policy which guided the making of decisions as Teheran and,

much later, at Yalta." What this document is, in effect, is a rationalization of the whole policy of submission to and appeasement of Russia during the remainder of World War II and, most notably, in our relationships with China thereafter. What it said was that as a result of the utter destruction of Germany which we had erected into a policy at Casablanca with the phrase "unconditional surrender," Russia would be the unquestioned "top dog" in Europe after the war, and that it behooved the great, enlightened, and truly progressive English-speaking peoples therefore to cater to, to placate, and, in fact, to submit to the will of the Kremlin thereafter. It said unmistakably that the British endeavors in the Mediterranean, which Marshall had succeeded in blocking, were aimed at balancing power in Europe vis-à-vis Russia. This Marshall did not want.

That, Mr. President, is bad enough. The document went further. It insisted that we must carry this attitude of solicitude and deference beyond the European situation. We must bow to Russia in the Far East as well. It is here that we find the first explicit delineation of the policy which produced the shameful betrayal of China at Yalta, the blackmail paid by Roosevelt to get Russia into a war which she had already announced her eagerness to wage.

STALIN'S GREAT VICTORY

The debate over Mediterranean policy had reached a focus at the White House late in May of 1943 when Churchill again crossed the Atlantic in pursuit of a common objective. He found Marshall opposed to any action in the Mediterranean beyond taking Sardinia after the occupation of Sicily and that then all of our subsequent efforts be devoted to what the late Sir John Dill, who was Chief of the British Military Mission in Washington, once referred to in a letter to Churchill as "Marshall's first love"—the transchannel invasion. Roosevelt was pulled and hauled on this issue as much as any in the war. His inclinations, based upon a great knowledge of geography and his adventurous strategic desires, were toward expanding the war into Eastern Europe. Ultimately, however, Marshall again won out and Roosevelt went along with him.

So determined was Churchill at the White House in May to have his views prevail that he induced Roosevelt to send Marshall with him to North Africa for a further discussion with military leaders in that theater. I gather from the Hinge of Fate that it was at this point that Churchill realized that his great antagonist in the war was Marshall, that he and Marshall were virtually contending for the mastery of their views over the impulsive will of the President. It was in connection with that journey by Churchill and Marshall to North Africa that the Prime Minister wrote in his book, pages 812 and 813, a tribute to the general as a "statesman with a penetrating and commanding view of the whole scene." It may be noted that Churchill did not ascribe to Marshall a correct and trustworthy view of the whole scene and it may be wondered, in the light of their

great conflicts, whether the Prime Minister was not perhaps indulging his rather frequent taste for irony.

In Tunis, Churchill brought to bear upon Marshall and Eisenhower, who invariably sided with Marshall, the whole battery of persuasion of himself and his military subordinates. The views of the British were made more persuasive by the fact that they had carried the major burden of the war in North Africa. Marshall resisted, remaining, as Churchill comments, "up 'til almost the last minute, silent or cryptic." The upshot was that Marshall insisted upon deferring the decision until Sicily had been made secure and "the situation in Russia known." The quotation is from Churchill's report of the conference.

We recur to the Quebec Conference of August 14, as Admiral Leahy reports it on page 175 of his book:

General Marshall was very positive in his attitude against a Mediterranean commitment.

Churchill did, however, temporarily prevail, and we invaded Italy; but Marshall and Stalin won out in the end when Roosevelt sided with them at Tehran, where there was thrown away the advantage of the Italian campaign. We are indebted to Mr. Sherwood for the fullest account of the Stalin position at Tehran. This account was obtained, of course, from Hopkins' oral and written recollections. At one point, quoted on page 780 of Sherwood's book, Stalin urged that the "entry of Turkey into the war—a development to which Churchill was passionately committed, and which the Russians had been previously urging—might be helpful in opening the way to the Balkans, but the Balkans were far from the heart of Germany, and the only direct way of striking at that heart was through France." Here Roosevelt suggested that it might be useful if the Americans and British marched east in conjunction with Tito's Partisans into Rumania and joined with the Reds at Odessa. Stalin inquired if that would affect the 35 divisions earmarked for the transchannel invasion of France. Churchill replied that it would not. Sherwood comments, however, that "nothing could be further from the plans of the United States Chief of Staff." It was then that Stalin brought his powerful guns to bear to conclude the controversy. I am quoting from Sherwood—and he wrote:

Stalin then expressed the opinion that it would be unwise to scatter forces in various operations through the eastern Mediterranean. He said he thought Overlord (the name given to the cross channel invasion) should be considered the basis of all operations in 1944 and that after the capture of Rome, the forces used there should be sent into southern France to provide a diversionary operation in support of Overlord. He even felt that it might be better to abandon the capture of Rome altogether, leaving 10 divisions to hold the present line in Italy and using the rest of the Allied forces for the invasion of southern France. He said it had been the experience of the Red army that it was best to launch an offensive from two converging directions, forcing the enemy to move his reserves from one front to the other. Therefore, he favored

simultaneous operations in northern and southern France, rather than the scattering of forces in the eastern Mediterranean.

We may be sure that Stalin's didactic observations fell upon Marshall's ears with the authority of revelation. It was made abundantly evident at Tehran, by his labors in behalf of Russia's military desires, that he had earned the warm approval of Stalin. On page 783 of the Sherwood record, the author notes that both Stalin and Voroshilov obviously "recognized—Marshall—as the supreme advocate of Overlord and therefore their friend."

In this same connection Sherwood notes that after Marshall had discussed the difficulties of Overlord, Voroshilov turned to him and said admiringly, "If you think about it, you will do it."

On page 791, in discussing the moot question at that time of who was to command Overlord, Sherwood repeats a report that Stalin in discussions with Roosevelt, made evident his conviction that "no wiser or more reassuring choice than Marshall could be made."

It is noteworthy that the brusque, cynical Stalin exhibited fondness for no other American at Tehran with the single exception of Hopkins, with whom he had a personal acquaintance dating from Hopkins' visit to Moscow in August of 1941 upon an errand which must have gratified the tyrant's heart. It was then that Hopkins offered the bountiful support of the United States to the Kremlin's resistance of the Nazi invaders without stint, quid pro quo, or any reservations whatsoever.

Stalin's exposition of the policy we should follow in Europe awakened the ardent support in far-off Washington of General Marshall's nominal superior, Secretary Stimson as well. Upon hearing that Stalin had vetoed the operations in the East, Stimson hurriedly called a press conference in which he commented guardedly on the results at Teheran. His comment may be found on page 440 of his memoirs. He said, and I am quoting from the book—

The presence of Premier Stalin and his companion at the conference, Marshal Voroshilov, had contributed mightily to the success of the conference. Marshal Stalin's power of lucid analysis and the fairness of his attitude contributed strongly to the solution of several long-standing problems.

The strategical fate of the Soviet Union and the United States had been so inextricably linked in Europe, the British done in, and Secretary Stimson was happy over that result. General "Hap" Arnold, who was not present because of illness, at Teheran, himself commented on the reports as he received them. His comments will be found on page 465 of Global Mission. Said Arnold:

Apparently Uncle Joe had talked straight from the shoulder about how to carry on the war against Germany and his ideas, it seems, were much more in accord with the American ideas than with those of the British.

Admiral Leahy, who was there, adds his comment after giving his own version of the Stalin speech I have quoted

from Sherwood. He wrote, and this is on page 204 of his book:

The Soviets and Americans seemed to be nearly in agreement as to the fundamental strategic principles that should be followed.

THE BALKANS ARE STAKED OUT FOR THE RED ARMY

Teheran took place, as all know, in November of 1943. The projected invasion of southern France was given the name Anvil. Although Churchill and his advisers continued to fight for the eastern operation it was manifestly a losing struggle. Churchill himself employed his stormy eloquence on Mark Clark, as that great American general was fighting his way up the Italian peninsula, assuring Clark that, given his way, the Western Powers could "slit this soft under-belly of the Axis." The Prime Minister was pursuing a lost cause. After the capture of Rome, the Fifth Army which had become, as Clark proudly asserts, "a tremendous fighting machine" with "horizons unlimited," was disrupted. Over Clark's strong protests, he lost the Sixth Corps and seven crack French divisions, all withdrawn from Anvil. Clark was compelled to abandon his drive to the Po, giving Kesselring respite, a decision that puzzled the German high command as we were to discover after their surrender. Writes Clark on page 371 of Calculated Risk: "It was a decision that was likely to puzzle historians for a much longer time." In considering his impression of that period when he sat down to write his memoirs after the war, Clark says, on page 368, and I am quoting him:

Stalin, it was evident throughout the Big Three meeting, and negotiations at Teheran, was one of the strongest boosters of the invasion of southern France. He knew exactly what he wanted in a political as well as a military way; and the thing he wanted most was to keep us out of the Balkans, which he had staked out for the Red Army. If we switched our strength from Italy to France, it was obvious to Stalin . . . that we would turn away from central Europe. Anvil led into a dead-end street. It was easy to see why Stalin favored Anvil at Teheran and why he kept right on pushing for it.

I come to a most significant passage which deals specifically with what lay before Clark and was denied him by Marshall in collaboration with Stalin. Says Clark:

After the fall of Rome, Kesselring's army could have been destroyed if we had been able to shoot the works in a final offensive. Across the Adriatic was Yugoslavia . . . and beyond Yugoslavia were Vienna, Budapest, and Prague.

At this point may I remind you that wherever the Russian armies came to rest, there they stayed and there they remain to this day. The Red armies have not relinquished one inch of the soil upon which they stood at the defeat of Germany. General Clark continues.

There was no question that the Balkans were strongly in the British mind, but so far as I ever found out, American top-level planners were not interested. It was generally understood that President Roosevelt toyed with the idea for a while but was not encouraged by Harry Hopkins. After the fall of Rome, we "ran for the wrong goal," both from a political and a strategical standpoint.

There is a note of poignancy in Mark Clark's reflections of the frustration of his great victory in northern Italy.

He has, moreover, a vantage point from which to judge the consequences because he served with the utmost distinction as the American military governor of Vienna after the war. It was there that he felt the iron determination of the Russian Empire to prevail over eastern Europe. It was there that he had ample opportunity to consider how differently things might have been had we proceeded east from the valley of the Po instead of turning our forces into the trivial and wholly unnecessary operations in southern France. General Clark concludes on page 3 of his book, and I here summon him as the most highly qualified witness in this matter:

Yet, I believe our mission was fulfilled and, save for a high level blunder that turned us away from the Balkan states and permitted them to fall under Red army control, the Mediterranean campaign might have been the most decisive of all in postwar history.

At another place, expressing his frustration over the enfeeblement of his campaign in Italy—and this is on page 368:

A campaign that might have changed the whole history of the relationships between the Western World and Soviet Russia was permitted to fade away. . . . The weakening of the campaign in Italy . . . was one of the outstanding political mistakes of the war.

I ask Senators, where today is Gen. Mark Clark, a man still in his military prime, a man of great achievement in Italy and of outstanding political and diplomatic accomplishment in Austria? Since World War II General Clark has been relegated to secondary commands. We now hear that he intends to resign from the Army at the very height of his powers and at an urgent point in our military situation.

After hearing the sentiments I have quoted from Clark, can you wonder why there is no place for him?

So also is this true of General Wedemeyer, likewise in his prime, likewise a soldier of great brilliance and great devotion to his country. Both Wedemeyer and Clark dared to oppose the judgment of General Marshall in his history-making decisions, Clark in Europe, Wedemeyer in Asia.

Where is Lucius Clay? Like MacArthur and Clark, a great proconsul; young as generals go, brilliant and steadfast in devotion not to party but to country. Clay insisted on resisting the Russians at Berlin.

Where, too, is Louis Johnson? Where is Admiral Denfeld? The lessons must be plain as a pike staff to the military leaders of our establishment. A prudent officer looking forward to his continued career and his pension, certainly has to think twice these days before he can express an objective and disinterested opinion of strategy, or the conduct of our military operations, which are so often complicated with political considerations.

General MacArthur is not the only monument to the determination of Mar-

shall with Acheson at his elbow to rule our policies now as he ruled our policies in World War II.

NO AMERICAN POLITICAL POLICY AT TEHRAN

The evidence, Mr. President, is overwhelming that at Tehran we had no political policy. It so appears in the recollections of General Deane. After observing, on page 43 of his book, *The Strange Alliance*, that "Stalin advocated the American point of view in our differences with Britain" and again that "Stalin's 'position' coincided with that of the American Chief of Staff and every word he said strengthened the support they might expect from President Roosevelt in the ultimate decision", Deane went on:

Stalin appeared to know exactly what he wanted at the conference. This was also true of Churchill, but not so of Roosevelt. This is not said as a reflection on our President but his apparent indecision was probably a direct result of our obscure foreign policy. President Roosevelt was thinking of winning the war; the others were thinking of their relative positions when the war was won. Stalin wanted the Anglo-American forces in Western and Southern Europe; Churchill thought our postwar position would be improved and British interests best served if the Anglo-Americans, as well as the Russians, participated in the occupation of the Balkans. From the political point of view, hindsight on our part points to foresight on Churchill's part.

The political immaturity of our generals, mentioned by Hanson Baldwin in his study of the great mistakes of the last war, was never so glaringly manifested as at Tehran—if, indeed, it was political immaturity and not the consequences of some hidden, and so far undisclosed, influence binding us to Stalin's world policy.

Could it be that like children, our military advisers at Tehran dwelt only in the pleasures and tasks of the day with no thought for the morrow? Could they not envisage what was so clear to many other minds that after the conclusion of hostilities the Soviet Union, conscious of its vast and violent world mission, might be ranged against us in every quarter of the globe? Or, did Marshall and his supernumeraries on the Joint Chiefs at Tehran think of England instead of Russia, as the future enemy?

Before quitting this question of the Marshall-Churchill conflict over the most important phases of the recent war, may I cite another example of the ruthlessness with which Marshall prosecuted the rift. It should be noted that Churchill, who is an indomitable adversary in the House of Commons and elsewhere, fought on against ANVIL long after his was a lost cause.

MARSHALL THREATENS TO RESIGN IF STALIN'S VIEW NOT ACCEPTED

At Malta, where the Yalta conferees on the Anglo-American side met before proceeding to that Black Sea conference, the British chiefs still persisted in the hope of accomplishing some Mediterranean operations while preparing for the attack across the Channel. In Sherwood's book, page 848, is a revealing passage concerning those discussions of

the combined chiefs, and I am now quoting Sherwood:

The arguments reached such a point that Marshall, ordinarily one of the most restrained and soft-spoken of men, announced that if the British plan were approved by the Prime Minister and the President, he would recommend to Eisenhower that he had no choice but to be relieved of his command.

Again, as in the case of the ultimatum over the "second front now" Marshall was threatening summary action unless his will prevailed. Why was it so important to Marshall that the British, as a full partner in the Anglo-American war effort, should be prevented from creating that balance of military power in the Mediterranean spoken of in the memorandum circulated by Hopkins at the first Quebec conference?

Why—we return to this question—was Marshall so determined to follow Stalin and oppose Churchill?

Marshall has found fault with MacArthur's independence. It is clear from the Malta episode, as well as other incidents, that as Chief of Staff in World War II he was always ready to overrule the judgment of his superiors up to the point of defiance.

Why did he insist upon ruling the political strategy of that war? We may find the answer before we are through documenting this record.

Before we proceed to other matters of political strategy, let us consider instances in the management of American military affairs where Marshall's actions were so bad for America.

GENERAL DEANE'S UNUSUAL INSTRUCTIONS

General Deane is an uncommonly friendly witness for George Marshall. He was Marshall's protégé having served as secretary of the combined chiefs in Washington until Marshall selected him and sent him in the fall of 1943 to go to Moscow as chief of our military mission in Russia. It should be noted that we had withdrawn our military and naval attachés from Moscow because in fulfilling the time-honored and expected duties of military attachés, they had aroused the resentment of the Kremlin. Those duties include discovering and reporting to the home government all information that can be obtained legitimately regarding the armed forces of the country to which the attachés are accredited. The information thus sought has to do with weapons, tactical programs and methods, and the size, training, and disposition of that country's military forces.

Before General Deane departed for his mission in Moscow, he had a long interview with General Marshall, in which the Chief of Staff cautioned Deane to seek no information about these matters for fear that he might "irritate" the Russians. I remind Senators that we were then devoting a substantial part of our military production to Russia's war effort, and doing so in entirely good faith. It was not long after General Deane reached Moscow that he began to be impressed with the extraordinary contrast between the Russian attitude and our own. He describes his feelings

on this subject on page 49 of his book. General Deane writes:

We had thousands of Soviet representatives in the United States who were allowed to visit our manufacturing plants, attend our schools, and witness tests of aircraft and other equipment. In Italy, and later in France and Germany, Russian representatives were welcome at our field headquarters and allowed to see anything they desired of our military operations. Our policy was to make any of our new inventions in electronics and other fields available to Russia. . . . each month I would receive a revised list of secret American equipment about which Russia could be informed in the hope that if it could be made available, it might be used on the Russian front. We never lost an opportunity to give the Russians equipment, weapons, or information which we thought might help our combined war effort.

The head of the American military mission in Moscow encountered the iron curtain long before Churchill coined the phrase. Toward the end of the war, when our always excessive solicitude seemed to him no longer warranted, he advised a more resolute attitude toward the Russians. Each time he suggested that we demand a fulfillment of an agreement—and they broke virtually every agreement we made with them—he was called off in Washington. By whom? Senators' guesses are as good as mine, but Dean's reports went directly to General Marshall.

WHO FAILED TO PROVIDE AN AMERICAN CORRIDOR TO BERLIN?

Why have we not had, and do not have at this moment, an American, or at least an allied, corridor to Berlin? Why are we at the mercy of the Russians in our access to the joint capital of the occupying powers? Why was it possible for the Russians to produce the blockade of Berlin with a simple set of instructions with which General Clay found it impossible, as a man of honor and a great American soldier, to comply?

It has been the fashion to place the blame for this lack of foresight upon the late John G. Winant. As our Ambassador to London he sat on the European Advisory Commission, which worked out under the direction of the respective governments the zoning of Germany for occupation purposes. Winant cannot answer our questions now. In his report on his great career as the American governor in Germany, *Decision in Germany*, General Clay accepts the version that shoulders the blame onto Winant. Subsequently, on page 26, he himself takes the final blame. He was in Berlin in late June of 1945 arranging with Marshal Zhukov for the entry of American forces into their occupation position in Berlin.

I pause to say to my colleagues on the floor of the Senate that it is certainly not necessary for them to stay in the Chamber to listen to a documentation which is bound to be very lengthy. Frankly, Mr. President, I do not expect my colleagues to remain in the Chamber, although I welcome their presence. I know they have other work to do. My presentation will consume many hours.

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. Gladly.

Mr. LANGER. I am sure that every colleague of the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin who is on the floor is very much interested in what he has to say. I hope that more of his colleagues will come to the floor of the Senate, because I consider the Senator's speech one of the most important speeches that has ever been made on the floor of the Senate.

Mr. McCARTHY. I thank the Senator from North Dakota very much. I may say that I have notified many of my colleagues that I would supply them with a copy of my address. Certainly I do not want them to miss the ball game this evening.

Mr. HENDRICKSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. HENDRICKSON. Mr. President, the junior Senator from New Jersey wishes to associate himself with the comments of the distinguished senior Senator from North Dakota [Mr. LANGER].

Mr. McCARTHY. I thank the Senator very much.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. WHERRY. Certainly the junior Senator from Nebraska, who represents the Republican side as minority leader, wishes to associate himself with the very able remarks made by the distinguished Senator from North Dakota [Mr. LANGER]. I wish to say that several committee meetings are being held at the moment. I know that it would be the desire of those who feel they must attend such hearings to be present to hear the Senator's speech. I will say to the Senator that his speech will be read by many Senators who are not present, as he well knows.

What we need is the kind of speech which the Senator from Wisconsin is making today. We need such a thoroughly documented speech. It states the historic background and leads up to the present moment in our foreign relations. I not only wish to corroborate what the distinguished Senator from North Dakota has said, but I wish to express my deep appreciation for the work which the Senator from Wisconsin has done in compiling such a lengthy speech. It is lengthy because it contains so much historical data, to which all of us can turn for documentation when we need it in discussing the chain of events which have led us into our present position.

Mr. McCARTHY. I thank my three colleagues very much. I deeply appreciate what they have said. It has been a monumental task. We have been working almost around the clock for about a month.

At this point I should like to pay high tribute to what I believe to be the most loyal and efficient office staff that any Senator can possibly have. I believe most of them are in the gallery today. I salute them; they worked 18, 19, and 20 hours a day in getting the document together.

The Russians were, as usual, hard to deal with. Clay was eager to get his occupation going and to have American forces on guard in Berlin. Instead of pressing the matter of a corridor under

American rule, guarded by American troops, with supply and communication beyond the reach of Russian interference, he accepted an oral understanding with Zhukov that nothing would ever occur to impede American access to Berlin. Our zonal border as you will recall, had been set at a distance of 100 miles from Berlin.

The legend which saddled the late Winant with the responsibility for this tragic blunder in postwar arrangements has been vigorously challenged by Hanson Baldwin. I have his book, in which he fixes the responsibility not on Winant but squarely on the War Department. War Department at that time meant George Catlett Marshall. From the fall of 1939 until the fall of 1946, Marshall was, in effect, the War Department. I cannot find in Mr. Stimson's memoirs any occasion on which he opposed the will of General Marshall.

I now read from page 47 of Baldwin's book, where he expresses his conviction "that the blame for Berlin cannot be laid—exclusively, or even to a major degree—upon the shoulders of Winant." Two pages later in reviewing the background of this deplorable situation, Baldwin notes that the State Department at the end of 1943 proposed that the zones of postwar occupation "be so drawn as to bring each into contact with Berlin." I hasten to remind you that Cordell Hull—not Marshall or the Red Dean Acheson—was then the Secretary of State.

I go on with Baldwin:

For some reason that defies logical understanding now, the War Department rejected this suggestion, which would have solved nearly all our postwar Berlin difficulties, so that it was never even broached in the EAC.

In February 1944, the British informally suggested that a corridor to Berlin be established and defined, but the War Department again objected stating that this was not a subject for the EAC, but that the entire question of access to Berlin was a military matter which should be settled at the proper time by military representatives.

And this eventually was the solution, but the military representatives made a botch of it. In May 1945 our allies stood deep on German soil. The zonal occupation agreements for Germany . . . placed Berlin in the Russian zone . . . In May 1945 ECA's work was done and SCAEF was briefed as to its accomplishments.

The military were told the history of the problem, according to Baldwin. They were told that the War Department had blocked any consideration of it by EAC and were advised that the EAC staff believed we should have an indisputably American corridor under our own military supervision and guard. As we have seen, neither Marshall nor Eisenhower made provision for a corridor, General Clay concluded his improvised agreement with Zhukov, and the fat was in the fire.

Why did the War Department, meaning Marshall, leave us at the mercy of the Russians in Berlin? Why did not our forces march first into Berlin? Why was General Patton not allowed to take Prague? We have only glimpses at the inner reality behind these questions. We gather from General Bradley's memoirs that Eisenhower's decision not to reach

Berlin first was conditioned to some extent by the flagrant quarrel that had arisen between Bradley and General Montgomery. In his version of the matter, appearing on page 69 of the *Life* magazine of April 30, 1951, Bradley relates a discussion with Eisenhower wherein it was decided not to allow Montgomery the forces with which to push on to Berlin. Eisenhower was principally concerned at the moment lest the armies of Russia and the English-speaking powers should meet in a head-on collision somewhere in Germany. I quote Bradley on how Eisenhower solved the problem:

Five days before Hodges and Simpson closed their trap around the Ruhr, Eisenhower radioed Stalin through the United States Military Mission in Moscow of his plan to push east with a powerful force in the center to the line of the Elbe.

The Elbe line was where Eisenhower proposed to Stalin that he would bring the American armies to rest. Eisenhower fixed this highly important point, be it noted, with Stalin. It is clear from Bradley's recollections that Eisenhower acted on this highly political question without consulting with Churchill. Whether he consulted Roosevelt and Marshall is not mentioned by Bradley. Certainly he must have consulted Marshall. I continue to quote Bradley:

Although Churchill protested Eisenhower's radio to Moscow as an unwarranted intrusion by the military into a political problem, he reserved his angriest vituperation for the plan Eisenhower had proposed. The Prime Minister, according to Eisenhower, was greatly disappointed and disturbed, that SCAEF had not reinforced Montgomery with American troops and pointed him toward Berlin in a desperate [sic] effort to capture that city before the Russians took it.

We gain another bit of insight into this situation—which provides a somewhat more startling example of command discretion than any displayed by MacArthur in Japan—from Edward Ansel Mowrer in his book, *The Nightmare of American Foreign Policy*, in which he relates having been personally told by the White House that "the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Truman to let the Russians take Berlin." The Joint Chiefs of Staff, of course, meant Marshall.

THE OBJECT OF WAR IS NOT MERELY TO KILL
THE ENEMY

We have been reviewing General Marshall's record as it applies to the war in Europe with an eye to his competence and the extent to which he backed up Stalin in political decisions. The Democrats in Denver proclaimed him "a master of global strategy." The term, of course, implies much more than purely military planning. As we have seen, when you reach the upper levels of command inhabited during the recent war by Marshall, Churchill, and Roosevelt, the military decisions blend everywhere with the political. They cannot be dissociated. A war is not conducted merely as a means of killing the enemy, although during the late war Mr. Roosevelt expressed so much joy over Russia's ac-

complishments in that line that it might be questioned if he always understood the nature of war. We have seen recently in Korea where, beggared of any respectable and intelligent war purpose, our forces have been led to believe from Marshall's testimony that the only objective of that war is to kill the enemy. I leave aside the ethical considerations raised by such an attitude and point out that the enemy's extermination is not enough. Of course, it is necessary to have the enemy's submission. But also, great powers must have some understanding of what that submission portends and what they intend to do with the world over which they will exercise sway once the enemy is defeated.

We have observed what calamities might have befallen the allied cause had Roosevelt accepted Marshall's persistent demand for a "second front now." We have seen the equivocal and dangerous nature of his counsel with reference to the North African invasion. We have observed how closely he fitted his views into those of Stalin over every major issue of the war. We have seen further how in his instructions to General Deane, his refusal to exercise foresight over the corridor to Berlin, and his wish that the Russians might first enter that great and shattered city, General Marshall's decisions paralleled the interests of the Kremlin.

The Democrats at Denver may have been correct in their appraisal of General Marshall's attainments as a strategist. The question that arises, after examining the facts we have enumerated and those we shall enumerate, is, in whose interest did he exercise his genius? If he was wholeheartedly serving the cause of the United States, these decisions were great blunders. If they followed a secret pattern to which we do not as yet have the key, they may very well have been successful in the highest degree.

I DEAL WITH MARSHALL'S ACTS—NOT HIS MOTIVES

I do not at this time discuss the question of whether General Marshall was aware that he was implementing the will of Stalin in these matters. I do not propose to go into his motives. Unless one has all the tangled and often complicated circumstances contributing to a man's decisions, an inquiry into his motives is often fruitless. I do not pretend to understand General Marshall's nature and character, and I shall leave that subject to subtler analysts of human personality.

YALTA—CHINA FOR SALE

We turn now to the Pacific side of the recent global war and an examination of General Marshall's behavior in that vast theater. However, before doing so, I should like to refer to another phase of Marshall's activities.

On Friday, June 16, 1948, when Marshall was Secretary of State, a Mr. Robert C. Alexander, in the visa division of the Department of State, testified under oath in regard to what he thought the truth was. He told about the num-

ber of Communists who were being allowed to enter the United States under the aegis of the United Nations. Senators will recall the facts in that connection. Let us see what Marshall, who then was Secretary of State, did. We should remember that Alexander testified under oath about the entry of Communists into the United States.

On September 9, 1948, Alexander, who had honestly testified before the committee, received from the State Department a notice informing him that he was to be disciplined, but let me read the first paragraph of the letter:

The Department proposes to take appropriate disciplinary action against you for misconduct in office and dereliction of duty.

Note those words, Mr. President.

I read further from the letter:

The intended action grows out of your testimony and inferences arising from your statements made before the staff of the Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate.

The Senator from Nevada [Mr. McCARRAN] wrote to Admiral Hillenkoetter sometime later—in fact, it was quite sometime later, being on June 30, 1949. I read from his letter:

DEAR ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER: There is attached to this letter a list of the names of 100 persons.

Of course, Mr. President, those were names given by the witness, Alexander.

I read further from the letter:

This is a partial list of those persons to whom visas have been issued for admission into the United States either as affiliates of international organizations or as officials or employees of foreign governments, and their families—

And so forth. The Senator from Nevada asked Admiral Hillenkoetter to inform him whether those persons were Communists.

Admiral Hillenkoetter, the head of the Central Intelligence Agency, replied to the Senator from Nevada by means of a letter in which the following is stated:

Thirty-two of the individuals named in your attached list have reportedly or allegedly been engaged in active work for the intelligence services of their respective countries.

Mr. President, listen to this:

Twenty-nine of the individuals named in your attached letters are high-ranking Communist Party officials.

I wonder whether Senators get the awfulness of that picture. The witness Alexander, under oath, says, in effect, Communists are being admitted to the United States. Here are their names, Marshall says, "We will take disciplinary action against you for telling the people of this country the truth," and then the head of our Central Intelligence Agency is given a list of 100 names of individuals named by Alexander, whom Marshall would discipline, and the head of Central Intelligence Agency says that 29 of them are high-ranking members of the Communist Party. That was Marshall as Secretary of State.

Let us examine Marshall's behavior in the vast Pacific theater. We must first consider what went on at Yalta. If, as Hanson Baldwin observes, we lost the peace because of great military mistakes in World War II, then it is clear that those mistakes culminated in the controlling decisions made at the conferences of Tehran and Yalta. It is my judgment, Mr. President, that we lost the peace in Europe at Tehran. It is even clearer that we lost the peace in Asia at Yalta. At Tehran, Marshall's will prevailed in concert with that of Stalin regarding the Mediterranean. At Yalta, Marshall's will prevailed with that of Stalin regarding Russia's entry into the far-eastern war as a full-fledged partner entitled to the spoils of such participation.

What happened at Yalta had enormous consequences for every American, especially for the men who are upholding the honor of our country in Korea. As we all know, Yalta is a former resort of the Romanoff czars on the shores of the Black Sea. Yalta is where Roosevelt, already suffering from the enfeeblement that brought his death 4 months hence, went to meet again with the bloody autocrat of Russia and the Churchill with whom he had signally differed at Tehran.

The President, bearing the marks of his approaching dissolution, traveled the thousands of weary miles by plane, by ship, and, at the end, by motorcar, to treat with the tyrant, to seek accord with him, and to make the bargains over Poland and China that today plague and shame us all. The principle, the most utterly damaging of these bargains was over China in the bribe he paid to Stalin for his eleventh-hour participation in the war against Japan.

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CLEMENTS in the chair). Does the Senator from Wisconsin yield to the Senator from North Dakota?

Mr. McCARTHY. I am glad to yield to the Senator from North Dakota.

Mr. LANGER. In view of the interpolation of the Alexander matter and the reference to the letter of the Senator from Nevada [Mr. McCARRAN], does the Senator from Wisconsin mind placing in the Record the letter of the Senator from Nevada and the reply thereto, in which it was stated that 29 of these top men were Communists?

Mr. McCARTHY. That is an excellent idea. I ask unanimous consent to insert in the Record at this point in my remarks a letter written under date of June 30, 1949, by the Senator from Nevada [Mr. McCARRAN]. It appears on page 357 of the hearings before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate, in regard to Communist activities among aliens and national groups. I also ask to have printed in the Record at this point in my remarks the reply thereto of Admiral Hillenkoetter, dated July 13, 1949, which appears on pages 358-360 of the same volume.

There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION,
June 30, 1949.

Rear Adm. ROSCOE H. HILLENKOTTER,
United States Navy Central Intelligence
Agency, Washington, D. C.

DEAR ADMIRAL HILLENKOTTER: There is attached to this letter a list of the names of 100 persons. This is a partial list of those persons to whom visas have been issued for admissions into the United States either as affiliates of international organizations or as officials or employees of foreign governments, and their families.

Without disclosing the name or indicating the identity of any such person, and without revealing the sources of information contained in the files of the Central Intelligence Agency, you are respectfully requested to furnish me an answer to each of the following questions, for inclusion in the public record of the Senate Immigration and Naturalization Subcommittee.

1. How many of the persons whose names appear on the attached list have been engaged in subversive activity prior to their assumption of official duty in the United States as affiliates of international organizations or as officials or employees of foreign governments? The term "subversive activity" as used in this question denotes active participation in foreign intelligence organizations or active Communist organizational work, rather than mere membership in the Communist Party.

2. Describe a typical pattern or typical patterns of such subversive activity and a typical background or typical backgrounds of such persons who have been engaged in such subversive activity.

3. Describe in general terms the extent to which foreign governments are utilizing their officials and employees in this country, and their membership, in international organizations, for active intelligence work against the United States.

4. Describe in general terms the extent to which foreign governments are utilizing their officials and employees in this country, and their membership in international organizations, for active direction of and participation in subversive organizations in the United States.

I should be obliged if you will cause your answers to the foregoing questions to be transmitted to me as soon as possible.

With kindest regards, I am,
Sincerely,

PAT McCARRAN,
Chairman.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
Washington, July 13, 1949.
The Honorable PAT McCARRAN,
Chairman, Senate Committee on the
Judiciary,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter of June 30, 1949, requesting answers to certain questions contained therein for inclusion in the public record of the Immigration and Naturalization Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.

I wish to point out that section 102 (4) (3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (Public Law 253, 80th Cong.), which established the Central Intelligence Agency, specifically provides that the Agency shall have no police, law-enforcement, or internal security powers and functions. For this reason our answer to question 1 of your letter,

concerning the list of 100 foreigners which you attached, is restricted to our knowledge of the activities of these persons abroad and not to their activities in the United States. The latter information is completely within the jurisdiction of other agencies of the Government.

Similarly, our answer to question 2 of your letter is based on typical patterns and backgrounds of subversive activity engaged in by Soviet and satellite diplomatic officials abroad.

In view of the reasons set forth above, we have not given detailed answers to your questions 3 and 4. However, the patterns set forth in our answer to question 2 may well be duplicated in this country. The extent to which it is being done, however, and the details of this apparatus lie completely within the jurisdiction of the FBI of the Department of Justice, and detailed answers, if available, must come from them in view of the legal limitations on CIA as to internal security functions.

Question 1. "How many of the persons whose names appear on the attached list have been engaged in subversive activity prior to their assumption of official duty in the United States as affiliates of international organizations or as officials or employees of foreign governments? The term 'subversive activity' as used in this question denotes participation in foreign intelligence organizations or active Communist organizational work, rather than mere membership in the Communist Party."

Answer. In view of the definition of "subversive activity" contained in this question, we have organized our answer in accordance with this definition:

(a) Thirty-two of the individuals named in your attached list have reportedly or allegedly been engaged in active work for the intelligence services of their respective countries.

(b) Twenty-nine of the individuals named in your attached list are high-ranking Communist Party officials. It must be assumed that by virtue of their positions they are working ardently for the benefit of their government. This activity, by definition, and in the light of known Communist methods, must be considered to be subversive and against the interests of the United States.

(c) Twenty-one of the individuals named in your attached list have reportedly or allegedly been engaged in active Communist organizational work of an underground or subversive nature outside their homelands.

(d) Fifteen of the individuals named in your attached list are not included in our files with data pertinent to the questions asked.

(e) Three of the individuals named in your attached list reportedly show definite pro-American sympathies and/or disaffection with Communist ideology.

Question 2. "Describe a typical pattern or typical patterns of such subversive activity and a typical background or typical backgrounds of such persons who have been engaged in such subversive activity."

Answer. Typical pattern. (a) Reporting on political, economic, industrial, and military conditions of the country concerned. This activity is carried out both through the collection of overt information from newspapers, periodicals, or radio, and through agents placed within strategic installations. As a corollary to this activity, an attempt is made to recruit and place agents against the time when the diplomatic official is required to his homeland.

(b) Arrangement of communications facilities through which agents can make their reports either to Soviet or satellite diplomatic installations within the country, or

directly to the homeland. In this connection, reports have been received of attempts of these officials to organize Communist Party cells among seamen serving on vessels sailing to the homeland. These seamen are then utilized as couriers.

(c) Surveillance of, and controlling, the activities of Soviet and satellite diplomatic personnel assigned to the country concerned as well as the activities of delegates from the homeland who enter the country to attend conventions or meetings, assuring that such personnel do not defect or become politically unreliable through contact with western influences.

(d) Disseminating party line propaganda within the foreign country. Also sending propaganda about conditions in the country back to the homelands in the form of articles designed to encourage unfavorable sentiment against this country.

(e) Work with immigrant groups who have settled in the country from the homeland or with citizens with former homeland connections. This activity is apparently regarded as particularly important. Attempts are made to activate Communist groups within immigrant elements. Immigrants are encouraged to send the more stable currency of the country back to the homeland where, when exchanged at an official rate, it represents a considerable income for the homeland government. Efforts are made to recruit immigrants to work for the homeland government and to use their established businesses, such as shipping or export-import firms, as a cover for the intelligence activities of the homeland. Networks are organized within immigrant groups in order to check native personnel abroad, to control immigrants and former natives and indoctrinate them in the party line. Strong efforts are made to break up an anti-Soviet or anti-satellite sentiments among immigrant groups. Attempts are also made to establish financial and commercial contacts with the immigrant groups for the benefit of the homeland.

(f) Act as intermediaries between the Communist Party of the foreign country concerned and the Communist Party of the homeland. Maintain communications and often procure funds for the homeland Communist Party.

(g) Organize pressure groups within the foreign country concerned in order to combat certain political or military measures being considered by that country which are deemed unfavorable toward the Soviet-satellite axis.

Typical background: Soviet and satellite diplomatic officials who have been selected to carry out espionage or subversive activities in foreign countries vary widely in their backgrounds, qualifications, and training. A study, however, of available background information has disclosed certain characteristics which it may be of interest to note.

Primarily, the official chosen is an individual in whom the Communist regime of his homeland places the greatest confidence as to political reliability. He is often an old line Communist who has served the party faithfully over a period of years. Many of these satellite officials have spent some time in the Soviet Union and some have served in the Soviet Army. Others have gained their position in the Communist hierarchy through their service with partisan guerrillas during the war.

Many of the official have records of long-time diplomatic careers in the service of their countries. These often are described as unscrupulous and opportunistic individuals who find it to their advantage to serve faithfully the regime in power. That they serve well is implicit in the confidence which the Communists apparently place in them.

It is of interest to note that many of these officials have had legal training and have practiced as lawyers. Quite a few also have journalistic backgrounds. Not much men-

tion is made of technical espionage training, although it may be assumed that many, particularly the old-line Communists and those who have visited the U. S. S. R., have received indoctrination of this type.

It is of further interest that the wives of many of these men are ardent Communists in their own right and occasionally even act as agents themselves. They are mentioned as exerting strong influences on their husbands.

In conclusion, these officials do not appear to be, in most cases, men of high moral standards or idealistic motivation. Many of them are described as clever, unscrupulous, opportunistic, ambitious, and given to shady financial deals or occasional black marketing.

I hope that this information may be of value to you in connection with your subcommittee's investigation. If there is any further assistance which I can render, please feel free to call upon me in this connection. Sincerely yours,

R. H. HILLENKOTTER,
Rear Admiral, USN, Director of Central Intelligence.

Mr. MCCARTHY. I also ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record at this point in my remarks, a letter dated September 9, 1948, written by Arch K. Jean, Chief, Division of Departmental Personnel, of the Department of State, to Robert C. Alexander, Assistant Chief, Visa Division, Department of State; and also two newspaper articles, one, bearing the headline "Marshall Naming Committee To Investigate U. N.'s Aliens," which was published in the New York Sun, on July 28, 1948; the other, an article entitled "Alexander Refuses To Attend 'Secret' Trial by State Department," published in the Washington Post of October 6, 1948.

There being no objection, the letter and newspaper articles were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, September 9, 1948.

Mr. ROBERT C. ALEXANDER,
Assistant Chief, Visa Division,
Department of State.

MY DEAR MR. ALEXANDER: The Department proposes to take appropriate disciplinary action against you, in accordance with the provisions of Public Law 623, Eightieth Congress, and civil service regulations issued in conformance therewith, for misconduct in office and dereliction of duty. The intended action grows out of your testimony and inferences arising from your statements made before the staff of the Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate.

The testimony in question appears on the following pages of the stenographic transcript of hearings before the afore-mentioned subcommittee as reported by the official reporters (Hart, Alderson, McCabe and Harkins); Thursday, July 15, 1948, volume 1, pages 98 to 105, inclusive, and pages 129, 130, 134, and 135; Friday, July 16, 1948, volume 2, pages 154 to 167, inclusive.

Specifically, the Department charges that this testimony was irresponsibly made and at variance with the facts. In the opinion of the Department, this testimony constituted an indiscriminate reflection on the United Nations and other international organizations, and consequently embarrassed the Department.

The Department further charges that you failed to make serious and persistent efforts to acquaint the responsible policy-making officials of the Department on a matter of high policy relating to a condition which you felt should be corrected in the interests of our national security.

As provided in Civil Service Regulations Nos. 9.101 and 9.102, you are hereby given 10 days from the date of this letter to reply in writing to the charges mentioned above.

If you wish, an informal hearing will be conducted to enable you to present facts and any extenuating circumstances which you consider may have a bearing on the disciplinary action to be taken against you.

Please advise this office within 3 days of the receipt of this letter whether you desire a hearing in addition to the opportunity to reply in writing to the charges. Following the receipt of your reply and at the conclusion of the hearing, should one be held, a decision will be made as to the disciplinary action to be taken against you.

Copies of hearing transcript and other material pertinent to your reply will be made available to you upon request.

Very truly yours,
ARCH K. JEAN,
Chief, Division of Departmental
Personnel
(For the Secretary of State).

[From the New York Sun of July 28, 1948]
MARSHALL NAMING COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE U. N.'S ALIENS—APPOINTING THREE DISTINGUISHED CITIZENS TO DETERMINE WHETHER FOREIGNERS WORKING FOR AGENCY ENDANGER UNITED STATES SECURITY

WASHINGTON, July 28.—Secretary of State Marshall announced today that he is creating a committee of three citizens to investigate whether the United Nations is bringing persons into this country who are a danger to American security.

Marshall declined to announce at a news conference the names of the three citizens, but he promised that they would be given out later. He described the three as distinguished citizens.

The investigation will cover all classes of persons associated with the United Nations, Marshall said, including foreign delegations and their staffs, newspapermen, and other reporters, members of specialized U. N. agencies, and the staff of Secretary-General Trygve Lie.

[At Lake Success, Arkady A. Sobolev, Acting Secretary General of the United Nations, declared that neither the United States nor any other nation has a legal right to investigate U. N. officials or conduct an inquiry on U. N. property. He added, however, that the U. N. had nothing to hide.]

The investigation grows out of testimony of two State Department officials before a congressional committee that hundreds of secret agents from Europe's Communist countries may be using U. N. credentials as a means of getting into the United States to stir up trouble.

INITIAL INQUIRY FRUITLESS

Marshall reiterated today what he said a week ago after this testimony came out: that he knew of no instances in which any person here on United Nations credentials had actually jeopardized the security of the United States by actions outside his official duties. Since then, he said, he has been having what he called a very careful check made of all records. That inquiry has developed nothing so far, he said.

Then he announced that he had started the setting up of a committee of distinguished citizens to investigate the whole issue and determine whether the United Nations or related agencies, such as the U. N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, have provided means of entry into this country for people whose actions are against American security.

SAYS U. N. WELCOMES INQUIRY

Arkady A. Sobolev, Acting Secretary-General, said at Lake Success today that the United Nations had nothing to hide. Commenting on an announcement in Washing-

ton by Secretary of State Marshall that he is setting up a committee of three citizens to investigate United Nations personnel and delegations, Sobolev said:

"The United Nations welcomes any public discussion of this matter. We have nothing to hide."

He would not comment further. He added that he could not speak for U. N. delegations.

Sobolev returned yesterday from a vacation at home in Russia. He is acting Secretary-General while Trygve Lie is in Europe on a tour of U. N. centers.

[From the Washington Post of October 6, 1948]

ALEXANDER REFUSES TO ATTEND "SECRET" TRIAL BY STATE DEPARTMENT

A secret "trial" of State Department Officer Robert C. Alexander on charges of misconduct had to be called off yesterday when the accused official refused to show up.

Alexander, Assistant Chief of the Department's Visa Division, boycotted the scheduled hearing and in effect, challenged his superiors to convict him without a public review of the charges.

Alexander said he would not submit to a secret cross-examination by Arch C. Jean, the State Department personnel chief who was to have decided his case.

The charges stemmed from Alexander's testimony to a congressional committee last summer that subversive aliens were getting into the country under the protection of the United Nations.

His testimony was contradicted by his department superiors all the way up to Secretary of State George C. Marshall. A committee of three private citizens appointed by Marshall to investigate denounced Alexander's allegations as irresponsible and untrue.

Alexander, who claims immunity for his congressional testimony, has denied in writing that he was guilty of misconduct and has threatened libel action against the three investigators.

BACKGROUND OF MANCHURIAN DEAL

Mr. McCARTHY. I beg leave to remind you, Mr. President, of the history of those parts before proceeding to the terms of this bargain. Manchuria, as you know, Mr. President, is the richest part of China. In terms of area and natural resources it may be described as the Texas of China. But Manchuria has not been China's to enjoy for many years. It must be recalled, and this is a key to much of China's fearful history during the last generation, that the age-old empire of China came to its end in the years before World War I. The causes of that event need not take up too much of our time. The imperial court, presided over by the aged dowager empress, was beset by western ideas, western-trained Chinese reformers, notably Dr. Sun Yat-sen, by the incompetence of the empress' advisers and by the conflicting and greedy claims of the Great Powers. And so it fell, and for a generation China has known neither peace nor freedom from foreign invasion.

Manchuria itself has been the scene and occasion of wars for more than half a century. Japan and Russia alike have fought for its mastery since the Sino-Japanese War of 1894. When, after that war, the Japanese were prevented by the European powers from enjoying the fruits of victory in Manchuria, Russia lunged down from the Maritime Provinces of Siberia to fill that vacuum.

By the year 1904, Japan felt strong enough to challenge Russia over Manchuria. That was what the Russo-Japanese War was about, a war in which, Theodore Roosevelt backed Japan by deed and sentiment, out of a fear of the growing might of Russia in eastern Asia. Theodore Roosevelt was solely pursuing American interest and when he saw that Japan, if it won too conclusive a victory, might succeed to Russia's mantle and advance farther into China, Roosevelt intervened. He brought the Japanese and Russians together at Portsmouth, N. H., to negotiate a peace which checked Japanese ambitions even as it also ended Russian sway in Manchuria.

The intervening years saw a steady encroachment by Japan over Manchuria, an encroachment viewed with alarm by the single-minded Americans who then conducted our foreign policies, until the climax was reached in 1937 when Japan launched full-scale war against China for undisputed control of Manchuria and northern China. Korea, which is a geographical dependency of Manchuria, had, of course, been sacrificed to Japan's imperial ambitions along the route and had long since been integrated into the empire of Nippon.

The historic route of the invaders of China has been from the north. During many centuries China has mounted guard on its northern frontiers against the peoples of Manchuria, Mongolia, and Siberia, who have, for as many centuries, been regarded as barbarians by the civilized Chinese. Manchuria has been the key to the security of China since the Manchu conquest now nearly four centuries ago. This fact we should remember and consider, as we remember Yalta.

CHIANG KAI-SHEK EXCLUDED FROM YALTA CONFERENCE

It was a rich, highly developed Manchuria that was at stake at Yalta. It was Manchuria which Roosevelt thrust upon the Russians, who had plotted the gift; it was, moreover, conferred upon the new barbarians will full understanding that the United States was thereby satisfying an old imperialistic design of the Kremlin. The very language of the secret protocol which sealed the bargain at Yalta recognized this fact. What Roosevelt ceded to Stalin at Yalta, without the knowledge or consent of the Chinese, whose sovereignty there we always had upheld, was, and I quote from the work of Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Roosevelt and the Russians, page 93, in restoration of "the former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904." The testimony before the Senate committee shows that Chiang Kai-shek was not invited to the Yalta conference and that the terms of the agreement selling out Chinese interests were kept secret from him. That at the Cairo conference it was solemnly agreed with him that China's rights—which were sold out to Stalin at Yalta—would be fully respected and protected. When Wedemeyer appeared before the Russell committee, he testified that when Ambassador Hurley informed Chiang Kai-shek of the Yalta agreement which sealed the doom of the Republic of

China, Chiang was so shocked that he asked Hurley to repeat it before he could believe it.

The project was not disguised. It was a nakedly imperialistic aggression over the prostrate body of China. What Roosevelt sealed and delivered in the protocol agreed upon by him and Stalin in a secret parley consuming only 11 minutes, and thereafter kept locked away in a White House safe for many months, were what he conceded to be the historic levers of power over China—the ports of Dairen and Port Arthur and the Chinese Eastern and South Manchurian railways. It was through those ports and along those railways, with their armed guards and command of all the communications, including the telegraph lines, that first Russia, then Japan, and now again Russia, with her satellite, exercised mastery over Manchuria.

According to the terms of the bribe, drawn up in Moscow by that elusive statesman of the half world in which our relations with Russia dwell, Averell Harriman, Dairen was to be "internationalized," the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union being safeguarded, and "the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the U. S. S. R. restored." I have quoted from the protocol as published by Stettinius. I again quote, "the Chinese Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad, which provides an outlet to Dairen, shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese company, it being understood that the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria." There were other provisions. Russia's long-standing protectorate over Outer Mongolia was ratified, the southern end of Sakhalin, of which Russia was deprived by the treaty of Portsmouth, was restored to her end, as if to boot, the Kuriles were handed her. The Kuriles had been Japanese, never Russian.

What shall we say of Roosevelt's cynical submission to Russian imperialism in that deal? This was the Roosevelt, mark you, who is represented to us in Sumner Welles' book, Seven Decisions That Shaped History, as the high-principled opponent of imperialism in Hong Kong and India. This is the Roosevelt who steadfastly through the war sought to persuade Churchill to get out of India and surrender the British leasehold of Hong Kong. This was the Roosevelt who proposed to Stalin at Yalta, and I find this in Sherwood on page 866, that Hong Kong be handed to the Chinese or internationalized and that colony turned over to a United Nations trusteeship. This was the Roosevelt who suggested that French Indochina be placed under a trusteeship. He broached this idea to Sumner Welles.

THE HYPOCRISY OF THE PHONY LIBERALS

What does this whole sordid transaction teach us about the good faith of the advisers of Roosevelt and the assorted liberals, Communists, Communist sympathizers, and agents of the Kremlin—the Achesons, the Lattimores, the Philip Jessups, and the Institute of

Pacific Relations—the whole sorry crew who have for so long been insincerely befuddling the people with talk of imperialism and people's rights in Asia?

Why, merely this, Mr. President, that in their minds the imperialism of the west, that decaying instrument of European expansion, is wicked and must be opposed. The imperialism of Russia is not only commendable but must be advanced by every means of diplomacy and war at whatever cost to the United States. That is the liberal-leftist doctrine on imperialism. Have we heard one liberal voice raised in this Chamber or elsewhere in condemnation of Roosevelt's surrender to Russian imperialism at Yalta? This is the test, and by it we may measure the monstrous hypocrisy of the self-proclaimed liberal elements in this Chamber and in the country which have assisted in and applauded the surrender of all China to Russia without the firing of a single Russian shot.

The record of our betrayal of Poland, of our friends in Yugoslavia and, in truth, of all Eastern Europe, is shameful enough but the pages of our history have never been blackened by a more immoral, a more illiberal sell-out of a friendly nation which put its unjustified trust in us.

The apologists for Mr. Roosevelt have attempted to palliate his offense. Robert Sherwood suggests that Roosevelt was tired. I quote him, "had it not been that the Yalta conference was almost at an end and he was tired and anxious to avoid further argument," Roosevelt, in his opinion, might have refused to sign the protocol. This is on page 867 of "Roosevelt and Hopkins." Yet on the preceding page he nullifies the argument of fatigue by conceding, I quote, "it is quite clear that Roosevelt had been prepared even before the Tehran conference in 1943 to agree to the legitimacy of most if not all of the Soviet claims in the Far East, for they involved the restoration of possessions and privileges taken by the Japanese from the Russians in the war of 1904." And Sherwood elsewhere reports Roosevelt offering Stalin the "warm water port" of Dairen as early as Tehran. Mr. Sherwood is, as all know, a fervent and practicing "liberal." He sees nothing wrong in restoring the imperialistic "possessions and privileges" which had been wrested from a dying Chinese empire by the forces of czarism. The insincerity, the speciousness, the nonlogical workings of the liberal mind when it comes to deal with Asia are clearly manifested by Mr. Sherwood. Mr. Welles presents a better case. He, too, is a "liberal" but with a higher sense of responsibility to history. I need not introduce Mr. Welles to you. He served in the Department of State until the fall of 1943 when his long-standing feud with Cordell Hull brought about the termination of his public service. Mr. Welles was Under Secretary of State when dismissed. His book, "Seven Decisions That Shaped History," is an apologia for his late chief, Roosevelt, and a justification for certain events in his own career.

Mr. Welles insists that Roosevelt's betrayal of China and the United States at Yalta is excusable. On what ground? "The ground of military necessity." When Roosevelt acted, according to Welles, he did so because he believed that we must entice Stalin into committing what we see as a plain act of self-interest, namely, getting into the war against Japan before it was too late. The President made that judgment because he had been advised by his military advisers, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that we had a long, hard row to hoe with the Japanese in January of 1945 and that without Russia's help we might not achieve victory.

That is the Welles doctrine. It is likewise the Marshall-Acheson-State Department line. Where Welles differs is that he exposes that the military advice upon which Roosevelt acted was false and misleading. And where does pursuit of this rationalization lead us?

And we might suppose—to Marshall.

FALSIFICATION OF INTELLIGENCE REPORTS TO MISLEAD ROOSEVELT

It was Marshall who stood at Roosevelt's elbow at Yalta, urging the grim necessity of bribing Stalin to get into the war. It was Marshall who submitted intelligence reports to support his argument, suppressing more truthful estimates, as we are informed in Hanson Baldwin's book on page 81, and keeping from the stricken Roosevelt knowledge that the Japanese were even then feeling for peace in acknowledgment of defeat.

Was this a sincere endeavor by the master of global strategy to advance American interest? Did we sorely need Russian assistance? Or was it another in the baffling and frightening pattern of General Marshall's interventions in the course of the great war which conduced to the well-being of the Kremlin? I leave you to judge after I have traced out this development in the detail it deserves.

It should be remembered that major portions of the Yalta agreement were drafted by three men working together—Alger Hiss, Gromyko, and Jebb. In that connection, there should be recalled the words of Arthur Bliss Lane, our Ambassador to Poland, when he first read the agreement. He said:

As I glanced over the document, I could not believe my eyes. Every line spoke a complete surrender to Stalin.

Hiss alone should not bear the odium of this agreement because he, Gromyko, and Jebb, drafted it. Marshall was much higher in the councils of Roosevelt, and unless he approved the document it would not have been signed. Certainly he and Hiss discussed details of the agreement.

The desire to have Russia's help in the Far East arose with Marshall and was embodied, as we know, in the pregnant, fateful appeasement memorandum of the first Quebec conference in August of 1943; the document which has charted our course of appeasement, at Tehran and Yalta, and thereafter. The desire to entice Russia into the Japanese war was officially embodied in a combined Chiefs of Staff doctrine which I

have previously discussed and which was presented at second Quebec, in September of 1944. Back in the fall of 1943 the President sent Averell Harriman to Moscow as his ambassador and Marshall sent General Deane, their "prime objective," as Deane describes it on page 25 of his book, being "to induce Soviet participation in the war with Japan."

Were inducements necessary? Was it in the Kremlin's interest to become a full-fledged combatant in the war in the Far East, to take part in the defeat of Japan and have a seat at the peace table where the spoils of war would be divided? Was it to the Kremlin's interest to march its armies into Manchuria, from which they had been barred since 1905 by the Kwantung army, and to be in possession there when the war ended? If some Americans did not grasp the strategic importance of Manchuria, there is certainly abundant evidence that the Kremlin, faithful to Lenin's dictum that "He who controls China controls the world," never lost sight of it. To ask these questions is to answer them, even if we lacked the indications of Stalin's determination to be in at the far-eastern kill, which we have. I ask any of my colleagues if they do not know the answers for certain. Of course they do. Any intelligent American, after giving the matter sufficient thought, would know that the aim of Roosevelt and Marshall at Yalta should have been not how to get the Russians in, but how to keep them out.

I have evidence here of four occasions before Yalta on which Stalin indicated to American officials his desires in this respect. The first such suggestion was made to Averell Harriman when, in August of 1942, he went to Moscow with Churchill to deliver the word that the operations in North Africa had been substituted for the second front now so exigently demanded by Stalin—and Marshall. The occasion is reported by General Deane on page 226 of his book, where he says:

Stalin told Harriman then that Japan was the historic enemy of Russia and that her eventual defeat was essential to Russian interests. He implied that while the Soviet Union's military position at that time would not permit her participation, eventually she would come in.

Roosevelt knew of this; so, presumably, did Marshall. It should be noted that Stalin ascribed Russian interests as his motive for fighting Japan.

The Red czar next informed Gen. Pat Hurley of his intentions. And in April of 1943 Hurley so reported to Admiral Leahy. The reference is on page 147 of Leahy's book, and I quote him:

Hurley saw Stalin . . . and the Marshal told him that after Germany was defeated, he would assist America in the war against Japan. . . . The (our) Army, in its plans for the defeat of Japan, was anxious to have the help of Russia. It was my opinion that we could defeat Japan without Russian assistance.

The stouthearted old sea dog Leahy held to that opinion throughout, being overborne always by Marshall. The history of the war in the Far East and our postwar loss of China, with the result-

ant war in Korea, would have been far different had Leahy been, as his rank prescribed, the principal military adviser to Roosevelt. That was not to be. The iron will of Marshall prevailed over Leahy, as it did over Roosevelt and after the invasion of Italy over Churchill.

I digress to give Senators the substance of Leahy's opposition to asking the Russians in, because it bears so pertinently on the issue and because Leahy's qualifications were so high, his reasoning so sound and so soundly American. In the record of World War II, where Leahy occupies an honorable place, no question can arise at any time as to where his loyalties lie.

MARSHALL AND MACARTHUR DISAGREE ON NECESSITY OF LAND INVASION OF JAPAN

In the strategical discussions about how to end the war with Japan, Marshall urged that a land invasion was necessary; an invasion beginning in the southern islands of the Japanese home-lands and proceeding north; an invasion requiring upward of 2,000,000 riflemen and entailing, according to Marshall's estimates, casualties of a half million.

Leahy reports a conference at the White House on the 10th of July 1944. This is on page 245 of his book. Wrote Leahy,

It was my opinion, and I urged it strongly on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that no major land invasion of the Japanese mainland was necessary to win the war.

Far more impelling even than Leahy's own judgment was the agreement he reported, page 251, between General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz at Honolulu on that point. Leahy accompanied Roosevelt, it will be recalled, on that excursion, which coincided with the Democratic National Convention of 1944. He attended the conversations at which the President and the Army and Navy commanders in the Pacific projected victory over Japan. These—Nimitz and MacArthur—were the true experts on the Pacific. Let us have their judgment and Leahy's conclusions thereon:

The agreement on fundamental strategy to be employed in defeating Japan and the President's familiarity with the situation acquired at this conference were to be of great value in preventing an unnecessary invasion of Japan which the planning staffs of the Joint Chiefs and the War Department were advocating, regardless of the loss of life that would result from an attack on Japan's ground forces in their own country. MacArthur and Nimitz were now in agreement that the Philippines should be recovered with ground and air power then available in the western Pacific and that Japan could be forced to accept our terms of surrender by the use of sea and air power without an invasion of the Japanese homeland.

There we have the strategy of MacArthur, Nimitz, and Leahy for winning the war in the Pacific—but not Marshall's. Who was right?

MARSHALL INSISTS ON LAND INVASION OF JAPAN OVER OBJECTIONS OF MACARTHUR AND NIMITZ

Yet despite this expert advice Marshall persisted. At the staff discussions before second Quebec, 2 months later, Leahy had this to report on page 259:

By the beginning of September, Japan was almost defeated through a practically com-

plete sea and air blockade. However, a proposal was made by the Army (meaning Marshall) to force a surrender of Japan by an amphibious invasion of the main islands through the island of Kyushu. * * * The Army did not appear to be able to understand that the Navy, with some Army air assistance, already had defeated Japan. The Army not only was planning a huge land invasion of Japan, but was convinced that we needed Russian assistance as well to bring the war against Japan to a successful conclusion.

This willingness on Marshall's part to sacrifice hundreds of thousands or millions of American boys in an invasion of Japan which MacArthur and Nimitz, who were in charge, considered unnecessary, when coupled with his frenzied attempt to obtain the Stalin-requested cross-channel invasion of Europe in 1942, despite the inevitable, using Churchill's words, "English Channel of blood," makes doubly significant his willingness to conduct an endless war of death and destruction on both sides in Korea rather than run the risk of offending Soviet Russia by winning a quick victory as suggested by MacArthur in Korea.

So much for the strategy of the matter.

RUSSIAN INTENTIONS

I return to the indications of Russia's intentions in the Far East. Cordell Hull was the unexpected and extremely gratified recipient of the third such proffer of help in the Far East. The venerable Secretary of State, an upright and proud man, although he did not wholly understand the currents of high policy that swirled about him, went to Moscow in October of 1943 to attend a conference of the Allied foreign ministers. It was a momentous occasion for Mr. Hull, the crowning accomplishment of a lifetime devoted to public service. At that time Mr. Hull suffered from the current credulity about Russia's good faith in the highest American circles. He was insisting, to the annoyance of subtler minds about him, that Russia was one nation, Britain another, equal in merit as in menace, and that we must treat them with equal and exact consideration. A fair-spoken man himself, Mr. Hull assumed that he was dealing with men of like scruple.

On the final night of his stay in Moscow, Mr. Hull attended the usual state banquet with which the master of the Kremlin regales his visitors. The banquet took place in the Hall of Catherine the Great at the Kremlin. They dined upon gold plate and drank innumerable toasts from heavy crystal.

Mr. Hull felt himself honored at being on the right of the prime author of world misfortune. After having suitably flattered Stalin, Hull was "astonished and delighted" when the marshal turned to him and said, as recorded on page 1309 of Mr. Hull's "Memoirs":

Clearly and unequivocally that, when the Allies had succeeded in defeating Germany, the Soviet Union would then join in defeating Japan. Stalin had brought up this subject entirely on his own. * * * He finished by saying that I could inform President Roosevelt of this in the strictest confidence. I thanked him heartily.

The Secretary of State lost no time in cabling the promise to Roosevelt, using

both the Army and Navy ciphers in the hope of keeping the news from the British. It was Mr. Hull's belief, a belief too often verified, that the Foreign Office in London leaked secrets.

In his reflections over Yalta—Hull had by then resigned—he seemed to think it passing strange that Roosevelt had had to acquire Stalin's assistance by means of "numerous territorial concessions." He added, "When Stalin made his promise to me it had no strings attached to it."

The fourth assurance from Stalin regarding the Far East came at Tehran where he observed that once peace came in Europe, "by our common front we shall win" in that quarter. But by that time, recognizing that Harriman and Deane had come to Moscow to ply him for his assistance, Stalin was, quite naturally, thinking of his price. The price was not cheap. In October of 1944, during Churchill's second visit to Moscow, Harriman got Stalin on the subject of the war against Japan. Deane noted, page 247 of his book, that Stalin agreed that—

The Soviet Union would take the offensive after Germany's defeat, provided the United States would assist in building up the necessary reserve supplies (for 63 divisions in Siberia) and provided the political aspects of Russia's participation had been clarified. His latter proviso referred to the recognition by China of Russian claims against Japan in the Far East.

At this sitting Stalin agreed that the United States Navy might have Petropavlosk on the Pacific as a naval base and our air forces the sites for heavy bomber bases in the Maritime Provinces, but denied us use of the Trans-Siberian railroad to haul in supplies.

Thus was the gun pointed at Roosevelt's head. If we wanted Russia in, we had to supply her armies and force Chiang Kai-shek to accept the loss of Manchuria, which had been solemnly promised him by Roosevelt and Churchill at Cairo. Marshall insisted, again beyond the call of duty, that we needed Russia. Roosevelt believed him. The cost of supplies was fairly heavy, the Russians stipulating what amounted to 860,410 tons of dry cargo, 206,000 tons of liquid cargo. All this in addition to the supplies for the war in Europe called for under the fourth protocol. The Russians got 80 percent of their far-eastern requirements. One item was 25,000 tons of canned meat. That would provide at least 50,000,000 meat courses, at a pound each, for Red soldiers.

And as one result of the political deal we have suffered over 140,000 casualties in Korea.

NO NECESSITY FOR THE STALIN PAY-OFF

I return to Yalta, where Stalin got his price in full, the conference which is described by Hanson Baldwin as, "the saddest chapter in the long history of political futility which the war recorded."

What was the war situation in the Pacific in January of 1945? Leyte was ours, the Japanese fleet was defeated, Manila fell during the Yalta Conference, Okinawa lay ahead, but the Air Force was daily raining destruction and fire on Chinese cities. General Bill Donovan's

Office of Strategic Services was reporting from China that the Kwantung army had been dissipated and depleted. In any case, said the OSS, what was left could not be moved to the Japanese home islands because of the lack of shipping. Nor could the Japanese troops in China be moved. Everywhere the story was the same. The Japanese merchant marine was beneath the sea. The blockade was strangling Japan. Admiral Leahy wrote on page 293 of his book concerning his own views of the situation at this time:

I was of the firm opinion that our war against Japan had progressed to the point where her defeat was only a matter of time and attrition. Therefore, we did not need Stalin's help to defeat our enemy in the Pacific. The Army did not agree with me and Roosevelt was prepared to bargain with Stalin.

Hanson Baldwin, writing after the event, endorsed Leahy's conclusions, saying, on page 79 of his book, that—

At the time of Yalta, Japan was already beaten—not by the atomic bomb which had not yet been perfected, not by conventional bombing then just starting, but by attrition and blockade.

MARSHALL'S PRESSURE ON ROOSEVELT

Yet at Yalta, General Marshall redoubled his endeavors for Russia's entrance with all the indomitable persistence he had applied to the "second front now" and to blocking Mark Clark and the British over the Eastern European strategy. The late Edward Stettinius, who, as Secretary of State, played a hand at Yalta, recalled on page 90 of "Roosevelt and the Russians," that—

I knew at Yalta . . . of the immense pressure put on the President by our military leaders (meaning Marshall) to bring Russia into the far-eastern war.

Before Stettinius left Washington he saw a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs to the State Department, saying, "We desire Russia's entry at the earliest possible date."

In support of his urgent demand, Marshall used what Baldwin calls on page 80 of his book, "a pessimistic intelligence estimate," which placed the strength of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria at 700,000, a total of 2,000,000 Japanese forces on the Asiatic mainland—"all first-rate troops and well trained," according to Marshall. Far worse than this, Baldwin exposes the fact that more realistic intelligence estimates, corresponding to the facts as brought out after the war and held at that time by Leahy and others, "never reached the top echelon at Yalta." Even the Washington Post, that Communist camp-following paper, that pillar of leftism and scuttle in Asia, felt moved on September 9, 1948, to declare that the Chiefs of Staff "made a blunder, to advise Roosevelt and Churchill at Yalta that Japan would last 18 months after VE-day."

Just how that got into the Washington edition of the Daily Worker I do not know. Nor is this the end of this dismal story.

JAPANESE PEACE OVERTURES

Rear Admiral Zacharias, in his book, "Behind Closed Doors," declares that a Japanese peace feeler had been received and transmitted to Washington by Gen-

eral MacArthur before Roosevelt departed for Yalta. So at the time we sold out China to Russia to induce Russia to come into the Japanese War, we already had Japan suing for peace, according to Admiral Zacharias. The peace overtures were to come thick and fast from Japanese sources after Yalta and by the time of Potsdam they were so authentic that the Declaration of Potsdam was put forward to answer them.

Yet late in April of 1945 Marshall was still intent upon wooing the Russians into the far-eastern war. As Stettinius reports it on page 97:

At a top level policy meeting in the White House just before the San Francisco conference opened on April 25, President Truman, the military leaders and I discussed the failure of the Soviet Union to abide by the Yalta agreement on the Balkans. At this meeting the United States military representatives pleaded for patience with the Soviet Union because they feared that a crack-down would endanger Russian entry into the far-eastern war.

Who advised patience with Russia? Marshall? At Potsdam in July Marshall's determination to have the Red Army equipped by us and moved into Asia had not abated. Stettinius reports, with some perplexity on page 98, that—

Even as late as the Potsdam conference, after the first atomic bomb had exploded at Los Alamos on July 16, the military insisted that the Soviet Union had to be brought into the far-eastern war.

Japan, as I have said, already had sued for peace.

In his endeavor to exculpate Roosevelt of blame for the shame of Yalta, Welles saddles the blame on the Combined Chiefs of Staff. We know that it was Marshall who formed and carried through those decisions, apparently indifferent to what should happen to the 2,000,000 riflemen he wanted to send ashore in Japan. Welles attributed Marshall's desire to have Russia in, to "a basic misapprehension of existing facts." This appears on page 158 of his book.

Is that the answer? Or was Marshall's insistence that Russia should be allowed to serve her own interest—not ours—in Eastern Asia a part of that pattern which has been emerging with ever greater clarity as we trace his career: a pattern which finds his decisions, maintained with great stubbornness and skill, always and invariably serving the world policy of the Kremlin? I ask the question. You answer it. Marshall can.

ALGER HISS AT YALTA

The President had another adviser at Yalta, Alger Hiss, that impudent, ex-crated, and unrepentant traitor. Was it upon the advice of Hiss, who served on the far-eastern desks and was deep in the China plot, that Roosevelt, chatting companionably with Stalin, assured him that "the blame for the breach (in China) lay more with the Comintern and the Kuomintang than the rank and file of the so-called Communists." The quotation is from page 868 of Sherwood's revelatory book. It will be noted that the Communists, the Kremlin lackeys who sent their armies against our own in Korea, were to Roosevelt only "so-called" Communists, and pretty good fellows at that, more reasonable, the

President may have gone on to say, than Chiang Kai-shek's bunch or even your own fellows, Generalissimo, in Moscow! We shall encounter that view of the Chinese Reds as agreeable innocents again when we examine Marshall's ill-fated mission to that ill-fated country.

Let me assume for the moment that Marshall's judgment in World War II was clouded by no ulterior objective, no hidden thread of purpose which could not reach the light of day. What kind of a "master of global strategy" would have made the mistake of Yalta? What kind of strategic genius does that display? The whole array of Marshall's strategical endeavors, from Sledgehammer, or the second front now, through his timidity over invading Algiers by way of the Mediterranean to his downright insistence upon invading southern France 2 months after D-day in Normandy, is unreassuring in this present situation. We inevitably contrast Marshall's competence with MacArthur's during that general's grand march from New Guinea to Tokyo. In the circumstances, how could we take Marshall's word on strategy? If he so overestimated the Japanese as to believe they could fight on for a year and a half after the Germans quit in Europe, how can we place any reliance upon his estimate of the strength of the Russian empire and its Chinese satellite in Eastern Asia at this moment?

So the A-bombs fell on Japan and the war was over, although so careful a military critic as Hanson Baldwin believes that the bombs hastened the end of the war, if at all, by only 1 day. Japan's fate had been determined long, long ago. And with the end of the war Yalta's chickens came promptly home to roost. The Red Army after a bloodless campaign of 6 days took over all Manchuria; it stood also in North China. The Reds were there by right, ceded them at Yalta.

MARSHALL DIVIDES KOREA

And so we come to the question of Korea. Who divided that unhappy land at the thirty-eighth parallel, ordering that Russia should receive the surrender of Japanese forces above that line, the United States below it? Here we have one of the major mysteries of that time. At Yalta, Stalin had agreed with Roosevelt on a four-power trusteeship for Korea, the powers to be the United States, China, Russia, and Britain—a decision which he ratified when Harry Hopkins visited Moscow in the late spring of 1945. The trusteeship called for a unified administration of all Korea with a government of Koreans to be freely elected and governing the whole peninsula. What happened to the trusteeship? When Japan quit, there arose the problem of accepting the surrender of the forces in the field.

Welles covers the situation on page 167 of his book, "The Seven Decisions That Shaped History." I quote him:

Some subordinate officers in the Pentagon hastily recommended that the Russians accept the Japanese surrender north of the thirty-eighth parallel in Korea, while the American troops would accept it south of that line.

I am told that this line was fixed because it was convenient. Certainly it was

fixed by officials with no knowledge of what they were doing, and without consulting any responsible members of the administration who might have had some regard for the political and economic considerations which the decision so lamentably ignores.

There the matter rested until the able senior Senator from Maine [Mr. Brewster] brought to light the fact that the thirty-eighth parallel has historic significance. I had wondered why the War Department in August of 1945 chose to divide Korea for purposes, as was said, of receiving the Japanese surrender, along the thirty-eighth parallel. Why not the thirty-seventh, or the thirty-ninth parallel? Why had it to be the thirty-eighth parallel?

The Senator from Maine [Mr. Brewster], in delving into United States Relations, which is the continuing history of American foreign affairs as published periodically by the Department of State, found that the Russians had fixed the thirty-eighth parallel, nearly a half century ago, as the dividing line. They were negotiating with Japan over the division of Korea between the two imperial systems that had designs upon China then. So the Czar's diplomats proposed to those of the Emperor of Japan that the thirty-eighth parallel be the border between the two empires.

I refer to the testimony before the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees on June 8, when Secretary Acheson was being questioned by the Senator from Maine [Mr. Brewster] on this point. Acheson disclosed that the decision was taken by the Secretary of War, was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by State, Army, Navy, Air Force Coordinating Committee, and by the President. This was not, as Sumner Welles—who has excellent sources of information—was forced to conclude, a decision made by "subordinate officers at the Pentagon." This was a high-level decision, initiated by the Secretary of War. Who was, in effect, the Secretary of War during the later incumbency of Mr. Stimson? I think no one who was in touch with the inner workings of those adjoining offices at the Pentagon, who has read the late Secretary's explicit memoirs, who knows the inner relationships between the two men, can doubt that in matters of this sort it was Marshall who made the decisions, Stimson who rubber-stamped them.

It was Marshall who selected the line for the division of Korea which was chosen by the Russian Foreign Office and General Staff nearly 50 years ago. We restored their pre-1904 claims on North Korea at the Pentagon in August of 1945.

I refer you particularly to this colloquy, the Senator from Maine asking, Secretary Acheson answering the questions:

Senator BREWSTER. Isn't it rather interesting to note the thirty-eighth parallel in Korea was proposed 45 years earlier by Russia as a means of dividing the spheres of influence of Russia and Japan incident to the episodes around the Russo-Japanese War?

Secretary ACHESON. I am not familiar with that, Senator.

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I content myself with noting further that a Secretary of State unfamiliar with the complex of imperial ambitions in the Far East during the days when the United States played a humane, a creditable and an intelligent part in those affairs can scarcely qualify as an expert on the diplomacy of the Far East.

RETREAT FROM VICTORY

The war was over, millions of Americans, mistakenly thinking that their international troubles were over too, had a 24-hour celebration only to awaken before long to find that, even as we were spending vast amounts of flesh and blood and steel to win the fighting part of the war, there was being conducted what appeared to be a planned loss of the peace. Hanson Baldwin refers to that disastrous planning as the follies of World War II. I am reminded of a wise and axiomatic utterance in this connection by the great Swedish chancellor, Oxenstierna, to his son departing on the tour of Europe: He said, "Go forth my son and see with what folly the affairs of mankind are governed."

GENERAL STILWELL'S ROLE IN CHINA

Before we plunge into the Chinese situation as it developed, with Japan defeated but Russia replacing her in Manchuria, let us have a brief look at what had been happening in China that bears on the career of General Marshall. We come at once to the contentious figure of Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, known as "Vinegar Joe." Stilwell was Marshall's protégé. Marshall had him appointed the American military representative and chief of staff to Chiang Kai-shek in 1942.

I shall not detain Senators with a study of "Vinegar Joe's" personal eccentricities, his self-assurance verging on arrant egotism, his contempt for Chiang Kai-shek, who was to him always "The Peanut," and for all the Chinese leaders except the Reds of Yenan. The dismaying chronicle of Stilwell is known to all of us. It was this twisted and tortured soldier who was set up by Marshall as our supreme military representative among the 450 million Chinese, who had for years been bearing the brunt of Japanese power, retreating and fighting, moving ever inland, but refusing with honor and dignity to make peace with the invader. Stilwell spoke Chinese.

He spoke that language in a halting, stilted way, I am assured by old China hands, and the complaint of the educated Chinese was that, because of his unfamiliarity with the inflections and nuances of their language, he often insulted them when he thought he was uttering matter-of-fact phrases.

STILWELL'S ADVISERS

The greatest barrier to cooperation between Chiang Kai-shek and Stilwell was not, however, his own unaccommodating spirit. Stilwell was surrounded in China by a clique of young Foreign Service officers supplied by the State Department, headed by John Patton Davies as his political adviser. Stilwell and Davies had been friends since 1938, when both were in Hankow, Stilwell as American military attaché, Davies as consul general. Those were trying days in the war between Japan and China. They

were days also of the common front, when the Communists were fighting alongside the Nationalists and all ranks were closed. The American colony at Hankow likewise included Capt. Evans Carlson, later a brigadier general in the Pacific.

I pause to remind you that Stilwell and Carlson are the Communist heroes of our war in the Far East, that both were and are honored in the Daily Worker and throughout the Communist movement in this country.

Dominating the intellectual life of the American colony in Hankow, according to Freda Utey, who was also there, was that effective agent of Russian imperialism, Agnes Smedley. That Miss Smedley, a recreant American, was a Russian spy throughout her long career in China, is doubted by no Americans outside of perhaps Owen Lattimore and his camp-following friends. I quote from Miss Utey's new book, the China Story, a scholarly and temperate account of how the Hiss-Acheson-Lattimore-Marshall group and their accomplices converted the Chinese civil war of 1945-49 into the present Chinese-American war. I quote from pages 106 and 107:

Agnes (Smedley) not only captivated "Vinegar Joe," but also completely won over the British Ambassador, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, subsequently Ambassador to Moscow and later, as Lord Inverchapel, appointed to Washington. "Archie" Clark Kerr was another benevolent friend of the Chinese Communists for many years. He told me he thought Agnes was "the greatest woman he had ever met" and their close friendship was continued in America. * * * Davies was also a great admirer of Agnes Smedley, whom he called "one of the pure in heart." He used to invite us to excellent dinners at the American consulate, at which he expressed both his admiration and affection for Agnes. * * * Together with Edgar Snow and other journalists I knew in Hankow, he (Davies) became one of the most potent influences in the Department (of State) furthering the cause of the Chinese Communists.

Davies, as Stilwell's political adviser, surrounded himself with young men of his choice and ilk—John Stewart Service, Raymond P. Ludden, and John Emerson. We have heard of Service before. I do not ask you to believe upon the sole authority of my word that the full weight of Stilwell, of Davies, and these young men were thrown in the balance of the conspiratorial, subversive Chinese Reds against our ally, the Government of China. You have read the State Department's insincere and dissembling white paper on the China question. I bid you read again, study, and mark the reports sent back to Washington by Stilwell's clique; read them with this in mind, that except for the reports of the naval attaché in China, these were the only advice the administration had to go on regarding the situation in that huge and distressed land.

The Army and the State Department were suffused with pro-Red propaganda emanating from Stilwell's circle. It is one of the few benevolent dispensations of fate in this situation that Admiral Leahy had a clear stream of information. Apart from his influence, and the word of honest travelers and finally the blunt advice of Gen. Pat Hurley, I honestly

believe that Stilwell would have been kept in China and the Reds have been able to conquer that land several years before they finally accomplished it.

Davies has been suitably rewarded by Dean Acheson for his sell-out of an ally. Davies serves in Washington as a member of the State Department's Policy Planning Committee, where he is strategically placed to help further the betrayal he began in Chungking.

It was the constant endeavor of the Davies people in China to assure the Departments of War and State that the Chinese Communists were moderate reformers, simple agrarians in the style of Thomas Jefferson, with no subservience to Moscow.

We find an excellent example of this in report No. 34, document No. 109A7, dated September 28, 1944, a document signed by John Stewart Service and sent to the State Department:

Politically, any orientation which the Chinese Communists may once have had toward the Soviet Union seems to be a thing of the past. The Communists have worked to make their thinking and program realistically Chinese, and they are carrying out democratic policies which they expect the United States to approve and sympathetically support.

We find the following in report No. 10, dated March 13, 1945, again signed by John Stewart Service:

The Chinese Communist Party, on the other hand, is the party of the Chinese peasant. Its program—reduction of rent and interest, progressive taxation, assistance to production, promotion of cooperatives, institution of democracy from the very bottom—is designed to bring about a democratic solution of the peasant's problems. On this basis, and with its realization of the necessity of free capitalistic enterprise based on the unity, not conflict, of all groups of the people, the Communist Party will be the means of bringing democracy and sound industrialization to China. These are the only possible guarantees of peace and stability.

This friendliness toward the Communists in Asia extended also toward the Japanese Communists. Luckily, MacArthur was in Japan. The State Department's advice was not followed there. But let me quote again from a John Service document S 187, with "Q" number 524:

The Japanese Communist Party is still small (Mr. Okano himself does not claim more than a few thousand members), but it has the advantages of strong organization and loyal, politically experienced membership. If its policies, as claimed, seek to achieve our own hopes of a democratic, non-militaristic Japan, we may wish to consider the adoption toward it of an attitude of sympathetic support.

The Stilwell-Davies group took over in China in 1942. Soon thereafter Laughlin Currie, at the White House, and John Carter Vincent and subsequently Alger Hiss, at the State Department, were exercising their influence at the Washington end of the transmission belt conveying poisonous misinformation from Chungking. The full outlines of Currie's part in the great betrayal have yet to be traced. That is was an important and essential part, I have no doubt. In this connection it should be recalled that Currie issued an order on White House

stationery depriving the Republic of China of 20,000 German rifles.

STATE DEPARTMENT ADOPTS COMMUNIST POLICY ON CHINA, ACCORDING TO EARL BROWDER

What bearing did Stilwell's assumption of command in China in 1942 have on the following answers made by Earl Browder before the unlamented Tydings subcommittee?

Mr. BROWDER. I could not name specific instances, but, now that you raise the question, I assume that that was done. It was our purpose to stir up all sorts of political expressions of opinion in support of the Communists in China and support of unity in China; to influence the Government in every possible way.

Mr. MORGAN. To influence the Government, you say, with respect to unity in China; unity between whom?

Mr. BROWDER. And to take a different attitude toward specific Communists—

Mr. MORGAN. What attitude did you want to project, Mr. Browder?

Mr. BROWDER. Abandonment of the previous policy in which the influence of the United States Government was largely instrumental in maintaining and intensifying Chiang Kai-shek's war of extermination against the Chinese Communists. We wanted that influence of America removed and this influence to be exercised, on the contrary, in favor of unification.

Mr. MORGAN. I believe you have answered for us the principal matter in which we are concerned, Mr. Browder. At least you have given your testimony with respect to it—

Mr. BROWDER. I would say that further, in 1942, it became unnecessary any longer to bring such pressure upon the Government of the United States because the officially declared policy from that time until 1946 was the United States pressed upon China the coalition of the Kuomintang, the Communist, and all the democratic mass forces in one united government.

From 1942 to 1946 that was the official policy of the American Government, and it was, therefore, no occasion for the Communists—I would say from 1942 to 1945, the only period of which I can speak—there was no occasion for the Communists to press for a change of policy in the United States Government at that time.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But, nevertheless, the views advocated up to 1942—at least, the substance of the important views advocated by the Communist Party up to 1942—were in fact adopted by the State Department toward the Communists in China at about 1942—is that correct?

Mr. BROWDER. In October 1942.

Is this mere coincidence? I do not think so.

CHENNAULT DESCRIBES STILWELL'S LOVE AND ADMIRATION FOR COMMUNISTS

Before coming to the denouement of this sorry state of affairs, I give you another view of the activities of Stilwell and Davies in Chungking. This testimony comes from an eyewitness, a valorous retired major general of the United States Army Air Forces, Claire Lee Chennault, who won undying fame with his Flying Tigers. I am referring to Chennault's recorded experiences in China, Way of a Fighter, where he reviews Stilwell's behavior in unsparing detail. Chennault describes how Stilwell in the spring of 1944 sent a mission to his friends in Yenan. I quote from page 317 of Way of a Fighter:

The American mission to Yenan was hardly established before Stilwell's Chungking staff began to proclaim loudly the superiority of the Communist regime over the Chungking

Government. Contents of secret reports from the Yenan mission were freely discussed over Chungking dinner tables by Stilwell's staff. No secret was made of their admiration for the Communists, who, they said, were really only "agrarian reformers" and more like New Dealers than Communists.

Incidentally, this, too, was the burden of Agnes Smedley's propaganda line at this time.

I return to Chennault:

The hue and cry charging the Generalissimo with "hoarding lend-lease arms" to fight the Communists was raised with renewed vigor along with the claim that China's best troops were being used to blockade the Communists instead of fighting the Japanese.

The American propagandists for Red China—men paid by you and me, by all taxpayers—were mendacious as well as disloyal to our alliance and to American interest. I quote further:

After Stilwell was removed, Wedemeyer conducted an exhaustive survey of all Chinese Army equipment and reported that not a single American gun or bullet had gone to Chinese armies east of Yunnan with the exception of 500 tons belatedly delivered to Kweilin and Liuchow. The generalissimo did keep a sizable army at Sian, the gateway to Communist territory, and they did maintain a patrol on the main communication lines to Yenan. That they were also defending the Tungkwang Pass, one of the three vital gateways to west China, was conveniently ignored by Stilwell's staff. Late in 1944 many of these troops were withdrawn to bolster the sagging Salween offensive, and the Japanese promptly began an offensive aimed at Sian. Only a sudden and cold winter halted the Japanese offensive short of its goal.

I have quoted General Chennault at this length because these passages go to the heart of the means by which the American people were misled and Government policy distorted during World War II to bring about our present disasters. I continue to quote Chennault:

The Yenan Communists shrewdly tickled Stilwell's vanity with many flattering appreciations of his military prowess and clinched him as an ally by shrewdly letting it be known that they would be delighted to have him command their armies. Stilwell never gave up his hopes of commanding the Chinese Red armies. . . . Since it was still official American policy in the summer of 1944 to support the Chungking government, it was a common joke (in Chungking) that Stilwell's headquarters were developing a private foreign policy with John Davies as secretary of state.

During this period there was a strong group of left wingers in the Far Eastern Division of the State Department who used Stilwell's sympathy for the Chinese Communists and his violent antipathy to the generalissimo as a lever to shift American policy in favor of the Communists. Had Stilwell been retained in his China-Burma-India command their chances for success would have been brightened. The situation was so bad that when Wedemeyer arrived he found it necessary to make all American officers in China sign a formal statement saying they understood clearly their duty in China was to execute official American policy, not to make it.

STILWELL EXPRESSES DESIRE TO FIGHT WITH COMMUNISTS AGAINST OUR ALLY

Before I leave the subject of Stilwell, I want to refer to a photostatic copy of a page from the New York Daily Worker of January 26, 1947. Represented on

this page is a handwritten letter of the general's to a friend. The letter appears under the letterhead of the Commanding General, Headquarters Sixth Army. Stilwell was then commanding the Sixth United States Army. The letter was addressed to a friend whose identity the *Daily Worker* did not see fit to disclose. Stilwell wrote, and I quote:

Isn't Manchuria a spectacle? But what did they expect? George Marshall can't walk on water. It makes me itch to throw down my shovel and get over there and shoulder a rifle with Chu Teh.

At that moment the forces of the Republic of China were successful in Manchuria, they had reached the peak of their efforts at pacification at about this moment. This was, of course, displeasing to Stilwell.

What Stilwell is saying is that even Marshall, unable to perform miracles, had not yet been able to deliver Manchuria to Chu Teh. This passage will grow clearer as we proceed with this narrative. Stilwell wanted also to give his assistance to the man who had carried support of him almost to the point of defying President Roosevelt. Need I remind you that Chu Teh, the heir of Agnes Smedley, was then, and is now, the commander in chief of the Chinese Red Armies who are at war with us in Korea?

MARSHALL FIGHTS TO KEEP STILWELL IN CHINA

Where does General Marshall stand in all this? After all, we are reviewing his career, not Stilwell's. Stilwell was his friend. He had nominated him for this job. What did Marshall do about this field commander who was, as we have seen, so disloyal to American policy, so flagrantly perverting our purpose in China, so grievously failing both as a soldier and a diplomat, and who, in the end, would avow his desire to take up arms with the Communists against America's ally.

Demands for Stilwell's removal from his disastrous command reached such a pitch in June of 1943 that President Roosevelt directed Marshall to recall him. Stilwell and Chennault, at loggerheads over the land-air strategy in China, had been brought back to Washington just previously, where they appeared before the combined Chiefs and advanced their respective positions. Chennault won the decision. Thereafter, Stilwell's strategy, his disposition, and his good faith were under constant and steady suspicion in the minds of all the American leaders save only Marshall's and the old gentleman who had been captivated by him, Secretary Stimson.

Did Marshall yield to the President's wishes that Stilwell, who was proved to be supporting the Chinese Reds, be recalled? He did not. I quote from Mr. Sherwood's book, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, on page 739, where he recalls that incident, saying that General Marshall said:

He realized that Stilwell was indiscreet but that he is the only high-ranking officer we have that can speak Chinese and that, while obviously, he does not like Chinese officialdom, he has a great regard for the Chinese people.

Mr. President, I believe that we have in the clause I have just quoted a clue to Marshall's regard for Stilwell and his obstinate determination to keep him and his bevy of Communist propagandists at Chungking. If Marshall had been entirely candid, I believe the words would have been, "He has a great regard for the Chinese Reds." As we all know, "people" in Communist parlance has a special meaning. It does not mean all the people in our sense. It is a catchword, an occult word, clear to the initiates, meaning Communists. They use it in a special sense to designate all their political organs. We all recall the various people's fronts organized to promote the Communist cause throughout the world. More specifically the Chinese Communist army was referred to in Communist parlance as the people's army. We shall find, as we pursue this subject, further evidences of General Marshall's affinity for the Chinese Reds.

Not only did Marshall brook the President's will in this instance; he risked a quarrel with Hopkins, the man who, as Sherwood elsewhere reports, had been his principal supporter for chief of staff when Marshall was unexpectedly jumped over many more highly qualified and experienced major generals and brigadier generals to that post in 1939. Sherwood is recording a conversation with Marshall, also on page 739, when he says:

Marshall has told me that his only serious difference of opinion with Hopkins in the entire war was over this issue between Stilwell and Chennault. . . . Hopkins was on the side of Chennault, who was close to the Fascist-tinted Kuomintang.

I beg you note the use of Communist terminology "Fascist-tinted" to describe the Kuomintang. It is significant. The false and meaningless epithet "Fascist" was on the lips of every apologist and propagandist of Russian imperial designs in those days from Smedley to Alger Hiss and their journalistic echoes in the United States. I suggest also that you check the accuracy of Marshall's views regarding the superior fighting value of the Chinese Reds with Chennault's plain, unvarnished opinions, with those of General Wedemeyer, and with a host of other loyal Americans who know whereof they speak. The legend that the Reds were genuinely fighting the Japanese was another of the big lies with which American opinion and judgment was corrupted and subverted at that time.

Roosevelt did not press for Stilwell's recall. Sherwood gives a partial explanation of why he did not in a continuation of the foregoing passage, saying:

Roosevelt had high regard for both Stilwell and Chennault, as fighting men, but his overriding concern was to keep China in the war and to hold the friendship of the Chinese people for the United States and he had those objectives in mind in every decision he made.

I think it is evident that Roosevelt did not know what we know. A great deal of water has gone over the dam; we are better informed and more vigilant now. We know that Stilwell and his gang were a nest of anti-American activ-

ity at the Chinese capital, that they did us unmeasured harm both in injuring the faith and credit of Chiang Kai-shek in America and in deceiving us concerning the minions of the Kremlin at Yenan. Chennault supplies us with other insights into Roosevelt's attitude toward China at this time. During his visit to Washington in the spring of 1943, Chennault saw the President three times. It was evident that the President had a due appreciation of Chennault's gallant services in China, that he respected and liked him. On page 225 of his book, Chennault reports Roosevelt assuring him that:

His policy was aimed at creating a strong pro-American China to emerge from the war as a great stabilizer among the oppressed peoples of the Orient. I have a deep conviction that had he lived and maintained the faculties which he had at his prime, the debacle of our postwar floundering in China and the incredible folly of the Marshall mission would never have occurred.

However that may be—and I sometimes feel that some have too indiscriminately charged Roosevelt with the blame for what has happened in China—Marshall remained at the President's elbow, a trusted adviser able to overshadow the loyal and foresighted counsel of Admiral Leahy, and, as we have seen, the tide of reports from the field, serving the great conspiracy, still flowed into Washington.

The impatience of Leahy with Stilwell and all he stood for breathes through a brief entry in his book, page 172, when he notes that "the problem (of the China command) was not to be solved for more than a year, however, when Stilwell was finally relieved of his command in October 1944."

And, on page 271, that great American, Leahy, observes that even after Stilwell's insults had moved Chiang Kai-shek to demand Stilwell's head at the price of remaining in cooperative wartime relations with America, "Marshall made repeated efforts to induce the President to retain 'Vinegar Joe' regardless of Chiang's objections." Leahy observes dryly that the President had to give "direct and positive orders" to Marshall before Stilwell was at long last called home.

How does that compare with Marshall's attitude toward the great proconsul of Japan? What accounts for the difference? Stilwell played with the Reds in China; MacArthur, on the other hand, made no secret of his wish to break their power over Asia. In whose cause was Marshall enlisted when he fought with such bitter obduracy to retain at Chungking the friend of the stooges of Moscow? How does it compare with his present and successful insistence for MacArthur's head? Was he then serving American interest in China and the Far East, the interest delineated by Roosevelt before he yielded to Marshall's scare pictures of the war in the Pacific at Yalta? I leave the answer to you.

And so Stilwell finally came home to be succeeded by that great American soldier, Albert Wedemeyer. Wedemeyer has not enjoyed the friendship and patronage of the powerful Marshall since the day he brought home his wise and effective report on China in 1947 and

since the further day when he refused, putting his career in peril, to sign a doctored version of his report which Marshall, by then Secretary of State, wished to issue in further delusion of the American people.

Wedemeyer does deserve the fullest confidence and esteem of the American people and I look forward to the day when, please God, this country may again have the full use of his talents, his judgment and his unalloyed devotion to his country and her interests. Wedemeyer redeemed our situation in China, he forged a fighting instrument out of Chinese conscripts, he reestablished good relations with our long-suffering and loyal ally, Chiang Kai-shek and he conducted the affairs of America in the interests of America.

THE COMMUNIST ENEMY OF CHINA SELECTS THE UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO CHINA

Before quitting Wedemeyer, I wish to call your attention to another telltale incident of General Marshall's mission. I refer to Marshall's veto on the appointment of Wedemeyer as Ambassador to China in the summer of 1946. I call your attention to pages 6,097 to 6,100 of the Russell committee transcript, wherein General Wedemeyer is testifying on that incident; pointing out that Marshall, having originally recommended his appointment, is now opposing it on the ground that the Yen-an Reds were violently opposed to Wedemeyer.

Let us run over rapidly Wedemeyer's testimony concerning Marshall's suggestion to the general in January or February of 1946 that he be named ambassador. Marshall, according to Wedemeyer, observed, "The Communists may not like you, but they respect you." Already Marshall was evincing tenderness to Communist views. In July, Wedemeyer, home on leave, was awaiting the appointment, his commission being on the President's desk, when he was called to the State Department. I quote Wedemeyer's testimony:

The then Under Secretary of State Acheson sent for me in July and showed me a telegram as I recall it stating that the appointment of General Wedemeyer has leaked, that is the prospective appointment of General Wedemeyer as Ambassador to China has leaked, and was militating against "my delicate negotiations between the Communists and the Nationalists. The Communists are protesting violently."

The telegram was from Marshall. I go on with the testimony, quoting Wedemeyer:

Dean Acheson said, "I'm sorry about this, Wedemeyer," and I told the Secretary, "Well, I'm not sorry at all about it. There are two factors that I don't like about it. One, I don't think that the Communists should determine who should be appointed by our Government in positions of responsibility, and two, I bought a trousseau, as it were, an ambassadorial trousseau to the tune of \$800 or \$900."

So he disregarded my first remark.

Would Wedemeyer, or anyone else, suppose that Dean Acheson would object, as did Wedemeyer, to the Communists dictating the appointment of an American ambassador? Of course, Acheson disregarded that comment of the gen-

eral. To Acheson it is perfectly all right for the Yen-an Reds, the Moscow Reds, or any other Reds, or the British Pinks for that matter, to interfere in an American ambassadorial appointment. I resume quoting:

And Acheson said, "The State Department will take care of the clothes." And I sent the clothes to the State Department along with the bill, and the State Department did pay the bill and the clothes were sent back to me and they are in mothballs.

This is not the end of this fantastic picture. The truth is that Wedemeyer asked to see the full text of the telegram from General Marshall but Acheson declined to show it to him.

This I have not documented but the information was given to me by one of Washington's most reliable correspondents who discussed the matter with Wedemeyer over luncheon shortly after the episode in question. I have obviously never seen that telegram but the best information we can get is that the wire recommended the appointment of Dr. Leighton Stuart. That this was upon the recommendation of Chou En-lai, who was with Marshall at the time and who had vetoed the appointment of Wedemeyer seems obvious. Dr. Stuart, as you know, had been the president of a university of Peiping. One of his many Chinese students was Chou En-lai. I urge that the Russell committee obtain a copy of that wire and find out whether it is true that Stuart was selected as American Ambassador to the Republic of China upon the recommendation of one of the greatest enemies of the Republic of China, Chou En-lai, the foreign secretary of the Yen-an Reds.

Mr. President, a very interesting article on this point, entitled "A Surrender to Communists," has been written by Constantine Brown, one of the outstanding columnists, and appeared in last night's Washington Star. I ask unanimous consent to have that article printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Evening Star of June 13, 1951]

A SURRENDER TO COMMUNISTS—ANXIETY OF STATE DEPARTMENT SHOWN IN CANCELLATION OF WEDEMEYER'S APPOINTMENT AS ENVOY TO CHINA

(By Constantine Brown)

The matter related by General Wedemeyer last Monday, concerning the cancellation of his appointment as Ambassador to China, is more than a mere routine incident.

It shows the anxiety of the State Department and of General Marshall, who at the time was on a special mission to China, to bring about a coalition between the Chinese Communists and the Nationalists, to leave no stone unturned to placate the Reds.

It amounted, in fact, to administration surrender to the wishes of the Communists, who did not want a man of General Wedemeyer's personality representing the United States in China. The result was appointment of Dr. J. Leighton Stuart, an American scholar, to the post at the suggestion of Chou En-lai, No. 2 Chinese Communist.

The appointment of General Wedemeyer had been proposed to President Truman by James F. Byrnes, then Secretary of State. Mr. Truman approved it. The former commander in China was selected not only be-

cause of his intimate knowledge of conditions in that country, but also because he enjoyed the complete confidence of Chiang Kai-shek and knew the top Chinese Reds personally and well.

There seemed to be no conceivable opposition to this appointment. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee had indicated its unanimous approval as soon as Mr. Truman sent the nomination for consideration.

Mr. Byrnes informed General Wedemeyer that he would have to have a complete new civilian wardrobe—top hat, cutaway, pearl gray vest with pretty mother-of-pearl buttons and silk hat. He suggested to the general, who had always bought ready-made civilian clothes, the name of a good New York tailor. The bill amounted to \$900.

Mrs. Wedemeyer gave up her apartment in Washington and made reservations on the train to San Francisco, where she expected to join her husband for the flight to Nanking.

Forty-eight hours before she was to leave, the then Under Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, sent a rush call to General Wedemeyer, and asked him to come to the State Department to see him at once. General Wedemeyer believed it was a matter of additional instructions.

Mr. Acheson was embarrassed and broke the news to him that General Marshall, then still in China, had sent a top priority cable urging the cancellation of General Wedemeyer's appointment because of strong objections voiced by the Communist spokesman, Chou En-lai.

General Wedemeyer wanted to read the telegram, but the interview was short because Mr. Acheson was in a great hurry to see the President. The general did have time, however, to mention his expense for the useless ambassadorial rig and received the assurance that the State Department would take care of that promptly.

Soon it became known that Chou En-lai had suggested to General Marshall that Dr. Stuart, aging president of the American University in Peiping which Chou had attended before the war, be considered for the job.

Dr. Stuart was practically unknown in America. The Far East Division of the State Department knew about his educational activities in China. Officers on the Chinese desk in the Department pointed out that with the help of an able staff, headed by a good counsellor of embassy, Dr. Stuart would be able to do the job. He was immediately appointed and confirmed by the Senate.

Dr. Stuart settled himself, his Chinese personal secretary, and his American staff in the former German Embassy in Nanking—the best building available in the Chinese capital—which Chiang placed at the disposal of the American Government.

He was a mere figurehead as Ambassador. There were no representatives of the Communists left in Nanking when the new envoy assumed his post. He marked time and frequently was as uninformed as Americans back home about what was going on between the American Government and both Chinese factions.

In fairness to the distinguished scholar, catapulted in spite of himself into an ambassadorial post, it must be said that while he never complained officially or attempted to act with the energy displayed by men like Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley, his predecessor, he did frequently and privately express his disappointment at the role which he was called on to play in Nanking.

After all General Marshall's efforts failed General Wedemeyer was ordered to go to China in 1947 on a special mission to report on the situation and to suggest whatever remedy he possibly could. Before leaving Nanking General Wedemeyer was urged to make a public statement for the press. He prepared it, and at Dr. Stuart's suggestion, the draft was sent to Washington for approval.

General Marshall at this time was Secretary of State. The draft was returned to Nanking approved. But it was such a changed and watered-down version that General Wedemeyer hesitated to release it. He felt that it did not fully express his views. Dr. Stuart and his State Department co-workers urged, however, that it be given to the press and General Wedemeyer agreed.

Mr. MCCARTHY. Mr. President, the war came to an end with the Russian armies firmly entrenched in Manchuria and the northern Provinces of China, thanks to Marshall's endeavors at Yalta, but with Wedemeyer at Chungking still able, if left alone, to salvage something out of the situation. In Moscow Stalin ungratefully proclaimed his joy over the bloodless victory in the Far East, giving no thanks to his benefactors, Marshall, Roosevelt, Harriman, and the crimson clique that is still entrenched in the State Department and omitting any reference to Agnes Smedley and her disciples:

The defeat of the Russian troops in 1904 left bitter memories in the minds of the people. It lay like a black spot on our country. Our people believed and hoped that a day would come when Japan would be smashed and that blot effaced.

Forty years have we, the people of the old generation, waited for this day.

The Kremlin had its revenge, it had the historic base of conquest over China in Manchuria and never perhaps in all human history had so much been obtained for so little. Stalin's proclamation is quoted from page 166 of Welles' book.

POSTWAR CHINA

The war was over and the Chinese people might at last have hoped to be free from the great troubles which had torn and vexed their land since the last days of the old Empress Dowager. But no. The Reds at Yenan, determined as always on acquiring all China in the service of the Kremlin, launched into guerrilla warfare. By October the conflict had assumed the scope of a civil war. Chiang Kai-shek was in a position to deal with the situation. He had 39 American-trained divisions, he had equipment, he had a high morale among his forces, although he lacked the air forces that had been promised him and withheld by the War Department. The situation was not too difficult. Back in March Pat Hurley and General Wedemeyer, with Commodore Miles, of the Navy, had assured the Joint Chiefs in expectation of the trouble that would ensue upon the end of the war that the "rebellion in China could be put down by a comparatively small assistance to Chiang's central government." I have quoted from Admiral Leahy's veracious record, on page 337.

The Government at Chungking was our ally. We had come through a long, hard war together. It was we who had encouraged Chiang to resist, to treat with scorn the entreaties of the Japanese that China fall out of the war so that the combined forces of Asia could fall upon the Americans in the Pacific and the Far East. We owed much to Chiang.

Roosevelt was dead. He had been swayed up to a point by Marshall. We now had Truman, who, in these matters, was to become the pliant tool and instrument of Marshall and of the Acheson

whose every endeavor is to deliver our foreign policy into the hands of London and our eventual fate into the hands of Moscow. In explaining to the new President how the Russians had got into Manchuria, Leahy gave Truman his "jaundiced view" of the situation, adding, and I quote from page 385, that the Army, meaning Marshall, had won the argument and the "decision had been ratified at Yalta." The exposition of the admiral fell upon uncomprehending ears. From that day forward Truman has never wavered in support of the forces that were intent upon delivering China to the Kremlin. The one manly and courageous act of his administration, however illegal it was, the only act that put a spoke in the wheel of the Hiss-Acheson-Lattimore-Marshall China policy was his decision to fight in Korea. This decision, from all the information available, was taken against the advice of Acheson and at a time when, by what I feel sure was a dispensation of Providence, Marshall was out of office and not at his side.

WHY DID TRUMAN ORDER MAC ARTHUR INTO KOREA?

This decision was made by Truman even after Acheson had informed the world on three separate occasions that neither Formosa nor South Korea fell within our defense perimeter—a notification to Russia that she could have her minions attack and overrun either of those areas without any interference from the United States. The question arises: Why did Acheson allow Truman to double-cross international communism at this point? The answer is clear if we merely hark back to that fateful 26th of June 1950. For months previous to that time the headlines on the front pages of every paper from the Atlantic to the Pacific, from New Orleans to St. Paul, carried day-to-day stories of the unsuccessful, bumbling attempts of the ill-famed Tydings committee to cover up, protect, and whitewash Communists in Government. The American people were at long last awake to the fact that this administration was subscribing to the destruction of this Nation by a combination of the slow death of socialism and the quick dagger death of communism.

Some of the administration's men up for election that fall were tottering upon the verge of political oblivion. Something had to be done—a bold stroke was necessary to convince the American people that this administration was really anti-Communist. So the administration which would not fight communism at home undertook to prove to the American people that it was willing to fight communism abroad. But even before the ink was dry on the order to MacArthur to help our friends in South Korea with American troops—an order of which he had not even a moment's previous notice—Hiss' friends in the State Department were drafting the orders which would make victory for us impossible.

TREASONABLE ORDERS

Let us briefly examine the first one of those orders—the most fantastic that this Senate perhaps has ever heard of in war or peace time—the order to the

Seventh Fleet. Among other things this order provides that American men in the Seventh Fleet have the job of protecting the Communist mainland from any invasion by our allies, the anti-Communists. Nothing secret or involved about this. The order to the Seventh Fleet very simply states that it shall immobilize Chiang Kai-shek on Formosa and prevent any landings by him on the China coast.

Another part of the orders to the Seventh Fleet provides that it break Chiang Kai-shek's blockade of the Communist ports. Prior to the entry of the Seventh Fleet upon the scene, Chiang Kai-shek had been doing a fairly good job of blockading the main Communist ports of China. Since the Seventh Fleet broke the blockade, a vast amount of British and some American war materials are flowing into Communist China and are being used to kill the men we send to Korea—brothers of the men we send into the Seventh Fleet whose orders are to protect the flow of war materials into Communist China.

The orders to the Seventh Fleet, of course, also were that it prevent the Communists from landing on Formosa. However, at that time, and for weeks thereafter, the weather and other circumstances were such that it was, according to all military men, completely impossible for the Communists to attempt any Formosan landing with the type of craft they had available on the China coast.

Before the Seventh Fleet was ordered to keep Chiang from attacking the China coast, there were roughly a quarter of a million Chinese Communist troops immobilized on the China mainland opposite Formosa. When the order went into effect, however, those troops started to move northward to Manchuria—to the Yalu River—and are now killing American men in Korea. It will be recalled that General MacArthur stated that two entire Chinese armies were freed in this manner and elements of those armies have been identified in Korea.

Let me sum up briefly just what the order to the Seventh Fleet has accomplished to date:

First. It has protected the entire exposed coast of China from landings thereon by our allies and has released vast numbers of Chinese Communist troops for service elsewhere.

Second. It is endangering the freedom of Indochina by freeing Chinese Communists otherwise immobilized on the China coast so that they may go to the aid of Ho Chi-Minh in Indochina.

Third. This in turn has impaired the defense of Western Europe by keeping the great majority of the French professional military forces from training duties at home.

Fourth. It has posed the additional threat to Hong Kong by freeing Red Chinese soldiers to concentrate against Hong Kong who would otherwise be immobilized on the China coast. Our myopic British friends seem to blind their eyes to this fact.

Fifth. It has in effect given complete freedom of action to the Chinese Reds by having our Navy protect their long

and very vulnerable southern flank from our allies, the anti-Communists. This in turn means more Chinese Communists hurled against American forces in Korea, more American dead and wounded, greater percentage of the American Army tied down in Korea, less arms and ammunition to rearm Western Europe, and an additional and almost unbearable burden upon the American taxpayer. Such is the result of our two-sided, contradictory war in the Pacific in which the Seventh Fleet is ordered to fight on one side and the United States Army on the other. It seems impossible, but it is happening.

BROTHER FIGHTS BROTHER

It must be puzzling, indeed, for an American young man who is drafted and sent to Korea to fight communism and whose brother is sent to the Seventh Fleet to protect the same Communists whom he is fighting—the result of the most fantastic order that has ever existed in war or peace—an order which cannot be justified by even the most tortured reasoning; an order which bears the fingerprints—the very blood fingerprints, if you please—of Communist treason.

ONLY AMERICANS ARE ENTITLED TO FIGHT AND DIE

As the Senate knows, while we were badly outmanned in Korea and taking an awful kicking around because of the tremendous weight of numbers of the opposition, our ally, Chiang Kai-shek, who has about 600,000 troops on Formosa, offered to supply badly needed troops in Korea. Incidentally, remember that Nationalist China is a member of the United Nations, and all members of the U. N. were called upon to send troops to Korea, and that Chiang made the first and only sizable offer of troops.

He also offered the use of 1,000,000 guerrillas in China if he were merely given the light automatic weapons to equip them—a million fighters as a diversionary force to drag the Chinese Communist armies back out of Korea. But the group in power in the State Department, the same group which has been slowly gaining more and more power since the early 1940's, the group which was in power during the sell-out of China and the sell-out of Poland, said, "No; we won't use your troops because, if we did, we might make the Chinese Communists mad."

No one with eyes to see, ears to hear, and a mind with which to think can but agree that this action on the part of the President's Communist camp—following advisers signed the death warrant of vast numbers of American young men. It would be noted, also, that Marshall has apparently endorsed these orders—lock, stock, and barrel.

UNDISCLOSED WEDEMEYER REPORT TO CHIANG KAI-SHEK

I have in my hand the report of General Wedemeyer to Chiang Kai-shek made on the 10th of November 1945 upon his return from an official mission to Washington. I do not believe that this report has ever before seen the light of day, although the joint committee may have received it—but I have no informa-

tion that they have. General Wedemeyer was the chief of staff to the Generalissimo and, in effect, the commander in chief of all the Chinese Government forces as he was supreme commander of American forces in that theater. Wearing these two hats it was his duty to mediate between the Generalissimo and the American authorities.

It was his duty also to report in detail upon the American official attitude toward the crisis in China. This he did and I quote first the section of his report dealing with what he learned in what he described as his "consultations with the President." Wedemeyer wrote, and I quote in paraphrase: (a) The President wanted me to convey his greetings. (b) He was well satisfied with the accomplishments of this theater. (c) He emphasized the necessity of the early withdrawal of American Army, Navy, and Air Forces from China, stating the pressure on this point, the withdrawal of American personnel from China, is strong.

From whence did this pressure arise? Was it from the great peaceable masses of the American people, eager to have the war over and peacetime conditions reestablished, eager to have their sons, husbands, and brothers back home but in nowise eager to have our forces out of China? The answer, and you know this as well as I, came from the friends of the Russian Empire in America.

The message of the President to the Generalissimo was not discouraging. It remained for the Secretary of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which, of course meant Marshall, to deliver the coup de grace to Chiang Kai-shek's hopes for American support, moral, economic, and military, in putting down what Leahy had called the rebellion in China. It was evident from the Wedemeyer report on his talks with him that the China policy had already been set: No help to the Government of China in case it undertook to put down the Reds. The State Department made that clear to Wedemeyer—it quoted the President, although Truman himself had not mentioned the matter to Wedemeyer:

That the United States would not permit herself to be involved in the conflict between Chinese forces, and that she would also not facilitate the activities of the central government vis-à-vis the rebellious forces within Chinese territory.

The Joint Chiefs—again meaning Marshall—were even more explicit and disheartening. It remained for Marshall to state the larger policy: not only would we view a suppression of the rebellion adversely, withdrawing our aid in case Chiang Kai-shek proceeded forcibly, but we would demand a government of unity in China. Chiang must bring the Communists into his government. Already we had the example of Poland and of Rumania before us. We were now embarking on that same disastrous road in China. The Joint Chiefs, and I quote the Wedemeyer report:

Solemnly declared that American forces could not be involved in the civil war in China and that the United States would remain aloof in relations between the Chinese Government and Britain, France, the Soviet Union, or any other country.

Who was this, declaring diplomatic policy? The President, the Secretary of State—no; it was the Chief of Staff of the Army. I digress to explain the significance of that utterance. At the end of the war this Government had brought its overwhelming influence to bear to induce Chiang Kai-shek to yield to the betrayal at Yalta. Chiang had, therefore, a treaty with the Kremlin respecting the sovereignty of Manchuria, a treaty which the Russians had steadily violated from the day of the Japanese surrender, stripping Manchuria of what Edward Pauley, the Reparations Commissioner, estimated was at least \$800,000,000 of movable assets under the specious claim that it was "war booty." "War booty" from a bloodless, 6-day war.

The declaration I have quoted from the Wedemeyer report to the Generalissimo served notice in unmistakable language that the United States, having coerced China into accepting the sell-out at Yalta, was washing its hands of China's relations with Russia. We were abandoning the lamb to the lion. I doubt if the history of nations exhibits another such cynical declaration nor one which made the intentions of its author clearer. And who was the author of it? Not the President or the Secretary of State, who constitutionally speak for the United States in such matters—but the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a term, which, as we have abundantly discovered, was merely a euphemism for George Catlett Marshall.

I go on reading from this incredible document:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff clearly stated that American military aid to China would immediately terminate if the United States Government became convinced by facts that the Chinese forces benefiting from American aid were serving a government unacceptable to the United States, were engaged in civil war, or were employed for aggressive purposes. The degree of political security obtained under a unified government completely representative of the people would be regarded as a fundamental condition for the consideration of American economic, military, and other forms of aid to China. The United States Government would consider the above-mentioned condition, i. e., a unified government, as the criterion in determining whether or not to continue such aid.

There you have it spelled out in all its blunt and terrifying implications: The China policy, which ever since that date has operated to deliver China into the hands of the Kremlin acting through Mao Tse-tung and his accomplice lackeys—the China policy that inhibited Chiang at every turn from suppressing the Reds, setting his country in order, and proceeding with the great internal reforms to which he was committed and which he has always given every indication of pursuing in entire good faith. There it is: The China policy that brought about the war in Korea and which turned 450,000,000 friends of America into 450,000,000 foes.

AUTHOR OF CHINA POLICY

And who was the author of it? Had this directive to Wedemeyer been dictated by the master strategists of the

Kremlin themselves it could not more accurately have represented their will and wish. And where does this China policy leave the vital interests of the United States in the Far East, interests which we had just vindicated at the end of a 4-year war fought in good faith with the aid of our Chinese allies and at the cost of many thousands of lives and uncountable treasure? What of the men, the flower of American youth who died in the air and over the waters and islands of the Pacific to sustain American honor and support American interest in Asia? Every mother's son of them was betrayed by this policy as surely as were our Chinese allies.

The paternity has been denied, but finally from the conflicting testimony taken before the Russell committee, it is clear that the named authors were Marshall, Acheson, and John Carter Vincent with the balance of Hiss's friends in the background. It will be recalled that originally Marshall brushed off the drafting of the document with the statement that he was tied up in the Pearl Harbor investigation and indicated that he only knew about the instructions after the draft had been completed. Finally, it became clear, however, that Marshall, with the aid of Acheson and Vincent, himself drafted the instructions and presented them to the President for the President's approval.

I do not care to take the Senate's time in giving a picture of the third man, John Carter Vincent, at this time. Suffice to say that he has been repeatedly named as one of those who is always found helping to do the planning where disaster struck America and success came to Soviet Russia. Vincent it was who, with Owen Lattimore, guided Wallace on his mission through China. At the conclusion of this trip, Wallace made a report to the State Department in which he recommended the torpedoing of Chiang Kai-shek.

In his book, *Soviet Asia Mission*, Wallace states—page 172—that while he, Lattimore and John Carter Vincent, were traveling through China, Sergei Godlize, a high Soviet official—president of the executive committee of Siberian territory—and an intimate friend of Stalin's, toasted Owen Lattimore and John Carter Vincent at a dinner as the men on whom rests the responsibility for the future of China.

We need not dwell at this time on why Marshall under oath in 1950 was so anxious to disavow knowledge of the formulation or paternity of this infamous document. His faulty memory in this respect, however, should be borne in mind as one of the keys to the mystery of Marshall. At first blush the policy as set forth in the above document would appear disorganized and without clear point. It was not pointless, however. Those who drafted it understood very clearly the over-all plan being advanced.

On the 2d of December, 2 weeks before Marshall departed for China, William Z. Foster, the chairman of the Communist Party in the United States, assured a meeting of the American Politburo in New York of what had been for long a truism of Communist world

strategy. He put it in a new time frame, however, saying, "the civil war in China is the key to all problems on the international front." The problems of Europe, in other words, depended upon the issue in China. The next great expansive moves in the Kremlin's plan for world conquest waited upon victory in China. Those were the plain meanings of his words.

ACHESON'S MESSAGE TO THE KREMLIN

Two weeks earlier, on the 14th of November, Dean Acheson gave what was perhaps an unconscious explanation of why he and Marshall were determined that Russia must have China. On second thought, perhaps what he said was not veiled to the Kremlin. I believe now that he intended it as an official assurance to the Kremlin, and its friends in America concerning our intentions in China. Acheson was speaking—he was Under Secretary of State—on the platform with the Red Dean of Canterbury, Dr. Johnson, with Corliss Lamont, the prospective quisling, with Paul Robeson and Joseph E. Davies, who assisted as much as any American in the corruption of the American mind regarding Russia and the nature of the Kremlin during World War II.

First Acheson indulged in some dishonest history, saying that American and Russian interests never had clashed anywhere in the globe; forgetting in his zeal for Mother Russia the fears of Russian designs on the west coast of North America that helped to occasion the Monroe Doctrine and forgetting also how this Government under Theodore Roosevelt gave aid and comfort to Japan in the war of 1904-5 because the President thought Russian aggressions upon China were harmful to our interests in Asia.

At the moment Acheson spoke the Red armies were giving every manifestation that they intended to treat Manchuria not as a part of China but as their own colony, which, they have, in truth done to this day, to the utter ruin of the Open Door Policy of John Hay. They were showing every sign of annexing Northern Korea to their Manchurian colony. They were violating the spirit and text of the treaty we had extorted in their interest from Chiang Kai-shek.

Yet the Under Secretary of State, abasing himself before Russian imperial power, found no objective reason to suppose that we ever would have a clash of interest with what, with infinite hypocrisy, he called the Soviet peoples, identifying the subjected masses of Russia, the first victims of bolshevism, the faceless serfs of the Kremlin, with the tyrants themselves. We find that utterly fraudulent identification throughout the public utterances of that prince of deceivers, Acheson. He added, while the Red Dean, Quisling Lamont, Robeson, and Davies applauded, "We understand and agree with them—the Soviet peoples—that to have friendly governments along her borders is essential both for the security of the Soviet Union and the peace of the world."

The peace of the world. That was the specious moral reason given by the deluded and duped Truman for insisting

upon Chiang Kai-shek's capitulation to the Chinese Reds.

I think it is clear what Acheson was signaling to his masters in Moscow. He was saying, "You have seen that we delivered Manchuria and Northern Korea to you. That task is completed. You have set us another task, to see that you have a friendly government on your Manchurian and Mongolian borders. Never fear, rest assured, we will see to that, too. Only give us time and you will have a friendly Asia and then we can have world peace."

It could not have been spelled out more explicitly. And, as we shall see, Acheson and Marshall performed up to the very limit of their capacity, stinting nothing, withholding nothing of their country's interest, brooking no opposition to see that the Kremlin had a friendly government in China and we had a bloody and pointless war in Korea.

MARSHALL CHANGES HIS STORY

So the instructions were put into final shape by Marshall and Acheson and John Carter Vincent and, no doubt, Alger Hiss, who was by then in the Far Eastern Division and who was then, as now, the trusted friend of Acheson's. Marshall has recanted his false testimony of September 1950 wherein he sought to make it appear that he had no hand in the China policy and was a mere messenger of the President's. He has acknowledged the truth which was staring him in the face from the pages of Jimmy Byrnes' book, where Byrnes wrote on page 226:

The Sunday before I left for Moscow, Under Secretary Acheson, General Marshall and members of his staff met in my office. By the end of the morning's discussion, we had agreed upon the statement of policy that subsequently was approved by the President and released to the public on December 15.

Thereafter, the President made no change in that policy except upon the recommendation of General Marshall or with his approval.

The disastrous China policy, as we now see, was given birth to by Marshall with Acheson and Vincent acting as sympathetic and helpful midwives.

MARSHALL'S MEMORY

In this connection it should be remembered that Millard Tydings, of whitewash fame, wrote Marshall about the part that Lattimore had played in the formulation of the State Department's disastrous and treasonable far-eastern policy. Marshall answered that he had never met Lattimore—apparently had never even heard the name. It developed, however, that Lattimore had attended a three-day round table discussion called by the State Department on far-eastern policy. Some of those who attended have since pointed out that Lattimore sat next to Marshall for 3 days and engaged in a rather constant interchange of ideas with Marshall—another reason why, perhaps, V. M. I. should add a memory refresher course to its curriculum.

STALIN PROCLAIMS HIS ADMIRATION FOR MARSHALL

There is an interesting footnote to this situation, recounted in all innocence by Byrnes in his discussion of the ill-fated

mission to Moscow which he was undertaking at the same time that Marshall went to China. On page 228 "Speaking Frankly," Byrnes draws aside the curtain upon a talk with Stalin at the Kremlin regarding the China matter. I quote Byrnes:

He (Stalin) paid a compliment to General Marshall, saying that if anyone could settle the situation in China he (Marshall) could.

As Stalin might have added with entire accuracy—settle it to my satisfaction.

MARSHALL WAS WRONG, SAYS LEAHY

This was only a few days after the stormy scene at the White House described only sketchily in Jonathan Daniels' hero-worshipping biography of Truman. Marshall had appeared to get Truman's approval of his policy and Admiral Leahy, who was present, emphatically admonished him that his China policy was wholly at variance with President Roosevelt's attitude toward China and the Far East. The discussion became acrimonious and resulted in a permanent breach of the friendship between Leahy and Marshall.

Daniels quotes Leahy, page 317, saying:

I was present when Marshall was going to China. He said he was going to tell Chiang that he had to get on with the Communists or without help from us. He said the same thing when he got back.

I thought he was wrong both times.

The admiral only refers obliquely in his own memoirs to this passage, which took place in the uncomprehending presence of the Chief Executive and which disposes of his fraudulent claims to having administered Roosevelt's world policies as a faithful heir. Concerning this, Leahy wrote on page 104 of *I Was There*, and I quote him:

In the postwar period, General Marshall and I disagreed sharply on some aspects of our foreign policy.

THE CHINA QUESTION

I pass over the moral aspects of the Marshall policy for China, a mere statement of which should bring the blush of shame to every conscientious American. I turn to the clear and easily understood question of our national interest. I am not, Mr. President, reluctant or shamefaced when I speak of the interests of America. They are the interests of a great, decent, peaceable human society; a society long-suffering and patient, bearing no malice to any people anywhere, a society which has distributed its surplus bounty with a generosity and on a scale undreamed of in all the centuries of man to this time. I speak of American interests in the Far East with pride, not with embarrassment. What was our interest in China in the fall of 1945? What was the stake as between the United States and the Russian empire? Which was to have sway and influence over China: That is the kernel of the situation which we describe as the China question.

ONE STAKE AT YALTA—OUR WEST COAST

It is not necessary to outline where we would stand if Russia controlled all the Pacific shores of Asia and the islands pertaining thereto—Japan, Formosa, the Philippines, and the rest.

Our flank would be most grievously exposed. Not only would Hawaii be rendered extremely insecure and our Pacific coast brought into danger, but, most significant of all, the road to Alaska and northern Canada would be open to the air forces of the Russians, who have been for so long perfecting the arts of Arctic warfare. The Russians can reach Alaska over their own land mass. Given command of the western Pacific, they can supply and refresh their forces in Eastern Siberia by sea and ward off our attempts to interdict their supply. And from Alaska, as I have said, Pittsburgh—to say nothing of the west coast with its enormous war plants—is brought within range of Soviet long-range bombing and of guided missiles.

The command of the coast of Asia is part of the stake for which Russia was playing at Yalta and before. That may be called the oceanic aspect of the strategic problem. There is also the continental—and this bears upon Russia's defense from us in case of war. I do not profess to be expert on this subject and so I turn to one more proficient. I summon as a witness General Chennault, an airman, who, besides distinguishing himself in command of air forces during the war in China, has had long service in the leadership of civil aviation in Asia. I quote from General Chennault's book, *Way of a Fighter*, in his foreword where he says:

China is the key to the Pacific The United States attitude toward China should be based on a thoroughly realistic appraisal of China's value to the United States.

And again:

The Russians understand the role of China.

I again quote:

I seriously question that Russia will make anything more than probing skirmishes in Europe until her Asiatic flank is secure.

Chennault goes on to explain why this is so, and I quote:

From air bases built for America during the last war at Chengtu, Sian, and Lanchow in northwest China, all of the vast Russian industry east of the Ural mountains is open to air attack. From these same bases and dozens of others in northern China the slender thread of Russian communications between eastern and western Siberia could be snapped by even a small air force.

Chennault published all this in 1949 before our China policy had finally borne its bitter fruit, but what he says remains true. I quote:

If China remains friendly to the United States, the Russians will not dare move deeper into Europe, leaving their vitals exposed on their Asiatic flank. If the Asiatic flank is secure and American airpower is pushed out beyond critical range, then the way will be open for new and more powerful ventures in Europe.

At this point, perhaps we should recall the words of Lenin—"He who controls China, controls the world."

I commend those observations regarding our strategical problem in the Far East and its relationship to the security of Europe to the baffled but arrogant statesmen of Westminster and the deluded gentlemen of this administration who say, whatever they may believe, that

what happens in Korea is of no matter to the safety of Europe.

PREVARICATION

I have established by means of the Wedemeyer report to Chiang Kai-shek that Marshall, with the aid of Acheson and the rest of the old Hiss crowd, is the author of our China policy. What bearing does this revelation have, you may ask, upon Marshall's testimony before the Armed Services Committee of this body on September 19, 1950, when, by what I take to have been a deliberate equivocation, he contrived to give the impression that he had not participated in drafting the instructions he bore when he departed on his mission to China. He was being questioned by a Senator who is no longer among us, Millard E. Tydings of Maryland, chairman of that committee at that time.

This is General Marshall replying to a question which had been asked in a very friendly fashion by the chairman:

While I was in this room for a week undergoing the Pearl Harbor investigation, the policy of the United States was being drawn up in the State Department, and that was issued while I was on the ocean, going over there.

This was, mark you, in September 1950. The war which Marshall had helped to produce was being fought and he was under the scrutiny of the Armed Services Committee with reference to his nomination as Secretary of Defense. The China policy was not as popular as it had been. The people had been awakened by the events in Korea to a livelier interest in the factors that had brought on the war. Marshall was eager to get that job. I leave his motives to your conjecture.

And so he indulged that piece of barefaced, if indirect, prevarication. For a few days he was believed, for a time sufficient to have his nomination confirmed in what was one of the most monumental blunders ever committed by the Senate of the United States. This prevarication was even too strong for the stomach of the Washington Post, which has a strong stomach where the betrayal of American interest in the Far East is concerned, and it took the Secretary to task for it. I shall not dwell further upon this disgraceful episode. General Marshall's veracity, or lack of it, would be apropos; the incident would brand him as unworthy of high office under ordinary circumstances. However, the issues with which we are now dealing far transcend the question of his truthfulness.

The questions now before us concern his share in a series of events which go to the very heart of our existence as a free, self-governing people. Our survival is at stake in the present war in the Far East and what shall grow out of it and upon the wisdom and the loyalty of the men at the head of our Government depend decisions of life and death. We are now concerned with reviewing the record of General Marshall with a view to ascertaining his trustworthiness in that larger sense.

I had often wondered, until I read the Wedemeyer report from which I have quoted, why General Marshall, a man of

advancing years, undertook the ardors and discomforts of a sojourn in wintry, war-ravaged China at the behest of the President in December of 1945. His laurels were fresh and undimmed. As one of the leaders of the sweeping, world-wide allied victory he had world-wide prestige. So far as the public knew he deserved the respect of his countrymen and the honor due an old soldier who had apparently fulfilled one of the greatest duties ever entrusted to an American. To go to China, to enter into that vexed and complicated situation as a mere emissary of the President would be a thankless task. Furthermore, it represented a come-down in status. It was a good bit like sending Churchill to govern India, if India had still remained subject to the Crown.

I think it is now transparently clear why Marshall went to China. Having, with the Yalta crowd, framed the China policy, he was intent on executing it down to its last dreadful clause and syllable and it is, I think, significant that he tarried in China for 13 arduous months, and when he left it was obvious to all beholders that China must fall to the Russian Empire. What was his mission?

First. To restrain the Government of China from subduing the Red forces which were sworn to bring all China within the orbit of Moscow.

Second. To deny the Chinese Government American assistance if it attempted to master the Communist minority by force.

Third. To insist at all times, in defiance of the lessons of Europe and the plain evidences of Russian imperial ambitions in Asia, that Chiang Kai-shek must accept the Communists into his government.

The surrender of Yalta had to be concluded and perfected.

WEDEMAYER'S SOLUTION

But there was a final act to perform, an act calculated to put the quietus on the only sane, sensible formula for settling the civil war in China that came out of this whole deplorable period. General Wedemeyer had sent such a formula to the War Department, whence the plan was circulated through the Navy and State Departments. It was so simple and workable, so in conformity with American interest and all the ideals which had been uttered by the late President, that only in treason can we find why evil genius thwarted and frustrated it.

What General Wedemeyer proposed was that the Government of China, with the backing of the United States forces under his command, offer the Chinese Communist leaders full political rights and full status as a national political party. The rights and security of their leaders and the status of their party was to be underwritten by the United States and its forces, providing only that the Communists disarm their forces and surrender their arms. The Wedemeyer proposal included the promise of national elections to be supervised by the forces of the United States, to be held soon, with full electioneering rights to be guaranteed. Further, General Wedemeyer proposed that if the Communist

leaders refused this offer, which rested on the good faith of the United States, the forces under his command would then forcibly disarm them and return their troops to civilian status. In that case, however, the full political rights of the Communist leaders and party would still be safeguarded as in the former case and their security guaranteed by the United States.

The Reds, one may be sure, would not have accepted the offer. They did not want peaceful collaboration but unrest, guerrilla warfare, and finally conquest backed by their neighbor in Manchuria and deviously abetted by the United States Government. And that was what they got.

What fairer solution could have been found? What better solution in the interest of the United States? We professed to want a unified China operating under democratic procedures. But did our Government want that? General Wedemeyer's plan died in the files of the executive agencies concerned and we heard no more about it until the Russell committee forced it into the open.

And so General Marshall departed for China. His instructions as we have seen were written by the enemies of our friend and long-time ally, the Republic of China. I beg leave to express doubt that President Truman understood what the instructions were all about. He perhaps thought he was furthering a pious object. I beg leave to doubt that Secretary Byrnes, then departing on a fruitless errand of quasi-appeasement to Moscow, fathomed the purport of the China project.

I believe that if Byrnes had studied the thing, if he had familiarized himself with all its implications and the complex circumstances surrounding it, he would have rejected the Marshall plan for China. Unquestionably Dean Acheson understood it, and helped draft the open instructions with pleasure and endorsed its every aspect. In the days since then, Acheson has never deviated from the sheer intent of the policy, which was the surrender of China to Russia.

Why was it so impossible for the Marshall mission to reach any conclusion that served the interests of China and the United States? To begin with we had served notice on Chiang Kai-shek in Wedemeyer's report of November 10, that we would oppose and obstruct any attempt by him to come to realistic terms with the rebels who were in arms against him. We were, under all the verbiage, in their corner.

MARSHALL'S DECISIONS AIDED THE REDS

It has been said that every decision made by Marshall in China helped the Reds, harmed the Nationalists. That is true and the study of the expurgated and biased white paper which I shall lay before you, will prove it beyond any shadow of a doubt. I shall cite an example of the partisanship with which the Marshall policy worked in an incident that happened within a few days of his arrival in China. The situation which then was most rolling the relationships between Nationalists and Reds was the surrender of the Japanese forces. General Wedemeyer, with commendable dis-

patch, had set about moving the Nationalist armed forces from the west and the south of China where the defeat of Japan had left them, to the east and north so that they could implement the capitulation arrangements imposed upon Tokyo. The Communists, in violation of those arrangements, as they were always in violation of all arrangements that did not suit them, were forcing the surrender of Japanese forces in territories which they controlled. This was by express order of Gen. Chu Teh.

The purpose was to fasten the Red hold on territories and to acquire the Japanese arms and equipment given up when they surrendered. It was this confused and illegal situation in northern China which had prompted the Generalissimo and General Hurley to work out plans for a so-called political consultative conference to be held in January at which plans for the future welfare of China, including a national assembly of all parties, were to be discussed. Marshall arrived after both the Kuomintang and the Yenian Reds had agreed to a meeting of a Chiang Kai-shek representative, Chou En-lai for the Reds, and a third party, which should complete the plans for the conference. Marshall was asked to be the third party. He agreed. It was a hopeful moment. Conditioned on the functioning of the consultative conference was a cease-fire or stand-by agreement, to end the fighting and regularize the surrender of the Japanese. The committee held its first meeting on the 7th of January. Marshall had arrived on the day before Christmas, December 24.

THE MARSHALL MISSION'S FIRST GIFT TO RED CHINA

At the last moment the Communists threw a monkey wrench into the program. On the eve of the consultative meeting, the Communists demanded control of two cities in the north before signing the truce agreement. The cities were Chihfeng and Dolun. They were gateways from north China into Manchuria. Possession of them would make it impossible for the Reds to move their forces from the west into Manchuria and there effect junction with the Soviet armies. The basis upon which Chou En-lai demanded these cities was that Communist Chinese already were in possession of them. This Chiang Kai-shek, relying upon his advices, disputed, saying the Russians, who had reached that point in northern China, held the cities under agreement to turn them over to the Central Government. A. T. Steele, the correspondent of the New York Herald Tribune in the Chinese capital, quoted Chou En-lai in a dispatch at this time as saying that "the Communists would never agree" to the Nationalists having those cities. Chou En-lai threatened to derrick the whole cease-fire arrangement and the consultative conference unless Chiang yielded. Chiang on his part was firm. Marshall offered several compromises which Chou En-lai rejected.

Thereupon, acting upon Chou En-lai's representations that Chihfeng and Dolun already were in Chinese Red hands,

Marshall forced Chiang Kai-shek to yield.

He went to the generalissimo's house at 10:30 o'clock on the night of the 9th. He stayed until midnight bringing to bear all the power which he held as the representative of the United States Government, and in the end Chiang Kai-shek gave up. Marshall sent for Chou En-lai the next morning, and at 8 a. m. issued a statement saying:

Last night I had a very good talk with the generalissimo and he agreed to the conditions regarding the towns of Chihfeng and Dolun.

Whereupon, Chou En-lai signed the cease-fire agreement. I take this incident in part from Miss Utley's book, in part from other sources. This was the first but not the last of Marshall's surrenders to the Reds. The fat was in the fire after that first test of his strength. The fact is, and it has bearing on the incident, that the cities were not in the hands of the Chinese Reds. That was a lie out of whole cloth. They were occupied at that time by the Russians, who did not evacuate them until the 23d of January. Chou En-lai knew it to be a lie.

So did Chiang Kai-shek. What Marshall had done was to force Chiang to abandon those cities upon the basis of a fraud which all China soon knew about.

I have in my hands the official report of a conversation between General Torochenko of the Russian Army, and Gen. Tung Yen-ping, deputy chief of staff of the Chinese Nationalist headquarters in Manchuria, at Mukden, on the 29th of January, which utterly disproves the lie that moved Marshall to impose his will upon Chiang. I did not obtain the transcript of that talk from Russian sources. Torochenko was reporting to Tung upon the Russian withdrawal from Chihfeng and Dolun, expressing his surprise that the Chinese Nationalist forces had not arrived at Chihfeng on the 16th as expected. He said:

Up to 2 a. m., January 23, there were no signs that the Chinese troops were advancing toward the city. Since we had no way of knowing why Chinese troops hesitated in entering the city, and since the Soviet troops were due to withdraw on January 23 from Chihfeng, the Soviet garrison commander, Colonel Shalenko, could only adhere to the withdrawal plan which had already been communicated to the Chinese authorities and ordered all Soviet troops to withdraw from the city. At the time of the Soviet withdrawal, the administrative machinery of the city remained intact . . . it was the same set of administrative machinery that we found when we entered the city in August 1945.

That ends the quotation. The city administration was non-Communist. I again quote the Red General Torochenko:

The responsibility for the failure of Chinese troops to enter Chihfeng should be borne by the Chinese alone. From January 16 to January 23 we were waiting for Chinese troops to enter the city. According to my own estimation, this is probably due to the fact that the Chinese troops had received orders from President Chiang Kai-shek preventing them from advancing as of January 13.

We have seen why they did not advance on the 13th. Marshall had on the 9th given them to Yen-an. The consequence was that these gateways to Manchuria passed to the Reds and that fact was highly significant in future operations. So began the dreary tale of the Marshall mission to China and it was so that General Marshall began executing the Yalta policy in China.

We must never lose sight of the overwhelming influence of the surrender to Russia at Yalta in the subsequent history of China. In his letter transmitting the white paper on China to the President, Secretary Acheson perpetrates two astonishing untruths. The first is his denial that the refusal of ammunition to the Republic of China by the United States from August 1946 to August 1947 helped bring about the downfall of the Republic.

This is the repetitious lie which has been amply refuted, if nowhere else, in the dispatches of Ambassador J. Leighton Stuart, published in the annexes of the white paper.

THE MASTER OF THE HALF-TRUTH

The second falsehood is less tangible. It deals with speculative matters. Dean Acheson is a master of the half-truth, of the artful deception calculated to deceive the people. There is a sinuosity to Acheson's public utterances which makes it always advisable to place them under close analysis. He excused the demoralizing effects of Yalta on China's postwar circumstances by suggesting that, in any case, Russia could have moved into Manchuria and accomplished what she did in the way of turning that treasure house over to the Chinese Communists. Acheson repeated this barefaced fraud in his testimony the other day. That is plainly not true. When the deal was made at Yalta, the Russians had something like 30 divisions in eastern Siberia, according to General Deane's report. For these they lacked equipment. They were not prepared for offensive operations. Under the terms of the bribe negotiated by Harriman and Deane at Moscow, we gave Russia 800,000 tons of equipment for its far-eastern forces. They moved a number of divisions from the west into Siberia and when they opened their bloodless march across Manchuria, at our invitation, they were a well-equipped army.

IF THE SELL-OUT HAD NOT OCCURRED

Suppose, and this is a reasonable supposition, we had not implored Russia to enter the war in the Far East, had not equipped her army, had not given her the right to take Manchuria—where would the sudden collapse of Japan on the 10th of August, 1945, have found the Russians? Certainly not established in force throughout Manchuria and the northern provinces of China. Had we followed the advice of Admiral Leahy, instead of Marshall, the war with Japan would no doubt have come to its abrupt end with the Kremlin dickering with us for the bribe which they obtained with such miraculous ease at Yalta. The situation in the Far East—then and to-

day—would have in that case looked something like this:

The surrender of the Japanese Kwantung army in Manchuria would have been made to the Americans and Chinese. The Americans would have held Manchuria—and all Korea for the Koreans—until the armies of the Republic of China could have been moved unimpeded there to take over. There were no Communists in Manchuria on VJ-day except for secret agents. The Japanese had refused to allow such enemies within their lines. Given a peaceable transfer of Manchurian sovereignty from Japan to China, the great industrial plant of Manchuria would have remained intact instead of being looted and wrecked by the Russians, the surplus agricultural products of Manchuria could have been organized for relief of hunger in China proper and the problems that aggrieved the Republic of China from 1945 to its fall in 1949—military and economic—would have been well on their road to solution. With the Red army of Russia confined behind the Siberian-Manchurian border, the threat of Russian assistance to the Yen-an Communists would have been negligible.

Given an uncontaminated American policy in Washington, we could have applied the same rule we were to apply to Greece—arming the government which we recognized, affording it military guidance to put down a Communist rebellion. Had we followed Leahy with respect to Yalta and Wedemeyer in the immediate aftermath of VJ-day in China, we would not, in all human likelihood, be at war in Asia today. China would have become a progressive, hopeful, democratic society instead of a slave state in subjection to Moscow and 140,000 young Americans would not have been called upon to expiate Yalta and the Marshall mission—with how many more to come, God alone knows.

I have emphasized the overshadowing importance of Yalta in what is to follow because Manchuria was the rock upon which China broke in the postwar years. It was Chiang Kai-shek's effort to claim Manchuria against the will of the Russians and their Chinese stooges and against the restraints imposed by Marshall that first cracked the great military machine which he had on VJ-day.

COMMUNISTS IN UNITED STATES WRECK CHINA MONEY SYSTEM

Chiang was also beset by the monetary and inflation difficulties which were partly the result of a lengthy war, but to at least some extent planned for him in the United States. In that connection, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD at this point an article by a man who, perhaps better than any other, has an insight into and grasp of the problems of China. While I know it is unnecessary, permit me to mention also that he is one of the greatest Americans I know—George Sokolsky.

In this article he points out that ruinous inflation for China was planned and perpetrated by the agents of the Kremlin working high in our Government.

I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, that this article appear in the body of the RECORD at this point in my remarks.

THESE DAYS

(By George Sokolsky from the Washington Times-Herald, September 3, 1950)

These two events are not unrelated:

1. The controversy between President Truman and Gen. Douglas MacArthur over Formosa;

2. The admission of Lee Pressman that he, John Abt, Nathan Witt, Charles Kramer and others had been members of the Harold Ware cell of the Communist party, designed to infiltrate the highest positions in government.

The connection is that were it not for the machinations of these intellectual Communists in the State Department and Treasury Department, it is unlikely that Nationalist China would have collapsed and Soviet Russia would not so readily have been able to add China to the federation of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Had China not been conquered, General MacArthur would not today be leading an army in Korea, and he would not have become involved in a controversy with the President over Formosa.

Therefore a full congressional investigation might be made, now that Lee Pressman has opened the door, into the destruction of China's currency by the Treasury Department of the United States. Such an investigation might go into the activities of Harry Dexter White, Harold Glasser, Charles Kramer and Frank Coe.

Chiang Kai-shek was a popular leader among his people since 1924 until the currency of his country became so depreciated as to be worthless. The beginning of this was the Silver Purchase Act of 1934, passed by the Congress of the United States.

China's currency was based on a silver standard. When the United States raised the price of silver from 30 cents an ounce to \$1.29, the silver of China flowed to the United States.

One of the arguments in favor of the Silver Purchase Act of 1934 was that it would aid the economy of China. Anyone familiar with the economy of China knew that it could only do damage, particularly to China's exports.

China sent commissions and representatives to this country to plead against this madness, which did them so much harm and did us no good. As K. P. Chen, manager of the Shanghai Commercial Savings Bank, once said:

"* * * The rise of the silver price brought in its wake, as far as China is concerned, falling prices, shrinkage of currency, destruction of industries and business, a greater deficit in the government's budget, and increasing chaos in society."

This is a mild description of what happened. Then President Roosevelt began to give China advisers. Some, like Lauchlin Currie and Owen Lattimore, actually went to China; other drew ornate plans in the Treasury Department.

Loans were made to China to help her off a bad spot, but these loans always involved an agreement to reform something in that country, and after the reform was introduced, the currency situation became worse.

It would be vitally important, if we are to get at the facts, to study not only the activities of the United States Treasury, but also of the RFC.

In connection with these various loans and credits and stabilizations, it would be advantageous to note which Americans acted as counsel for the Chinese borrowers.

It might also be of advantage to study the role of that amazing Pole, Ludwik Rajchman, who is no longer attached to the Chinese but

is a representative of Communist Poland in the United Nations.

Gen. Douglas MacArthur, who knows how vital Formosa is to the defense of the United States on the Japan-Okinawa-Philippines line, has already issued a warning to the American people. In 1947, before it was too late, General Wedemeyer reported:

"The situation in Manchuria has deteriorated to such a degree that prompt action is necessary to prevent that area from becoming a Soviet satellite."

"The Chinese Communists may soon gain military control of Manchuria and announce the establishment of a government."

"Outer Mongolia, already a Soviet satellite, may then recognize Manchuria and conclude a 'mutual support agreement' with a defacto Manchurian government of the Chinese Communists."

"In that event, the Soviet Union might accomplish a mutual support agreement with Communist-dominated Manchuria, because of her current similar agreement with Outer Mongolia."

"This would create a difficult situation for China, the United States, and the United Nations. Ultimately it could lead to a Communist-dominated China."

The warning was not heeded and we are now at war in Korea. If General MacArthur's warning that Formosa is vital to our national defense is not heeded, we may soon be fighting again in the Philippines.

CHIANG'S PROBLEM IN MANCHURIA

The campaigns in Manchuria, added to the harassing and vexatious necessity of fighting the guerrilla warfare of the Communist Chinese in north China, strained the logistics of the Republic unendurably, as General Wedemeyer had predicted they would when, in his November 10 report to the generalissimo, he advised deferring the attempt to subdue Manchuria until north China had been pacified.

That advice Chiang Kai-shek was unable to accept. The sentiment of his people reminded him that the 8-year war with Japan had been over Manchuria. Manchuria was his nominally by a treaty which he hoped, in spite of all examples to the contrary, Russia would honor. Furthermore, and this was a clinching fact, Manchuria, the workshop of Asia, contained until looted by Russia four times the industrial capacity of China proper, three times its power capacity and four times its railroad mileage in proportion to area. The great plains of Manchuria, moreover, were and are the granary of the Far East.

What was the diplomatic situation when Marshall began his mission? The August treaty, signed by T. V. Soong and Molotov, bound Russia "to render to China moral support and aid to be given entirely to the National Government as the Central Government of China." You will remember that this treaty pledged Moscow to recognize Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria. Did Russia live up to this treaty? The question answers itself. Did Bolshevik Russia ever live up to a commitment made with the world outside its hostile battlements? General Wedemeyer reported to the War Department as early as the 20th of November 1945, and noted on page 131 of the white paper; and I quote:

Russia is in effect creating favorable conditions for the realization of Chinese Com-

munist, and possibly their own plans in north China and Manchuria. These activities are in violation of the recent Sino-Russian treaty and related agreements.

Wedemeyer added a warning with reference to the fatuous policy—a policy that never made sense from the American and Chinese viewpoint but made the highest type of sense from that of the Kremlin—of attempting a Nationalist-Red coalition in China. He said:

It appears remote that a satisfactory understanding will be reached between the Chinese Communists and the National Government.

As Wedemeyer reported this in November of 1945, the State Department was daily receiving advice from its embassies and legations in Eastern Europe to the effect that collaboration with Communists in the succession governments of those States was an evil dream, impossible to maintain in good faith, conducive only to the conquest of those lands by Moscow.

One American diplomat who was so notifying the Department in the most urgent and explicit terms was Arthur Bliss Lane, the postwar Ambassador to Poland, who protested when Dean Acheson's law firm wangled a \$90,000,000 loan for the Red government at Warsaw and received a \$50,000 fee for that betrayal of the American taxpayer.

At the time Acheson was negotiating this loan for Communist Poland, Ambassador Lane cabled him as follows:

With the greatest earnestness of which I am capable, I beg the Department not to approve the extension of any credits at this time. When the terroristic activities of the security police come to an end, when freedom of the press is restored, and when American citizens are released from Polish prisons—not until then should United States public funds be used to assist the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

But getting back to China, the white paper further records, on page 136, that:

The National Government is convinced that the U. S. S. R. had obstructed the efforts of the National Government to assume control over Manchuria in spite of the provisions of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of August 1945, and that the Chinese Communists were tools of the U. S. S. R.

And again, on page 147, allow me to submit this further evidence:

The entry of Chinese Government forces (into Manchuria) had * * * been seriously impeded by Russian refusal to permit their use of Dairen as a port of entry * * * and by delay in Russian withdrawal. This delay also had the effect of giving the Chinese Communists time to build up their forces in Manchuria, which had apparently been reinforced by the movement of hastily organized or reinforced units from Chahar and Jehol provinces.

These movements were by way of Chihfeng and Dolun, cities about which we have heard.

What had the Russians done to implement their treaty of friendship and alliance with China? A treaty, mind you, to which we were a part, for, and

I am reading from page 116 of the white paper:

At the outset (of the T. V. Soong negotiations for the treaty in Moscow) the United States informed the participants that it expected to be consulted prior to the signing of any Sino-Soviet agreements in view of its role at Yalta.

Not only did we compel the Chinese to make this treaty, we declared, for that is what the diplomatic language means, that we were a party at interest in it.

What did the Russians do? First, they closed the principal port of Manchuria—Dairen—to the shipping of all nations, including the Chinese, whose sovereignty over it they had just sworn to uphold. Did we protest this flagrant violation of the treaty and our rights? The white paper fails to record it if we did. Next they clamped a rigid control over the railroads, denying them as it pleased them to the forces of the Republic of China even though the ink was scarcely dry on their solemn word that the railroads were to be administered jointly by Russia and China.

CHINESE REDS MOVE INTO MANCHURIA

The Russians welcomed the Chinese Communists to Manchuria. They had enormous stores of arms surrendered by the Japanese, their ammunition dumps, their reserve weapons, and so forth. Those they gave to the Chinese Communists. They supplied staff direction, training officers, and camps for the conscript of the Chinese Reds. They stiffened them with Japanese from the Kwantung armies and finally they turned them loose—a disciplined army, well armed and well led—to defeat the war-weary, under-supplied forces of the Chinese Republic.

That is the story. It is an old story, familiar to you all. Does anyone doubt it? On the 2d of November 1945, Chinese Reds, who had already seized the port of Yingkow in Manchuria with Russian Red assistance, warned Vice Admiral Barbey, of the United States Navy, to withdraw his command from that port to avoid a collision. Barbey was also compelled to pull out of the Manchurian port of Huludao after Chinese Communist soldiers fired on his launch.

Did our State Department protest this unfriendly action? I remind you that at about the time the United States Navy was being humiliated in Manchurian waters, General Marshall was admonishing Chiang Kai-shek, that he could expect no diplomatic assistance from us vis-à-vis Russia. Protect Chinese interests? We would not even protect our own.

ATTEMPTS TO DECEIVE RUSSELL COMMITTEE

The other day Dean Acheson testified before the Russell committee. He uttered the time-honored and fraudulent version devised by him and Marshall of why we yielded to Russia at Yalta. He sought to palliate that shame by his shopworn excuse: Had we not bribed Russia into the war, she would have come anyway and then her behavior would have been even worse. I ask this question—I do not ask it of Dean Ache-

son; he is too far gone in mendacity and treason for his answer to carry any weight whatsoever—I ask it of the people whom we all in this Senate collectively represent.

Given the immense strength the United States disposed in the Far East in August 1945, do you believe the Soviet Union would have ventured to fight its way into Manchuria once we and our Chinese allies had accepted the surrender of the Kwantung army? The answer is self-evident.

If we had wanted to keep Russia out of Manchuria in August 1945, all hell couldn't have blasted her in. We didn't want to keep Russia out. We invited her in, and Acheson had the nerve the other day to insult the intelligence and the knowledge of two senior committees of the Senate of the United States by repeating that pernicious tissue of falsehood regarding Yalta.

What was the situation when General Marshall arrived? Economically, according to the White Paper, page 127, it was, and I quote, "despite the brutal and devastating effect of 8 years of war, surprisingly good and contained many elements of hope. In China proper, although there had been serious wartime disruptions in certain sectors of the economy, the productive potential of agriculture, mining and industry in most of the area taken from the Japanese was not substantially different from that of 1937. The expulsion of the Japanese from Manchuria and Formosa promised to increase several-fold the national industrial plant and to contribute to the achievement of national self-sufficiency in food."

The Chinese Republic, as we have seen, never got Manchuria. China had unprecedentedly large gold and United States dollar exchange, estimated at \$900,000,000, with half that much again in private hands. Politically, the prospect was equally promising, except for the rebellion. Civil rights had been restored, including the right to a free press, and Chiang Kai-shek was genuinely trying to implement the reforms which had been interrupted by the outbreak of the war with Japan in 1937.

As always, he was committed to the Sun Yat-sen program, which all parties, including the Communists, embraced in principle; being willing to go half way with the Reds on a new political regime which would end the one-party rule of the Kuomintang. He had shown his good faith—as he was to do again and again in the negotiations with the Yenan Reds—in the matter of the political consultative conference.

I notice a curious aspect of the white paper. I find nowhere in its hundreds of pages any reflection upon the character and integrity of Chiang Kai-shek. His character was proof against the busy justifiers who compiled that record under the editorial oversight of Philip Jessup. It is my opinion that when the historians of the future come to enumerate the foremost men of the age in which we live, they will place Chiang Kai-shek high on that roster. I say this, Mr. President, in spite of all the high-

pitched screaming and squealing of the Lattimores, the Jessups, and the camp-following bleeding hearts of press and radio.

SABOTAGE BY COMMERCE AND STATE DEPARTMENTS

In a military sense, the Republic of China was in a position to meet any problem confronting it except the subversion of its will and the failure of supply from outside. Had China been Greece, had 1945 been 1947, there would have been no problem of pacification at all. I turn again to the white paper, page 311, for the story of the military situation, and I quote:

The Government . . . possessed an estimated 5 to 1 superiority in combat troops and rifles (over the Reds), a practical monopoly of heavy equipment and transport, and an unopposed air arm.

General Wedemeyer had promptly ferried armies to Shanghai, Peiping, and Nanking by air from the west. He subsequently transported up to a half million troops to new positions. He finished equipping the 39 divisions which had been trained by the United States forces and supplied large quantities of military supplies earmarked under wartime lend-lease. This was the only material assistance given the Republic of China in any bulk after the war until the aid-to-China bill of 1948 began to operate—the operation of which was thoroughly sabotaged by the Commerce and State Departments. It should have been more. Over the hump in India, the United States military authorities were detonating large stores of ammunition and dumping 120,000 tons of war supplies in the Bay of Bengal—much of it undelivered to China but charged to her wartime lend-lease account.

CHOU EN-LAI CONVERTS MARSHALL

The arrival of Marshall in Nanking was welcomed by all parties. Chiang Kai-shek, who, at the time, was unacquainted with Marshall, as many of us have been, and thought so well of him that he would have, the following fall, invited him to take supreme command of his armies, hoped that Marshall, if truly serving the interests of the United States, would soon perceive, after a personal experience of the realities, where those interests lay. The Communists, as Miss Utley reports on page 10 of the China Story, "Welcomed," and I quote, "General Marshall with open arms." Miss Utley is not a hostile witness for, while she dissects and condemns the China policy with merciless clarity, she is indulgent with General Marshall and considers that he was imposed upon by impossible orders. The Wedemeyer report of November 10 was not available to her when she wrote.

The Chinese Reds were fortunate, Miss Utley continues, in that their leading representative in Chungking was the handsome, intelligent, and charming Chou En-lai, now foreign minister of the Peiping government. Chou En-lai had for years shown a singular capacity for converting American journalists to the belief that the Chinese Communist Party was composed of liberal agrarian reformers who should be backed against

the despotic, reactionary government of Chiang Kai-shek. I continue to quote Miss Utley:

Soon it became apparent to those of us who were in Chungking at the time and were frequently invited to General Marshall's residence, that Chou En-lai had succeeded in captivating him. Any doubts General Marshall may originally have had as to the truths of the State Department thesis about the "progressive" Communists and the "reactionary" Nationalists had obviously been dispelled. The fascinating Chou En-lai had evidently finally convinced General Marshall that the Chinese were not "real" Communists, or that they could be detached from their Russian affiliation provided only that they were helped by America to bring "democracy" to China. Marshall had long since come under the influence of his old friend, General Stilwell, who believed in the liberal professions of the Chinese Communists. Chou En-lai merely completed his conversion.

I do not subscribe to Miss Utley's analysis of Marshall's state of mind. I do not regard him as the dupe of Chou En-lai.

RADICAL WRITER DESCRIBES MARSHALL

I call up another friendly witness to the happiness brought to the Communists by Marshall's arrival. This one is Robert Payne, the author of the seemingly authorized and certainly idolatrous biography entitled, "Mao Tse-tung, ruler of Red China." Writes Mr. Payne on page 207, and I quote him:

In the early days of 1946 there was a breathing spell for the Communists. Gen. George Marshall had been sent to replace General Hurley. He was a man of an entirely different caliber. He made a serious effort to understand the opposing camps. He visited Yen-an and commented favorably upon the Communist's social policies, and he detested the servility (sic) of most of the Kuomintang officers he met. Urbane, polished, sensitive to social forces, he refused to accept the claims of either side in the quarrel, his preferences remaining with the liberal groups in the center, though for the most part these had long ago despaired of the reactionary policies of the Kuomintang.

I ask you to pause with me for a moment while we analyze the language of Payne. You will note the use of the term "reactionary" to describe the Kuomintang. That was standard operating procedure for the Yen-an Reds as it was, and still is, for all those in America who follow the Yen-an line on China. We shall meet with that epithet for the Kuomintang later in the language of the soldier-statesman who was sent to China presumably to work out a solution of the civil strife in that country, which would accord, first, with the international interests of the United States, and secondly, with the interests of the people of China. The job of George Marshall in China scarcely called upon him to pass upon the relative social reform program of the contending parties. Both were reformers, both claimed to be the heirs of Sun Yat-sen. A commission of social workers or practicing sociologists could have weighed those matters far more expertly than this old soldier. He was called upon at a critical stage of world history, with Russia looming down from

Manchuria and with that country already visibly embarked upon its scheme of world conquest and consolidation to consider where the struggle in China fitted that larger picture and to extract from it something that suited his own country's welfare and security. I shall give you an example that is strictly to the point. Suppose Britain had sent to Austria in the days when the Nazis, the Dollfuss-Stohremberg party and the Social Democrats were contending for mastery, a soldier with the mission of bringing about a peace that would serve England's European interests as against the rising Nazi power. Would he have troubled himself with questions of internal reform, or would he have sought to make a peace which would bring to power the forces most bent upon frustrating and defeating Nazi power?

The spectacle of General Marshall, ignoring the world interests involved in China, the menace of the Russia he had done more than any other man to seat in Manchuria, and solemnly inspecting the soup kitchens and nurseries of Yen-an would be laughable were it not so heavy with portent for the American people.

GUTTER INTELLECTUALS—WHETHER NAZI OR COMMUNIST, THE SAME

The point to dwell upon here is that Marshall showed throughout his stay in China that he accepted the party line for innocents, that the Communists are a party of social reform devoted to the well-being of the masses. In that light they had his sympathy. It is no wonder that the prevailing opinion of the Marshall mission has been that it was the venture of a gullible man not yet apprised of what was a truism to students of politics and the world in 1946, namely, that communism was a drive for power by a disciplined minority with welfare as its cloak, precisely as nazism was an enterprise of gutter intellectuals to gain the power of a great state and then Europe in the guise to Germans of what its name meant: national socialism. That view of General Marshall does insufficient credit to his mentality and is far too pat. Reform was not, in my opinion, Marshall's prime consideration in China, although he sometimes made it appear so. Neither was peace. What it was we shall consider later when we have treated the evidence further.

MARSHALL'S COMMISSION

I shall not take the time to discuss Marshall's exploits in China in detail. I could speak for a week on that subject. It is unnecessary, I think, to follow the course of the endless, frustrating negotiations he conducted. He had commissioned himself to provide a political solution of the civil war "satisfactory to both sides." The specific solution was a new government which would include representation from the Communists and the minor parties, a government that could function with a parliament, courts and the rest, but a government with two armies. For that was what allowing the Communists to have a part of the national army, to be stationed in

areas under Communist political control, meant. As finally worked out but never, of course, put into practice, the Republic of China was to have 50 divisions, the Peoples Republic of Yen-an 10 divisions. I have only to state the solution which Marshall was bent upon imposing to exhibit its absurdity. Such a proposal did not look to a permanent government in the western sense, it looked only to a truce in the struggle for all China. The Kuomintang wanted a stable government representing the consensus of all political opinion with a parliament affording a forum in which issues might be debated and resolved. The Communists said they wanted participation in a national government with a private army and regional ascendancy on the side.

DISTORTION OF THE WHITE PAPER

I have studied the White Paper on this subject. In this address I am going to refer only to the White Paper concerning General Marshall's activities. Chapter 5 of the White Paper deals, as you know, with the Marshall Mission. It contains a footnote which says, "The bulk of the material for this chapter has been drawn from the files of General Marshall's mission."

The White Paper is obviously a highly prejudiced document. It is impossible to form a final opinion of China's sell-out from it alone because so much has been left out—so much of it is phrased and tailored to convey a certain viewpoint toward Marshall and his policy.

For example, where the editors needed to balance the recalcitrance of the Communists on some point which is tangible, they resort to intangible reports of what some unidentified officials of the Republic of China were saying, not doing, so that they may blame them also for the failures. This is in line with Acheson's bringing forth, at the Russell hearings, an anonymous document from an anonymous chamber of commerce in an anonymous town signed by anonymous men, setting forth all of the Communist party line arguments against the Republic of China, and it was a fantastic sight to see a few Senators during the reading of this anonymous document, nodding their heads and smiling as though they were receiving some valuable information.

Where it became necessary to recount some Communist outrages against United States Marines in July, the authors of the White Paper first meticulously related an attack upon a peace delegation that went from Shanghai to Nanking, an attack which the White Paper says was committed by "an organized group of Kuomintang secret police." The information that they were Kuomintang secret police was from an anonymous source, of course. This is on page 171. Turn the page and you come to a paragraph describing as "part of Communist activities during this period" the kidnapping of seven Marines in East Hopei and, this I quote:

A deliberate Communist ambush of a United States Marine-escorted motor convoy bound from Tientsin to Peiping, during which 3 Americans were killed and 12 wounded.

That is surely a restrained treatment of that occurrence. Considerably greater emotion was displayed by the writers in describing the incident at Nanking. One gathers that, since the alleged assailants at Nanking were Kuomintang police, the victims were Communists. You can be sure none of the Marine victims of the Communists were Communists. This is taken, may I remind you, from an American Government document printed at the expense of Americans. I find similarly biased matter throughout the White Paper, but it is General Marshall's own record of his mission, hence I quote from it hereafter.

NATIONALIST VICTORIES SPEED UP MARSHALL'S DEMAND FOR CEASE-FIRE

I related to you some time back how Marshall was able to arrange a cease-fire between the contending armies in January after compelling Chiang Kai-shek to give up the cities of Chihfeng and Dolun. That truce was in effect when General Marshall returned to the United States on March 11. It was generally observed by the forces of the Republic. On the 15th of April, however, there was a resounding breach when the Yen-an Reds laid siege to the important city of Changchun in Manchuria, which lies on the railway from Mukden to Harbin. Three days later the Reds had Changchun. That day General Marshall returned to Nanking.

Chiang, finding the truce broken to his disadvantage, ordered his forces to recapture Changchun. A month later the Nationalist forces defeated the Reds in a battle south of Changchun, and with the Reds in flight to the northward, the Nationalists easily retook Changchun on the 23d of May.

At this time the advantage lay with the forces of the Republic. This was before, mind you, the Yen-an Reds had been able to train their conscripts with the new weapons handed them by the Russians. The Nationalists streamed north out of Changchun, headed for Harbin. It is possible, and the Nationalist generals so thought, that victory in Manchuria and the control of the railway lines as far as Harbin lay open to them.

WHITE PAPER DESCRIBES MARSHALL'S FRENZY

General Marshall had other plans. He had been busy since his return, seeking to restore the truce. With the Nationalist victory he redoubled his efforts until, as described in the White Paper, they mounted to something like a frenzy. The Reds were clamoring at his heels, demanding that he call off the enemy. Chiang went to Mukden and the wires were kept hot between Marshall and him.

At length, Chiang yielded, and on June 6 a new truce was put into effect. Several times extended, it lasted until early in July, but in the meanwhile no political issues could be settled. I want to be fair about this, I do not want to give you a hasty judgment, but throughout the Marshall mission the succession of events seems to have been this:

Marshall obtained concessions from Chiang to meet Red demands, whereupon, having gained a point, the Reds levied new demands. It was the familiar technique of Petrograd in 1916. When-

ever the Kerensky government yielded a point to the Bolsheviks in the Petrograd Soviet the Soviet presented a new demand more exorbitant than the preceding one. I think it is evident from a reading of the white paper on these negotiations that the Yen-an Reds never appeared in good faith. They did not want agreement but disagreement.

They were playing for time in which to avail themselves of their resources in Manchuria, meanwhile conducting a barrage of insulting propaganda against the United States in the free press of Kuomintang China aimed at enfeebling the already feeble will of the Truman administration to help the Republic of China.

The June 6 truce was being steadily whittled away during July. Aggressive action was being taken, primarily by the Communists, and never for an instant did they cease the guerrilla activity, the destruction of the railway lines, the blowing up of dams and bridges, the damaging of mines and factories which were making a nightmare out of the efforts to reestablish the communications and the economy of China. By mid-July the forces of the Republic had gained control of many strategic points and the Reds increasingly were thrown back on hit-and-run activities. I shall not list the specific points taken by the Nationalists. The names of the cities are unfamiliar and difficult to pronounce and, in any case, of more significance to the Chinese than to us.

CHINA REDS DENOUNCE UNITED STATES

It was during July that the outrages I have mentioned, along with others less grievous, took place against the 50,000 marines who were stationed at Tientsin and other points. It was during July that the shrill denunciations of the United States over the radio and in the Red press reached a crescendo. On July 7 the Yen-an officials issued a manifesto denouncing the United States in bitter terms for giving assistance to the Chinese Republic. We were sending a military advisory staff to Nanking, the advisory service which you will recall the Joint Chiefs had advised General Wedemeyer they approved in November. The Government at Washington was negotiating with Nanking over the sale of surplus war materials stored on the islands of the Pacific.

ACHESON ASKS HOUSE COMMITTEE TO APPROVE TRAINING OF COMMUNIST ARMIES

It was on the 21st of June that Chou En-lai suggested to Marshall that the United States undertake the training of Communist troops slated for the national army. You are familiar with this episode. Let me put it in the framework of the Marshall mission. The Reds were everywhere obdurate in the negotiations, they were violating the truce wherever it was profitable, they were attacking Americans and, apparently acting upon orders from Moscow, uttering the same billingsgate simultaneously in Shanghai, Nanking, Manchuria, and in the cities of America.

It was under those circumstances that on June 19, Marshall's faithful coconspirator, the Under Secretary of State, Acheson, appeared before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in behalf

of that project. Already in China 69 American officers had been earmarked for the training program and 400 tons of equipment set aside to start the project. The hearings were being held on a bill submitted by the State Department as an aid-to-China bill, but which contained the joker relating to training the Communist forces. We are all indebted to the able and vigilant Congresswoman EMORY Nourse ROGERS for bringing the crucial part of these hearings—which never were published—into the RECORD recently. "The Communist leaders have asked," Acheson testified, "and General Marshall has agreed that their integration with the other forces be preceded by a brief period of United States training and by the supply of minimum quantities of equipment."

Mrs. ROGERS reported that she sought unavailingly to find out who had written the bill. Secretary of War Patterson, who was also testifying for the bill, said that it came from the State Department. Acheson mentioned a State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee, but Mrs. ROGERS found, upon consulting her Congressional Directory for 1946, no listing for such a committee. She did find a State Department coordinating committee mentioned—its chairman was Dean Acheson.

Among its members—

And I am quoting Mrs. ROGERS—

were Alger Hiss and John Carter Vincent. Mr. Hiss also is listed as Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs. Mr. Vincent is listed as Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs. Both positions, as you know, had an important bearing on the matter before the committee at that time. I think my question, which was never answered, was pertinent then and that it is pertinent today in the light of the tragedy we are undergoing now in Korea.

Is the matter clearer now?

There was a colloquy further in the hearings between Mrs. ROGERS and Acheson in which she pressed him as to what assurances we might have that the Chinese Communists would not use our arms against us. The Under Secretary referred to the United Nations as a guarantor of the peace, then said, and I quote:

I think we can rest assured that the Chinese will not do that.

The chairman rescued Acheson from the questioning, but he concluded:

I am sure we do not need to worry.

We probably owe it to Mrs. ROGERS and the grace of God that Americans are not being killed today by American-trained Chinese Reds.

FOREIGN POLICY IN EUROPE CONTRADICTORY TO FOREIGN POLICY IN ASIA

It was during this same period, with Marshall seeking to placate the Yen-an Reds while at the same time using his great power to wring concessions out of Chiang Kai-shek in the interest of a unified Chinese Government, that the State Department was taking quite another line in Europe. I turn to Sumner Welles' book, *Seven Decisions That Shaped History*, and I read you from page 217, where the author is expressing his view that the late President would

never, in view of Moscow's tactics, and I am quoting "in imposing Communist governments on Poland and other countries in the autumn of 1945 and 1946," have continued the Marshall policy in China. I quote again:

He [Roosevelt] would never have permitted his representative in China to pave the way for a repetition of the same tactics in the Far East by trying to browbeat Chiang Kai-shek, as General Marshall did, into bringing representatives of the Chinese Communist Party into the Chinese Cabinet. It is, in fact—

And I am still quoting Mr. Welles—a strange anomaly that this Government in 1946 urged Prime Minister de Gasperi, of Italy, to oust the Communists who were then in the Italian Cabinet. De Gasperi's decision to take that step was in the highest degree salutary. It was probably the chief reason why a successful coup d'état in Italy that year was prevented. Yet in the autumn of that year General Marshall, as President Truman's special representative in China, was informing Chiang Kai-shek that all American assistance would be withdrawn unless he broadened his Government by appointing Communists as well as other liberal elements to the Cabinet.

What the former Under Secretary of State overlooked—it is doubtful if he knew it—was that Italy had been saved to the Anglo-American world over Marshall's strenuous objections.

What he likewise overlooked was that the same Marshall had provided at Yalta that Russia should have Manchuria and, furthermore, there was the Acheson doctrine announced at the Madison Square Garden rally with the Red Dean of Canterbury that we heartily endorsed Russia's demand for friendly neighbors.

MARSHALL'S INTERVENTION AND EMBARGO

Marshall's first Chinese intervention gave the Communists two cities by a species of fraud perpetrated by the Reds. His second checked the victory of the Nationalists at Changchun, halting them in their tracks, and giving the Reds a chance to regroup, retrain, and to prepare for more decisive action later. His third intervention occurred in August. Its long-range effects were far more disastrous. It may not be wide of the mark to say that perhaps more than any other factor it made the victory of Russian imperialism in China inevitable.

I refer to the imposition by Marshall of an embargo on the sale and shipment of arms from the United States, an interdiction promptly seconded by the British, to the Republic of China. By this act and a further minor restriction on the Nationalists' ability to obtain ammunition, Marshall declared the United States neutral in the struggle of China to remain free of Russian domination. Using Marshall's own boastful language:

As Chief of Staff I armed 39 anti-Communist divisions, now with a stroke of the pen I disarm them.

And, while he was arbitrarily shutting off the flow of arms to one of the great Chinese contestants, the flow of arms, of men, of training, and moral support from Russia to the other continued unabated.

What occasioned this momentous decision by the man who had been sent to China presumably, as far as the Amer-

ican people knew, to conserve their interests in that quarter?

I take you again to the white paper where, on page 181, Marshall's own files explain why he embargoes war supplies to China. I quote:

With respect to United States military aid programs, General Marshall was being placed in the untenable position on the one hand between the two Chinese groups while on the other the United States Government was continuing to supply arms and ammunition to one of the two groups, namely, the National Government.

The situation was obviously not only untenable but to General Marshall intolerable. The Republic of China was winning its campaigns to subdue the rebellion. Something obviously had to be done to keep the Republic of China from winning the civil war which the Yen-an Reds continued at all times to agitate by their aggressions. The Russians were providing for the Reds. That aspect of the situation was satisfactory. It was now necessary to pull the plug on the Republic of China. Otherwise Russia might not have a friendly neighbor and the United States and the west would have a progressive and prosperous China with a hopeful future as a powerful containing force against Russian imperialist aims in Asia. The prime author of the Yalta sell-out could not stand idly by and see that happen.

I ask again, supposing that Marshall was acting in good faith—which I deny—did he regard himself as an impartial arbiter of China's destiny with no responsibilities to his native land which had honored him extravagantly and was, to put the matter on its lowest terms, paying the bills for his venture into international politics?

I throw in also the reflection, which will at once strike home to those American liberals and leftists who eagerly besought sanctions in behalf of the Spanish Government in the late 1930's: The ground upon which they based their argument was that the republican government at Madrid was the legal and recognized government and hence entitled to our assistance against the Franco rebels. Marshall's embargo in China was applauded by these same liberals and leftists. The shoe was on the other foot in China but the liberal-leftists unblushingly forgot the arguments they had used in the Spanish civil war. Their inconsistency is only apparent, however, not real. What you must look for with the gentry of the left is the hard line of consistency that runs to Moscow. They never deviate from what serves the cause of Soviet imperialism.

I invite you to give ear to the insincere, devious language with which Marshall recounted his embargo in the white paper. That is on page 181, and it reads:

Action was therefore taken in August to suspend certain portions of these programs which might have a bearing on the continued prosecution of hostilities in China. Licenses were not granted for the export to China of combat type items of military equipment and in late September shipments of combat items from the Pacific area to China were temporarily suspended.

What is referred to in the first sentence is an order obtained from Truman by Marshall withholding combat items, such as ammunition, from the surplus supplies granted China from the stores left over from the war in the Pacific, stores rotting on Pacific islands. This order was another nail in the coffin of Chinese hope although, as it turned out, only a minute part of this surplus equipment could be used by the Nationalist forces and only a tiny part consisted of their greatest need: Small arms and small arms ammunition.

The language I quoted in the foregoing is the kind of language we have grown accustomed to from the State Department when they wished to conceal something. What Marshall did was to get from Truman an order forbidding export licenses in the sale of materials of war to China. He got also a similar order from the British Government. This left Nanking high and dry. There were no other markets into which they could enter. Does his language make that clear? I think not. This is the same sort of calculated deception that emanated from Marshall when he testified in the MacArthur hearings.

The embargo was put on in 1946—it lasted for a year, sufficient time to enable the Reds to launch their massive operations in 1947—and the white paper came out in the summer of 1949. Times had changed. The people were uneasy over what had happened in China. They were coming to resent the fact that our ancient ally, China, was being overthrown by the Communists, with Russia standing by in Manchuria. They had begun to wonder if there was not something deeply sinister, perhaps treasonous, in what the American Government had been doing in China. And so the brief and ambiguous reference in the white paper to what was the crown and seal of Marshall's destructive mission, his embargo, was followed by weasel words of reassurance. I quote:

This ban was imposed at a time when the National Government was gradually increasing the tempo of its military campaign and when its reserves of material were ample. The ban apparently had little effect, since it was not until November, when the National Government had reached the peak of its military holdings, that the National Government issued an order for the cessation of hostilities. By that time the Government's forces had occupied most of the areas covered by its demands to the Chinese Communists in June and during the later negotiations and had reached what turned out to be the highest point of its military position after VJ-day.

What Marshall and his editors here are saying is that the forces of the Republic of China were at a high tide of victory in August and the fall of 1946. That was true. It is possible that Marshall acted in the nick of time. Obviously the choking off of supplies to the Generalissimo's forces would not take effect at once. I interpolate a minor comment on the white paper's objectivity. The official name, honored in all diplomatic documents, of the Government at Nanking was the Republic of China. Does the white paper so describe Nanking? Only where it so appears in official papers. Republic of

China is a plus phrase in the language of the semanticists. It has a favorable connotation to American ears; National Government is a less commendable phrase.

The aim of the words I quoted about the state of Nationalist affairs is obvious. It is to assure the readers of the white paper that the embargo did not hurt Chiang Kai-shek's cause and that it brought him to a cease-fire in November. That statement is false on two counts. The embargo stifled the cause of the Republic of China, and the cease-fire had no relationship whatever to it. We shall soon come to the ugly details and connotations of this cease-fire. The fact is that the Republican forces had arms in 1946. By 1947 they had fewer, a fact noted in a dispatch to the New York Times on June 22 from Manchuria, which reported that the barrels of some of the machine guns of the First Army were so worn out that, and I quote, "bullets fell through them to the ground." What the Republican forces needed most were small arms and ammunition, as we have said, and trucks.

VALUE OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT SENT TO CHINA

I have recently talked to one of the officers in charge of the "roll up" of American surplus materials for shipment to China. He stated that Acheson's story about the amount of military material we have shipped to China would defy the abilities of Ananias, even when Ananias was operating at the pinnacle of his ability. For example, he pointed out that the tanks which we dumped into China had their guns spiked and the breeches blown. He stated further that when the President asked him about the value of the surplus material shipped to China about that time he told the President that he could best compare it to a situation in which he were asked to redecorate the White House, and he had, say, \$2,000,000 to do the task, and he spent all of that money for baby-grand pianos in which the wires were all cut and the keyboards destroyed, and then were to announce to the American people that the White House really was decorated because he had spent \$2,000,000 doing the job.

The enemies of the Republic of China have made much of the declining morale of its armies in late 1947 and 1948. The enemies of the Republic of China never ascribe the declining morale to the shortage of bullets, rifles, and machine guns. Much has been made of the capture by the Reds of Nationalist equipment. The legend has been spread that American supplies were sold by venal Chinese generals to the Reds. Some Nationalist generals did defect to the Reds as the war wore along. A great deal of propaganda to-do has been made over the fact that when the victorious Red armies, Russian-trained Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese, entered Peiping in 1949 they paraded in American trucks, they wore American parkas, and they exhibited guns made in the United States. Where did those items, none of them battle-stained, come from? They were part of the 800,000 tons of equipment turned over to Russia as bribery for the Russian

war in the Far East which did not eventuate.

The question of stopping the flow of combat items from the reserve dumps in the Pacific, raised in my quotations from the white paper, brings to light a telltale piece of behavior upon Marshall's part. He acted, of course in both instances—the embargo and the one under question—under pressure from Chou En-lai. If we want to put a polite term to it, we may say that Marshall's acts were appeasement of Chou En-lai. Marshall was under heavy abuse in Communist organs in China and America. His good faith and his integrity were being called into question. And so, in an attempt orally to appease Chou En-lai and to attest his fidelity to the impartiality of his course, Marshall prevaricated to his friend about the nature of the surplus stores. In this connection I read from page 180:

General Marshall had explained to General Chou En-lai the background of the negotiations (between Nanking and Washington) leading to the signing of this agreement . . . and had explained that the surplus property in question did not contain combat material but consisted of machinery, motor vehicles, communications equipment, rations, medical supplies, and various other items which would be of considerable value in the rehabilitation of the Chinese economy.

The prevarication in no way damaged the Communist cause of Chou En-lai because Marshall got an order from Truman barring the shipment to the Republic of China of any material other than what he had told Chou En-lai was in the stores. So while on the face of it he lied to Chou En-lai and justified the pressures upon him by the Communist press, actually he was only anticipating what he could get Truman to do.

THE NECESSITY FOR ANOTHER TRUCE

At this precise moment Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung were ordering a general mobilization, which meant the conscription of the farmers' lads throughout the areas controlled by their forces, the kind of conscription which fills their ranks today in Korea. Did Marshall seek to discipline the Reds for that as he had just disciplined the Generalissimo? Do not be absurd. He could not discipline the Reds, even had he wanted to, which I, of course, doubt. He had no leverage on the Reds. The only party to this quarrel which he could injure was the Chinese Republic. We have seen how he did so in his third major intervention.

We come to his fourth deadly blow at the friends of the United States in the republican government.

As the white paper states, the forces of the Generalissimo were rapidly expanding their gains during September. The Reds were alarmed. The propaganda machines at Shanghai, New York, and Moscow were busy spewing out abuse of the Americans in China and our Government's supposed assistance to China. The great objective of the Yen-an Reds at this moment, having won their campaign to stop American aid to China, was a truce. The Generalissimo was pushing too hard. The great objec-

tive of the propaganda campaign being waged with great intensity in the United States was to get the Americans' military mission, which was idling its time away in Nanking performing no useful function, and the Marines out of China.

"GET-OUT-OF-CHINA" RALLIES

I shall remind you of the force and nature of the get-out-of-China drive of the American Communists by describing one major rally with which they were seeking to bring pressure upon Marshall in China, and upon the administration here in Washington. This one took place in San Francisco, beginning its 3-day sessions with a mass meeting on the 18th of October. Brigadier General Carlson, whom we have met before with Stilwell as disciples of Agnes Smedley, presided. Paul Robeson was vice chairman. Among the celebrated participants in this rally were Harry Bridges, Bartley Crum, Joe Curran, and Frederick Vanderbilt Field, the self-proclaimed Communist; Guenther Stein, the Soviet Spy; and Harrison Forman, the Soviet apologist; Congressman Marcantonio, the Soviet mouthpiece; and his colleagues, de Lacy, and Ellis Patterson.

And likewise prominent on the platform were these leaders of the intellectual and political life of Hollywood: Edward G. Robinson, Paulette Goddard, Gregory Peck, and the young gentleman who gave such a disconcerting performance before the House Un-American Affairs Committee the other day, John Garfield. The rally passed resolutions denouncing Chiang Kai-shek as a reactionary and demanding that this Government at once withdraw our forces from China.

THE OPENING OF KALGAN PASS

The Yen-an Reds had been besieging the city of Tatung in northern Shansi Province since August. Late in September the Generalissimo's forces began a retaliatory movement upon Kalgan. That city which is described in the white book as "one of the political and military centers of the Communist Party," had great strategic importance inasmuch as it commanded the Kalgan Pass through the mountains from China into Manchuria. The Reds had seized Kalgan with Marshall's blessing soon after VJ-day and it was through the Kalgan Pass that multiple thousands of Red soldiers and conscripts had marched into Manchuria, there to be outfitted and trained for the expected campaign from the north against the Republic of China. So valuable did Yen-an consider Kalgan, that Mao Tse-tung announced that he was lifting the siege of Tatung in the hope of deterring the Nationalist attack on Kalgan.

With the Generalissimo's forces pressing steadily north toward Kalgan, Chou En-lai began his supreme effort to bring about, through Marshall, a cease-fire. As a gesture of annoyance, Chou En-lai had quit Nanking for Shanghai in mid-September and Marshall had to communicate with him thereafter at long range, making, however, one visit to Shanghai to beseech the Red leader to yield on a point under

discussion. At issue in these times was the whole impossible endeavor of Marshall to force an amalgamation of the party of the Republic and the Reds at Yen-an into a parliamentary system, an endeavor likened by General MacArthur to the generally accepted impossibility of making oil and water mix. The discussions centered upon Communist agreement to enter in good faith into the various agencies and organs that had been proposed under the Political Consultative Conference's terms of the preceding January, a council of state divided among the Kuomintang on the one side and all other parties on the other; a national assembly and a new executive yuan, or cabinet.

The heart of the issue was this: Chiang Kai-shek insisted that the Communists nominate their representatives in these bodies and get ready to make them work before he called off hostilities. The Reds demanded the cease-fire first. Having found through long and distracting experience that the Reds, being true to their nature, never lived up to any agreements whatsoever, the Generalissimo felt that there must be some quid pro quo as an indication of good faith.

Chou En-lai steadily dinned into Marshall's ears his demand for a truce before the Nationalists took Kalgan. In support of his demands, Marshall threatened the Generalissimo that, without the truce, the Reds "would be driven to seek outside support such as Russian aid." I quote that from page 187 of the white paper. Chiang Kai-shek, in general, replied that, and I quote from page 190:

It was absolutely essential to the national welfare that the Government gain control of Kalgan and that the occupation of that city by the Government would do much to prevent further military action by the Communists.

Meanwhile, 2 weeks earlier, Chou En-lai, at Shanghai, had threatened Marshall that unless he brought about a meeting of the P. C. C.'s committee of issues, he would, and I quote from page 186 of the white paper, "be compelled to make public all the important documents in the negotiations since the June truce period." What that touch of blackmail hinted at I do not know. The white paper omits any reference to what Chou En-lai had in his possession that might prove sufficiently damaging to spur Marshall on to greater efforts.

MARSHALL'S THREAT

So matters stood at the beginning of October. The Generalissimo could see daylight ahead through his military operations. The Reds were panicked. On the 4th of October Marshall saw the Generalissimo, urging him in the strongest terms to leave Kalgan to the Reds. When Chiang Kai-shek still insisted on some evidence of good faith from Yen-an, Marshall returned to his quarters resolved, as he put it in a message to Truman dated the next day, October 5, to play his ace. That consisted of his self-directed recall to America, a sign that the United States was abandoning its efforts to find a solution in China.

Marshall wrote the President, and this may be found on page 192 of the White Paper—

That this is the only way to halt the military campaign and to dispel the evident belief of the Government generals that they can drag along the United States while carrying out their campaign of force.

In these controversial days he repeatedly lectured the President of China regarding what he called his campaign of force. There is no evidence in the White Paper that he ever sermonized Chou En-lai about the campaign of force which the Reds had been conducting wherever they could since the truce of June had been broken by them. The evidence of Marshall's partiality to the Reds infuses every page of the White Paper at this point.

In this connection let me read an incredible passage on page 205 of the White Paper:

General Marshall stated that he wished General Chou to determine formally from the Communist leaders at Yen-an whether specifically they wish him to continue in his mediation role and asked that the matter be viewed as a plain business proposition without regard to Chinese considerations of face since he was not interested in face. He explained that his sole interest was the question of whether he could render some service to China by way of mediation. General Chou stated that he sympathized with the request by General Marshall and that he would place the question before the appropriate Communist authorities at Yen-an.

I believe that in this revelatory passage we begin to have some insight into Marshall's true relations with the Communists in China and perhaps those at a far higher level.

Marshall did not so conduct himself with humility and a desire to please before the great adversary of the Reds, the President of China. To Chiang Kai-shek, Marshall prided himself upon speaking with direct and forceful candor. He never, so far as the White Paper discloses, asked the President of China, "How am I doing?" If his attitude toward the Yen-an Reds was that of a solicitous subordinate, toward Chiang Kai-shek it was one of master, with only one reservation: he could not as a rule expressly order the President of China to do his bidding.

Even that became possible after he dictated to Truman the order for his recall, allowing Leighton Stuart, his bewildered "Man Friday," to show the text to Chiang Kai-shek. The scheme worked. The Generalissimo, who, through thick-and-thin, resisted Japanese threats and blandishments and rejected during this period advances from Moscow for a common front against the Americans, remained as always steadfast in his friendship for the United States. I think it is not well understood that during this trying period the Russians had made and were to make further overtures to Chiang Kai-shek, offering his regime a full partnership in a great Sino-Russian state enterprise to exploit the riches of Manchuria and hinting that if he agreed he would have no further trouble with his domestic Reds. To join

up with the Russians meant, however, trouble with America, because the proposed deal made permanent and legal hash of this country's desires for the open door in Manchuria. Perhaps Chiang Kai-shek, who viewed the Russians with a cautious eye on good and sufficient grounds, also feared getting into their clutches.

CHIANG SURRENDERS TO MARSHALL

In any case he surrendered to Marshall. The white paper puts it this way, and I quote from page 192:

When word reached the Generalissimo through Ambassador Stuart of General Marshall's action, the Generalissimo expressed his willingness to stop military advances against Kalgan for a period of 5 days, perhaps even longer if the American mediators insisted, on condition that the Communist Party would immediately participate in meetings of both the five-man committee and the committee of three (these were agencies by which they had been trying to reach political understandings) and that Kalgan would be the first issue negotiated. The Generalissimo also requested that General Marshall and Dr. Stuart discuss the matter with him the following morning.

Marshall's ultimatum, suggestive of the get-out-of-China agitation stirring the American leftists and liberals at that moment, had worked. Although, the Communists, as could have been anticipated, rejected any and all proposals arising in the truce negotiations, Marshall now had the upper hand and nothing but an unconditional cease-fire by the Republic of China would satisfy him.

It was during these days that Marshall put the dignity of the United States in his pocket and went to Shanghai to implore Chou En-lai to make at least some face-saving gesture. Chou En-lai, as you might suppose, refused to take his friend off the hook. Agreement, peace, and the welfare of China were far from the thought of Chou En-lai.

On October 13 Marshall laid down the law to the Generalissimo, saying, according to page 197 of the white paper, that, and I quote:

The important factor was the immediate cessation of hostilities and that—

And I ask you to mark these words carefully—

even if the Communists were forced to submit to various agreements by the pressure of government military action, there could be no healthy results from political negotiations and the reorganization of the government as the bitterness engendered thereby would be too deep and the spirit of revenge and distrust too great.

In other words, you have the Reds on the run, they have refused at all times and on all occasions to act in good faith concerning the future of China, but do not press them. If you do, they may get mad and will not play.

Three days earlier Kalgan had fallen to the Nationalists, Chihfeng also on the same day, there was talk of a new offensive in Manchuria and the Nationalists were marching on Communist-held towns in the province of Kiangsi. The situation grew urgent. In the last hours of his independence, Chiang Kai-shek

agreed to issue a new basis for negotiations, an 8-point tender which, had the Reds ever been willing to make terms, would have fetched them. Quite naturally, they flatly rejected it.

The military situation had by now grown so menacing to the Reds that party negotiators and agitators, who had been sheltered under government protection in Nanking, Shanghai, and Chungking, besought transportation from the United States authorities to Yen-an and were flown there in Army planes.

Marshall and Stuart handed the Generalissimo a draft of a statement to be issued by him on November 7. As we have previously pointed out, this is the Stuart who was picked for the ambassadorship by Chou En-lai and approved by Marshall. This statement, whether the Generalissimo knew it or not, was his last straw. In it the mediators, if such they may be called, put the Generalissimo on record for an unconditional cease-fire.

He protested, he made his last stand, saying, and I am quoting from page 205 of the white paper:

That he could not support an unconditional termination of hostilities before his military and political leaders, and that he stood practically alone in the belief (among his associates) that matters could be settled by peaceful negotiations.

Yet Marshall was adamant. When the Generalissimo asked him to reconsider his views with another draft in mind, Marshall replied, and this appears on page 205 also:

That he would need an opportunity to consider with Dr. Stuart the points of view expressed by the Generalissimo as he was seriously concerned whether he should participate, as a representative of the United States Government, in the preparation of a paper in accordance with the points of view he had indicated, which were contrary to the views of General Marshall and those, he thought, of the United States Government.

He had scarcely bothered to glove the mailed fist. This was, of course, a threat. How different from Marshall's inquiry of Chou En-lai as to what the big boys at Yen-an thought of his exertions.

Chiang Kai-shek yielded the next day, issuing an unconditional cease-fire order to all his forces.

Did this humiliating capitulation save him and his Republic? You know the answer as well as I. Did it lift the embargo? Did it bring cooperation from Yen-an? You know quite well that it did not.

It did bring the Communist armies a much-needed respite, however—another breathing spell in the sense of the biographer of Mao Tse-tung. The legions they and the Russians were training in Manchuria with Japanese and American stores were not yet ready to march. That would come later. And what shall we say of the effect upon the morale of the fighting forces of the Republic? They had been stopped in their tracks after long, weary, bloody campaigns across the face of northern China and Manchuria with victory in sight. They could not but read in all this—coming on top of the embargo and

the partiality of Marshall for the Yen-an Reds—the desertion of China by its ally, America.

The cause of the Republic of China reached its high-water mark at the time of the enforced truce. The Generalissimo's armies would make some gains thereafter, but the balance had been tipped and slowly, gradually, the advantage would come to lie with the armies of Yen-an and Moscow.

The United States had thrown its weight on the side of Moscow in the struggle for command of the allegiance and resources of China. That was the plain meaning of Marshall's fourth and last great and fateful intervention. That struggle, which might have been settled honestly by Chinamen in battle, would now have to be settled in battle by Americans as well as Chinamen, but, as we shall see to our sorrow later in this discourse, the interventions of Marshall were not at an end.

MARSHALL'S ATTITUDE TOWARD YENAN

Marshall, his mission completed, was to stay in China until early in January 1947. Chiang Kai-shek, carrying out his promises of political reform, convened the first national assembly on the 15th of November. The Yen-an Reds, of course, stayed away. They wanted no part of any democratic institutions unless they had full control and could subvert them to totalitarian purposes. Chou En-lai came to call on Marshall on the next day, the 16th, to ask for an American airplane ride to Yen-an:

He (Chou) expressed fear that the National Government would undertake offensive operations against Yen-an and said that if this occurred it would mean the end of all hopes for a negotiated peace.

I have quoted from page 208 of the white paper. I have heard of idle threats all my life. Chou's threat to end all prospects of a negotiated peace if Yen-an were invaded strikes me as the choicest example I have ever heard of the idle threat.

General Marshall hastened to offer United States Army transportation for all Red personnel in Republic of China territory, adding, with a tender touch of solicitude—

That—

And I am quoting from the same page—

while he had no information of Government plans for an attack on Yen-an, he would deplore such action and oppose it strongly. He also said that if such an attack occurred he would consider that it terminated his mission.

Quite naturally, and the inference from the foregoing is that had he information that the Generalissimo intended advancing upon Yen-an he would gladly disclose it. In summing up his impressions of the breach in negotiations represented by Chou's departure for Yen-an, Marshall thought the Nationalists obdurate because—

They were thoroughly convinced—

And I quote from page 209—

that the Communists would not carry out any agreement reached . . . and that the Communists would merely disrupt any government in which they participated.

The experience of all Europe had by that time developed the hard and inimitable fact that you could not do business with Communists in your government. The Kuomintang was, as we will all agree, entirely correct in its appraisal of the situation. Marshall ascribed the refusal of the Yen-an Reds to make a single concession toward accord and peace in very innocent terms.

The Communist Party had—

And I am quoting from page 210—

defeated itself through its own suspicions.

MARSHALL'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Upon the subject of the Chinese Government's shortcomings, Marshall was all but rabid. The white paper quoted, page 210, Marshall's reply to a high-ranking Government official who was asking for American financial assistance.

The general was "very emphatic in stating to him that it was useless to expect the United States to pour money into the vacuum being created by the Government military leaders in their determination to settle matters by force and that it was also useless to expect the United States to pour money into a government dominated by a completely reactionary clique bent on exclusive control of governmental power."

When another Chinese official asked why the Export-Import Bank had rejected loans for the purpose of rehabilitating the Canton-Hankow Railroad and for a Yellow River bridge in Honan—

General Marshall pointed out—

And I am quoting—

that it was the open corruption of the Government as well as its military policy which entered into consideration.

On the 1st of December, Marshall, in a talk with Chiang Kai-shek, briefly but firmly warned the Generalissimo that he could not expect to subdue the Yen-an Reds because they were too strong, and that, therefore, it was imperative, and his words are taken from page 212 of the white paper, "that efforts be made to bring them into the Government." Three days later Marshall heard from Chou En-lai at Yen-an. The Red leader who is, I believe, the Foreign Minister at Peiping at this moment, imposed utterly impossible terms for reopening negotiations. Says the white book:

General Chou En-lai's message made no reply to General Marshall's request for an indication by the Communist Party of its attitude toward his mediation effort and posed conditions which the National Government obviously could not be expected to accept. It appeared that the Communist Party had, in effect, rejected American mediation.

The terms called for the dissolution of the National Assembly, which was, at the moment, adopting what the white paper was to call with some reservation "on its face a democratic document." They called also for the relocating of all Chinese troops to where they stood in the preceding January when the Reds had the advantage.

We have heard much of the necessity of reform in China. Although a bit grudgingly, the white paper did have to

pay tribute to Chiang Kai-shek's progressive endeavors in the Assembly. I quote:

He did exercise a determined personal leadership, assisted by almost all other groups and individuals in the Assembly, in opposing the extreme right-wing group. The Assembly adjourned on December 25 with the Generalissimo in full and confident control of the situation, having demonstrated his ability to override the Kuomintang reactionaries and having restored his prestige through his action in securing the adoption of a constitution of a democratic nature.

That was not good enough for Marshall.

The passage of the constitution was only the beginning—

Reads the white paper, page 215—

and the only guaranty of an honest reorganization of the Government and a genuine enforcement of the constitution lay in the development of a truly liberal group in China.

In his farewell statement, made January 7, 1947, when Marshall departed for his reward in the Secretaryship of State back home, he spoke approvingly of the liberals in the Chinese Communist Party.

It has appeared to me—

And I am quoting from Marshall's statement on page 687 of the white paper—

that there is a definite liberal group among the Communists, especially of young men who have turned to the Communists in disgust at the corruption evident in the local governments—men who put the interest of the Chinese people above ruthless measures to establish a Communist ideology in the immediate future.

Here is truly the real Marshall speaking. In connection with this I ask a question, How could Hiss, Gromyko, or Stalin himself disagree with this?

I see what you mean, General Marshall, as I follow the dispatches from within the Chinese iron curtain and the news of the "human waves" of Chinese peasants attacking our positions in Korea.

MARSHALL VIEWS THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS

The January 7 statement of General Marshall's must be read in one of two ways. It is, in my opinion, the most fantastic utterance ever to come from an American in an exalted position. If it is read as a propaganda document in behalf of Communist world objectives, it makes sense. It is in that case a highly intelligent, effective piece of work, calculated to confuse the American people concerning the situation in China but to fill them at the same time with a warm reassurance that things are coming all right once the liberals in the Communist Party and the other liberals obtain control of affairs from the dominant reactionary group in the Government. How dominant they were we have just seen in the results of the national assembly. If, on the other hand, you try to understand the statement as the report of an American who was sent to China to advance his country's interests and the interests of the free world and to arrest the advance of Communist terror and Russian imperialism, you will be dumbfounded. You will then have to fall back upon the origin of this mission, the well disclosed intentions of Marshall, the author of his

own directives; and the climate in the Department of State with Acheson, Vincent, and Hiss managing far-eastern policy.

I urge that you reread this statement in the white paper.

There is nowhere in it a phrase suggesting that the United States has a stake in what happens to China. There is no indication of any special interest on the part of the country whose representative Marshall presumably was. There is, mark my words, no suggestion that the Chinese Communists were anything more than a political party, wholly Chinese in character, working toward a Communist regime in China, it is true, but first, and I quote, "advancing through the medium of a democratic form of government of the American or British type."

That is the subtlest, most disarming of all the adroit passages in the statement. In an attempt to establish his fairness, Marshall condemns Communist propaganda in harsh terms, but reports that the Government publicity agency misrepresented him also although those misrepresentations "were not," and I am quoting, "of the vicious nature of the Communist propaganda." The new constitution, he concedes is "in all major respects in accordance with the principles laid down by the all-party Political Consultative Conference of last January." He continues, "it is unfortunate that the Communists did not see fit to participate in the Assembly since the constitution seems to include every major point that they wanted."

To the careless reader that would appear to make the Communist Party neglectful of its own true interests in refusing to sit in the Assembly. How far off base can you get?

Nowhere in this remarkable letter is there any hint that the Reds of Yenan belonged to a worldwide imperialistic system, that they were in league with and under command of the Kremlin; that in Manchuria, ceded at Yalta, Russia was supplying the strategic direction, the training and the supplies so that these liberals could take over all China and thus add it as another vast and teeming province to the dominions of Moscow. Nowhere is there any reproach to Russia for having broken its good faith in Manchuria over and over, for having prevented the China with which it was bound in the treaty of August 1945 from exercising its sovereignty over Manchuria.

As I say, if you read this letter as coming from an American emissary, loyal to his country and his institutions, you are first puzzled, then indignant, and you finally conclude that its author is the greatest incompetent ever sent abroad by this or any other country. If you read it as a propaganda document in behalf of other interests, another country and civilization, you will be struck by its persuasiveness and force, and the brilliance of its author.

The utter silence of Marshall's letter regarding the rampant Bolshevik conspiracy to rule the world is deafening. Had the letter been written in the early 1940's it might have been put down to innocence of Russia's lethal intentions.

Coming in January of 1947, after Marshall had been check-by-jowl with Russian imperialism in Manchuria for 13 months, after every other informed man in the non-Communist world had scanned the darkening skies and read therein the outline of Soviet expansion, the letter admits of one of two conclusions—you name them.

A sober, measured epitaph was written on the Marshall mission by General Chennault, who observed, in the foreword to *Way of a Fighter*, and I quote him:

The net result of Marshall's mission to China was much the same as Stilwell's earlier experience. The trend of a gradually stronger central government was reversed and the military balance shifted again in favor of the Chinese Communists.

MARSHALL COMES HOME

So Marshall, with Acheson and Vincent at his elbow, having created the China policy, having executed it in China, was returned to the State Department where he could administer it in line with his will and desires.

I have often wondered what prompted President Truman to replace Byrnes, a man of politics, who seemed steadily to be learning more about his job and understanding more deeply the single, all-encompassing issue of these years, Russia, with a professional soldier—a soldier turned diplomat who had, moreover, just sold China out to the Communists—a fact which, I suspect, was, however, among the multitude of things that Truman did not know. But he had much company in this. Our attention, among other things, was on Greece during the early weeks of 1947 and Marshall's prestige among the liberals who control the avenues of communication with the people was towering by then.

Jonathan Daniels gives us a satisfactory clue in the *Man From Independence*, where, on page 316, he reflects and I quote, that—

Truman had, when he appointed him and afterward as well, more confidence in Marshall than in anybody in the Government and probably anybody in the world. Sometimes, indeed, he acted when some members of his staff thought that Marshall was being a little stuffy, as if Marshall were his walking equivalent of George Washington and Robert E. Lee.

Elsewhere—page 320—Daniels has more of the same and I quote him:

Even if he did not always please Truman's political advisers, so far as Truman himself was concerned, Marshall was the Secretary of State he had been seeking and needing from the beginning. He had a soldier's distaste for politics. But he had magnificent presence, great prestige, and a deep loyalty to Truman.

The subject of Marshall's loyalties is a challenging one as we have seen and shall see further.

I have some curiosity that goes deeper than the passages I have just quoted. Whence did that adoration spring? What hidden and undisclosed forces were at work around the President so to shape his emotions and his will that he would appoint Marshall Secretary of State. Some future memoirs may enlighten us or information may come to the surface in other ways.

In any event, Marshall apparently discovered the same thing that Acheson also had learned so well—namely, that if you were to hold any degree of hypnotic influence over Truman you must at all times cater to his ego, convince him that he was a great man, and if you could convince him of your loyalty to him personally, then the Nation be damned.

Whatever dark forces lay behind Marshall's appointment to head up our foreign relations, it did bring him into even more close contact with Dean Acheson. I have studied Acheson's public utterances sidewise, slantwise, hindwise, and frontwise; I have watched the demeanor of this glib, supercilious, and guilty man on the witness stand; I have reflected upon his career, and I come to only one conclusion: his primary loyalty in international affairs runs to the British labor government, his secondary allegiance is to the Kremlin, with none left over for the country of his birth. The only trouble Acheson ever encounters is where Socialist-British and Russian-Communist policy diverge, which, in recent months, has been seldom. Then he reluctantly follows the lead from Socialist London. That was so in the matter of the Greek and Turkish aid policy to which we shall soon come. On the question of China he has no difficulty: Socialist London and Communist Moscow are as one there.

Where, you may ask, does Truman fit into this picture? I do not believe that the President's staunchest advocate will claim that he understands these questions. They are beyond the capacity he has demonstrated to the country both as to scope and detail. We have noted his idolatry of Marshall through the testimony of his friend and former press secretary, Jonathan Daniels. I think it is clear that, in these great matters of life and death, Truman is in the custody of Marshall and Acheson.

So we find that from January of 1947 onward Marshall and Acheson were linked in intimate, day-to-day endeavors in the State and Defense Departments. Their relationship before that time is not documented, but it was close.

The question of China was never absent from the forefront of American concern during the two years Marshall passed as Secretary of State. The matter of supplying the Republic of China frequently recurred. We had brushes with Russia over the open door in Manchuria. Twice during 1947, we are informed by the white paper, this Government protested over Russia's appropriation of the free port of Dairen, a port whose freedom was guaranteed in the Yalta-inspired treaty of August 1945 between Moscow and China. Each time the State Department was rebuffed and let the matter drop. The Russian pretext was that the treaty allowed Russia to close the port in time of war with Japan. Were we at war with Japan? Technically, yes. No peace treaty had ended that war and Russia was a party to that war because of Marshall's exertions before and at Yalta. As you might suppose, the Secretary of State refused to get exercised over Russian effrontery and impudence in this matter.

There were a number of other situations affecting China which we shall consider in their proper place. Through his incumbency at the State Department, Marshall remained the sworn and implacable enemy of the Republic of China, as we shall see. Such enmity, of course, was in the interest of the Yen'an Reds and their masters in Moscow.

MARSHALL GOES TO MOSCOW

Other major aspects of the struggle with Russia over the shape of the peacetime world intruded in the spring of 1947. Marshall had scarcely warmed his office chair before he went to Moscow for one of those fruitless, ill-natured conferences with the commissars through which we have expiated the original sin of getting on friendly terms with the Bolshevik empire. This conference was to consider a peace treaty with Germany. Before he departed for Moscow on March 7, the Secretary of State ordered home the last of the United States Marines who had afforded some measure of stability to north China. This removed, as the American Communists had long been urging, the last visible assurance to the Chinese that American power was friendly to them. On April 2, in Moscow, Marshall was able to report to Molotov that the marines were coming home "as rapidly as shipping becomes available." Did he tie this great concession to the Yen'an Reds, to American leftist and liberal agitation and to Moscow, to anything we wanted from the Kremlin? Not that we know of.

The council of foreign ministers at Moscow was a perfunctory exhibition of Russian intransigence. Nothing of any moment was accomplished. Marshall had been unprepared and had to be briefed daily on the rudiments of the problems of Germany and Austria. The plain-speaking Mark Clark was there on the problems of Austria, Lucius Clay on those of Germany. As Clark recalled the matter in his book, *Calculated Risk*, and I quote him from page 486:

I felt that it must have taken a great deal of courage for Marshall to step into the job of Secretary of State and then leave almost immediately for Moscow to deal with many intricate problems before he had had time to familiarize himself with the essential details.

I was amazed, however—

And I am still quoting General Clark—when we met in Berlin (on the way to Moscow) to discover that we didn't have a definite program of action. On the eve of the most important conference since Potsdam everybody was still discussing what we should do in Moscow.

I want to interrupt the main stream of our review of General Marshall's public career to deal with a minor and collateral matter treated by Clark in his book. It bears upon the infinite ramifications of the problem that confronts us. Clark had been in London acting as Secretary Byrnes' deputy at a meeting of deputy foreign ministers at work on a treaty for Austria. When assigned there by Byrnes, he had advised the State Department that he was taking his own staff of experts on Austria with him from Vienna. Back came a quick reply

from Washington, saying that his staff would be furnished by the State Department and he should take only a personal secretary. General Clark is not a man to be lightly brushed aside, however, so he took his Vienna staff, finding thereafter at London that he had two staffs.

The principal issue at London was the definition of German assets in Austria. The Russians were claiming as German assets everything that had passed into German possession during the virtual occupation of Austria by the Nazis. The western powers had maintained that assets seized, appropriated, or extorted from the Austrian Government and Austrian nationals by the Nazis should be restored to their rightful owners and not go to Russia. In making the treaties with the Russian satellite countries, hasty instruments drawn up in the full tide of western appeasement, the Russians had been able to make good such illicit claims as they were now pressing upon Austria. I have rephrased the explanation of this matter as it appears in Clark's book in the interest of brevity. At London, Clark found that the State Department contingent of his staff, as he noted on page 483 of his book, seemed intent on putting Austria "in about the same position as the satellite countries"—Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria. I am quoting Clark:

There was an inclination to make the same kind of treaty and, in many instances, to use the same clauses; in other words, we must get a treaty at almost any cost. One of the main difficulties . . . was the Russian demand that we accept their definition of German assets in order to legalize their looting of Austria . . . It was already apparent that in making treaties with the Russian satellite countries we had agreed to too much that the Russians wanted . . . we more or less had sold those countries "down the Danube." We had not fully understood . . . what the Russians were trying to do or the manner in which they were seeking to gain complete domination over central Europe. . . . Austria was an entirely different matter, and I was determined to do all that I could to guarantee its independence, based on a sound national economic set-up rather than on one controlled by Soviet interests.

Clark's difficulties at London would have been enormously magnified, as we may imagine, had he heeded the State Department injunction and left his own staff in Vienna.

In passing I should note that it is refreshing to come across evidence that the United States commands the loyalty of such soldiers as Mark Clark, Lucius Clay, Albert Wedemeyer, and Douglas MacArthur.

The atmosphere of Moscow should have been congenial to Marshall. On several occasions, as we have seen, Marshal Stalin had gone out of his way to make commendatory remarks about the American—the only such remarks that appear in the exhaustive annals of Robert Sherwood concerning the conferences of those days. At a dinner given by Molotov, Marshall wore his Order of Suvorov on his dinner jacket. He had a talk with Stalin. Usually, perhaps without exception, foreigners who have words with Stalin find some way to acquaint the public with the whole con-

versation between them and the Autocrat of all Russia. Not so with Marshall. He did say in a radio broadcast noting the conference's failure, that, in this conversation, Stalin had called the conference negotiations "only the first skirmishes and brushes of reconnaissance forces on this question." The question was the kind of self-government Germany should have. This broadcast took place on April 28 upon Marshall's return to Washington. The obstacle to agreement on this issue, he said, was that "the Soviet government insisted upon proposals which would have established in Germany a centralized government adapted to the seizure of absolute control." He concluded, "the patient is sinking while the doctors deliberate."

It may be gathered that one subject of Marshall's private talk with Stalin was the Russian demand, first heard when Hopkins was in Moscow in the preceding June for a reinstatement of some of the items of the fourth lend-lease protocol which was, as you will recall, canceled at the end of hostilities in Europe but later given some modification under the fiction that Russia was going to fight in the united interest of the Allies in the Far East. All lend-lease had, of course, been terminated with the end of the war with Japan.

MARSHALL COMES HOME FROM MOSCOW

A few days after Marshall's return to Washington he conferred here on the Hill with the chairman of the Appropriations Committee of this Chamber, the Senator from New Hampshire and with his opposite number from the other house, Mr. TABER. The Congress, as some of us at least will recall with nostalgia, possessed in those days a Republican majority.

Marshall came to see those gentlemen in behalf of a project which he very much desired, namely, the restoration of some forty million dollars' worth of lend-lease which the Russians claimed due them by some distortion of logic. The Secretary of State announced that he approached the gentlemen of the Congress as personal friends to plead in that capacity for this appropriation. "We must," he said, and I am relying upon the memory of my colleague, "in our relations with Soviet Russia be, like Caesar's wife, above reproach. We must give them no reason whatever to feel that we have not lived up to every commitment we have made." The Secretary was asked if he knew what the forty million dollars represented in the way of goods. He said that he did not, not having the schedules with him. Whereupon he was told that, among other things, the schedules in question called for two plants, earmarked for Siberia, for the purpose of converting gasoline into high octane fuel for aviation purposes. Marshall failed to win his case.

The principal advantage to the United States, as I look back over it, of the Moscow conference was that it took Marshall out of Washington while the policy of aid to Greece and Turkey was being hurriedly formed. Given his militant aversion to anything which would adversely affect Communist interest in the Mediterranean, which we

have seen, and subsequent manifestations which are yet to come, we can scarcely believe that he would have been a genuine advocate of the Forrestal plan in the eastern Mediterranean. I regard the assistance we voted to Greece and Turkey the most statesmanlike approach made by the Truman administration to the whole postwar problem of the containment of Russia. The so-called Truman doctrine for Greece and Turkey, which should be rightly named the Forrestal doctrine, is perhaps the only statesmanlike enterprise which has come out of the administration.

THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE VERSUS THE MARSHALL PLAN

With the Truman doctrine, Marshall had nothing to do. He was the author of the Marshall plan. Between the two concepts and programs there is the difference of night and day, although they have become inseparably united in the public mind under the impact of administration propaganda. It is no doubt generally supposed that, as Jonathan Daniels puts it on page 321 of his book, *The Man of Independence*, the Truman doctrine, the Marshall plan, and the Atlantic Pact "all were steps in one plan and parts of the policy of one man." He is referring to the man from Independence. Nothing could be more misleading.

I take it you are all familiar with the rapid events which in March of 1947 brought our quick acceptance of the British burden of support for Greece and Turkey. Its chief supporter in the highest administration circles was the late James V. Forrestal, a complex, gifted statesman, who saw with as much clarity as any American the drift of events toward Russian expansion. Because of his strong services rendered in this cause, Forrestal was marked for destruction by the Soviet apparatus in this country.

THE ASSASSINATION OF A GREAT AMERICAN

The character assassination of Jim Forrestal was carefully planned by the Communist apparatus and led by Drew Pearson, that master of snidery and venom, who operates in the dark, smelly corridors of half-truths. How much Forrestal's derangement and eventual tragic death came as the result of the campaign by Pearson and the other Communist camp followers to injure his faith and credit and reflect upon his gallantry and courage, I do not know. I can only say that their task was to destroy him.

This seems to be the one time in all of Acheson's history in which he supported a plan adverse to Communist Russia's interests, which seems to indicate that Acheson's first loyalty is to Socialist Britain, with Communist Russia a close runner-up for his loyalty and affection. Marshall had no part whatever in the discussions of the Forrestal program for Greece and Turkey. In this respect, I am relying in the matter of the personalities involved upon the recollections of a man who was at the time high in the confidence of the White House.

The situation at the time seemed to those around the President most urgent. He, therefore, cut short a vacation to

hurry home, and on March 12 asked Congress to support an aid program for those countries to preserve them from Communist aggressions, actual and feared. The President asked for \$400,000,000 for Greece and \$150,000,000 for Turkey. What were these sums for? Primarily, to strengthen the military forces of the countries, only secondarily to assist them economically, and emphasis was put on the rebuilding of harbor installations and railways in Greece for military purposes. This was a policy that made sense from the point of view of America's world politics. It served the interest of the United States and the west—not the Kremlin. The Congress passed it by overwhelming majorities in both Houses.

The stanch Americans who, like Forrestal, believed that the steady encroachment of Soviet imperial purposes must be confronted by evidences of America's will to resist were enormously encouraged. That they were momentarily in the ascendant at the White House was seen when the President went on to put the policy into a larger frame.

The enlargement of the Forrestal Greek-Turkish aid measure into the Truman doctrine came on May 8. On that date Dean Acheson addressed an audience in Cleveland, Miss. Because Truman was staying close to the White House telephone for word from the sick room of his aged mother in Grandview, Mo., he had seen fit not to deliver the speech prepared for him at Cleveland and had deputized Acheson to substitute for him. It was an important speech. So muddled has been the thinking on this subject that it is generally held to have been a prior enunciation of Marshall's plan, which was born in a speech by Secretary of State Marshall at Harvard University nearly a month later, on June the 5th.

NO LIKENESS BETWEEN FORRESTAL AND MARSHALL PLANS

Actually, the only similarity between the Cleveland speech and the Cambridge speech is that they both envisaged the enormous transfer of money from the pockets of the American taxpayers to those of other lands.

At Cleveland, Acheson said, and I quote:

Since world demand exceeds our ability to supply, we are going to have to concentrate our emergency assistance in areas where it will be most effective in building world political and economic stability, in promoting human freedom and democratic institutions, in fostering liberal trading policies, and in strengthening the authority of the United Nations.

How would the United States Government determine where its assistance would be sent? I quote the answer given by Acheson at Cleveland:

Free peoples who are seeking to preserve their independence and democratic institutions and human freedoms against totalitarian pressures, either internal or external, will receive top priority for American reconstruction aid. This is no more than frank recognition as President Truman said, "Totalitarian regimes imposed on free people, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States."

Keep in mind this was not Acheson speaking; this was Truman's speech. He had been given it to read—a speech drafted under Forrestal's thinking and not the thinking of Acheson and Marshall. It must have deeply pained Acheson to give this speech, but he had instructions to follow the text. As we may well suppose this speech found little favor in the Kremlin. The prospect of the United States pouring out its limitless treasure to support the enemies of Soviet aggression, direct or indirect, could not be welcome to the masters of Russian policy. The means test, the test which signified that only countries prepared to resist Russian world policy could qualify, must have been especially irksome. It could easily have been clear to Stalin that such a policy, strengthening the political and military resources of lands in the path of Soviet ambition, and followed as a logical corollary by an effective military alliance among the free nations, would be infinitely troublesome to his plans.

So rested the matter when the President, on May 17, flew to Kansas City to be at the bedside of his dying mother. He was absent from Washington until after she died on June 26, transacting the Government's business in his penthouse suite atop the Hotel Muehlbach in Kansas City. In his absence, Secretary Marshall and his advisers—I wish we knew who all of them were—wrote the speech that launched the Marshall plan. I wonder if the President, harassed as he was by grief, attending his mother several hours a day, ever passed upon that speech or whether it was represented to him as it has been steadily represented to the country ever since, as a complement to, a fulfillment, of the Truman doctrine, and hence something he need not see and study. Certainly, Acheson's heart must have sung with joy as he passed on this speech.

What Marshall said at Cambridge, after depicting the disorganization of European economies, the hunger and scarcities obtaining there, was this:

It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace.

Was there to be any discrimination in the assistance envisaged by the Secretary of State, any means test based on resistance to Soviet encroachments and machinations? No, indeed. He went on and I quote him:

Our policy is directed not against any country, or doctrine, but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist. Such assistance, I am convinced, must not be on a piecemeal basis as various crises develop (a direct hit at the Greek-Turkish aid program). Any assistance that this Government may render in the future should provide a cure rather than a palliative.

Who is to get the assistance? I again quote:

Any government that is willing to assist in the task of recovery will find full cooperation, I am sure, on the part of the United

States Government. Any government which maneuvers to block the recovery of other countries cannot expect help from us. Furthermore, governments, political parties or groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom politically or otherwise will encounter the opposition of the United States.

Need I point out to you that the Marshall plan made mincemeat of the Truman-Forrestal doctrine? The last sentences, I quoted were, of course, window dressing, a restatement of the Truman-Forrestal doctrine in innocuous weasel words with no point whatsoever. Their insincerity was plainly shown when the benefits of the Marshall plan were promptly offered to Russia and her satellites. Need I elaborate the point that, whereas the Truman-Forrestal doctrine offered to give our wealth to like minded countries, striving to combat communism, externally and internally, the Marshall plan neatly eradicates that purpose? Need I say that the one bade fair to forge the free world into a great and vital instrument with which to confront Soviet imperialism, the other reduced the whole splendid concept of Truman speaking Forrestal's mind at Cleveland into a mere charity enterprise, without political content and without use to the United States in the major crisis of these times. What Marshall did, to borrow the facetious language of some opponents of his plan, was to put Europe on the WPA.

The Forrestal plan would have strengthened us in the conflict with Russia. The result of using the Marshall plan instead of the Forrestal plan in Europe has been to make us the patsy of the modern world, to arouse the contempt and suspicion of Europe and to leave us in the summer of 1951, heavily engaged in Asia, and with no willing, reliable allies in all Europe among the beneficiaries of our bounty except Greece and Turkey and, a country that had no seat at the table at all, Spain, plus Western Germany whose resources we cannot use in the struggle against international communism because her 48,000,000 people according to the State Department are not peace-loving.

The Truman-Forrestal doctrine's means test would have included Spain. The Marshall plan excluded Spain, although it included Russia in its intent.

I do not think that this monstrous perversion of sound and understandable national policy was accidental. I think it was an evil hoax on the generosity, good will and carelessness of the American people. I think that it was the product of a will and intention hostile to this free society.

The Marshall plan was received with a clamorous acclaim from the leftist, liberal intellectuals and the superficial, knowing gentlemen who write so many of our columns and advise us on the air. Those who spoke against it, who sought to point out the dire discrepancy between it and the Truman doctrine, were howled down as ungenerous reactionaries. There was point to this hubbub, which raised Marshall to the highest levels of liberal esteem, although the point was not apparent, I must assume, to most of those who in the press, the pulpit and

the universities contributed most to it. I voted for the Marshall plan. As I said at that time, I voted for the Marshall plan because it had some good aspects, for example, the feeding of the starving people of Europe. I strongly maintained then that the food and clothing which we were giving should be on the basis of need of the people themselves rather than a gift to the government involved, which sold it to the starving people on the basis of ability to pay. Another point which I maintained at that time was that the money for the rehabilitation of industry should have been loaned directly to the industry in question, taking back what security that industry had to offer regardless of how valueless the security might be, instead of funneling the money through tottering, corrupt, and socialistic governments as the Marshall plan proposed to do.

Nevertheless, in the end I voted for it because it was a case of Marshall plan aid for Europe or nothing. I am not too sure today that nothing might not have been better.

Of all Marshall's significant endeavors since the early months of World War II, the derricking of the Forrestal plan ranks next, I should judge, to the Marshall policy for China in its massive helpfulness to the world ambitions of the Kremlin. That judgment is in no way impaired by the fact that Russia declined and forbade its satellites to share in the Marshall plan's bounty.

There were good and sufficient reasons for that attitude from the Russian viewpoint. Two will immediately occur to anyone who thinks of it. To accept it meant to disparage in the eyes of the world the industrial magnitude, the might and prestige of the great rival of the United States, Russia. The acceptance of this assistance would likewise have meant the intrusion of United States representatives in the affairs of the satellites—although, given the political nature of so many of the men and women who have represented this country abroad under UNRRA and ECA, that could not have been the major disability it no doubt seemed to the Kremlin—and a certain interference with their economies. The Kremlin could not, it is patent to me, have allowed to arise among the millions of its unwilling vassals sentiments of gratitude for this free country.

ORIGIN OF MARSHALL PLAN

I have often wondered whence came the inspiration for the Marshall plan in the mind of its author. Why should he conceive that we needed another plan when we already had the Truman-Forrestal plan? What called for his intervention in this matter? The country was content with the Truman doctrine. There were no objections from abroad save from the Kremlin alone. Who prompted Marshall? I hope that some among my colleagues are better instructed on this point than I am.

I have found one clue that offers some promise. I have here a book by Earl Browder entitled "Tehran—Our Path in War and Peace." It is a highly informative book that deserves a wider reading among those who would like to

make sense and order out of our national policies in recent years. In his book, Browder gives us the true significance of Tehran from the viewpoint of Russia, finding great cause for rejoicing in the solidarity of American and Russian interest at that conference. There is more to the book than that. I find in it almost textually exact the blueprint for unlimited, indiscriminate benevolence abroad comprehended in the Marshall plan. In fact, in 1945 Browder in his book gave almost a complete blueprint of the Marshall plan and of the administration's point 4 program.

Let us again briefly compare at this time the Forrestal plan—erroneously named the Truman plan—for Greece and Turkey with the Acheson-Marshall plan for Europe.

The Forrestal plan—which Truman fortunately adopted for Greece and Turkey—provided for all the necessary military aid to people who themselves were willing to fight communism—enough military aid to make them strong enough to withstand international communism. While sufficient economic aid was given to make the military aid effective and workable, the emphasis at all times was to be on military aid. The Forrestal plan proved very successful.

The Acheson-Marshall plan for all of Western Europe was directly opposite to the Forrestal plan for Greece and Turkey. It consisted of giving the maximum economic aid with no thought whatsoever of any military defense of Western Europe. In fact, the over-all plan was to build up the area economically and keep it defenseless from a military standpoint. The Acheson-Marshall plan fitted perfectly with Communist Russia's desire for a power vacuum in all of Western Europe. The recommendations of Washington in the summer of 1947 were something like this:

Hundreds of millions for Greece and Turkey to help preserve them from being engulfed by the tide of Soviet imperialism—billions for economic aid for Europe—not one cent for the Republic of China.

The Secretary of State, having opened the Treasury gates for his massive and unrewarding boondoggle throughout Europe, made no mention whatsoever of aid to China. It was only after the Eightieth Congress indicated that they would look with disfavor on aid to Europe unless aid to China were included in the plan that the State Department proposed a similar nonmilitary grant to China. It called for \$570,000,000 over a 15-month period. Marshall stipulated in the bill he sent to Congress that the money should go alike to his friends, the Yen-an Reds and our friends, the Republic of China.

CAMPAIGN OF DECEPTION

I must at this time deal with the extraordinary campaign of deception which has been practiced upon this Congress regarding aid to China. Acheson's testimony before the Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees early this month was a piece of organized fabrication on so vast a scale as to have excited the envy of the prince of liars, Ananias.

Acheson had the triple-distilled brass to repeat the assertion that this Government between VJ-day and 1949 gave China \$2,000,000,000 in grants and credit. He has used that figure before, and so great is his persuasiveness, that he cozened the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee into accepting it and repeating it on this floor.

They scraped the bottom of the barrel to arrive at that figure. It includes lend-lease left over from the war to the tune of several hundred millions. It includes nearly a half million estimated to be the United States share of UNRRA for China—our friends and the Yen-an Reds alike sharing in this. It includes about \$600,000,000 for "services," the principal part of which was the cost of transporting the Republic of China's armies into northern and eastern China and Manchuria to accept the surrender of the Japanese—as much our job as theirs. It includes perhaps a hundred million in loan for internal reconstruction. If you were to believe Acheson, the unbelievable, half of the two billions was "military aid." That is the most preposterous aspect of his great deception. I invite you to study the record. You will find, as I have found, that the only military aid given the Republic of China, either as grants or credits, from VJ-day to 1949 consisted of this:

The balance of lend-lease with which Wedemeyer finished equipping and munitioning the Nationalist forces in the fall of 1945; the \$125,000,000 voted by this Congress in the spring of 1948, an appropriation which was maliciously sabotaged by acts of the State Department and Commerce Department; a tiny residue found in the surplus war materials sold the Republic of China on credit in 1946 before Marshall, in deference to his friend, Chou En-lai, procured a Presidential order forbidding any combat items to be included.

Why do Marshall and Acheson seek to deceive you about this? The record is open. Not only did we fail to assist the Republic of China in its war with world communism, represented by the Yen-an Reds; it was the declared and consistent policy of this administration to refuse to assist our only friends, the only friends of freemen and the west that could be found in the political framework of China—Chiang Kai-shek and the Republic of China. I refer you to the directive of December 15, 1945, of Truman to Marshall, written by Marshall, in which it is said, and I quote:

A China disunited and torn by civil strife could not be considered realistically as a proper place for American assistance along the lines (including military assistance) enumerated.

I refer you to the State Department bulletin of the day following, December 16, outlining the Marshall China policy to our representatives abroad, a document produced no doubt by the collaboration of Acheson, Service, and Hiss, which spelled it out, and I quote:

United States support will not extend to United States military intervention to influence the course of any Chinese internal strife.

And adding that only when China moves toward peace and unity, will we be prepared to assist the National Government of China. I refer you finally to Truman's statement of policy of December 18, 1946, where with unflinching zeal on an evil course, after all the evidence of Russian intentions to dominate all governments in which they were allowed to enter had been thoroughly disseminated through the western world, he demands in stern tones that Chiang Kai-shek accept the recalcitrant Yen-an Reds on pain of incurring his displeasure. I want particularly to stress Truman's apologetic reference to the surplus stores, supplies which Acheson would have you believe assisted in China, and I quote the President's words:

China agreed to buy all surplus property owned by the United States in China and on 17 Pacific islands and bases . . . especially in view of the rapid deterioration of the material in open storage under tropical conditions and the urgent need for the partial alleviation of the acute economic distress of the Chinese people Aircraft, all nondemilitarized combat material and fixed installations outside of China were excluded. (This was done at Marshall's insistence upon the urging of the Yen-an Reds when the Nationalists were winning the civil war.) Thus, no weapons which could be used in fighting a civil war were made available through this agreement.

TOO EARLY OR TOO LATE?

I have submitted enough evidence to prove beyond any doubt whatsoever that, instead of lending assistance to the Republic of China as Acheson claims, it was our studied policy to do nothing of the sort. And so when Acheson said in the foreword to the white paper that "the second objective of assisting the National Government . . . we pursued vigorously from 1945 to 1949" he is deliberately attempting to deceive. Not only did we not assist them affirmatively, but Marshall shut off what they had coming to them by his embargo and in the surplus stores. I shall offer one final proof of Acheson's moral turpitude in this matter.

First I read from testimony of Acheson before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House on March 20, 1947, when he opposed military advice and supplies to China, saying:

The Chinese Government is not in the position at the present time that the Greek Government is in. It is not approaching collapse. It is not threatened by defeat by the Communists. The war with the Communists is going on much as it has for the last 20 years.

Next I read from the white paper letter of transmittal where Acheson said that the action which he was against in 1947, because it was unnecessary then, was too late to do any good in 1949. I quote:

The unfortunate but inescapable fact is that the ominous result of the civil war in China was beyond the control of the Government of the United States. Nothing that this country did or could have done within the reasonable limits of its capabilities could have changed that result; nothing that was left undone by this country has contributed to it.

I hope that I never have to face an angry God with a lie of that enormity and that fatefulness to the history of

China, this country and the world upon my conscience. The plain fact is, and I am confident that when I have finished this analysis you must agree with my conclusions, that we not only did not assist the Republic of China to avoid "the ominous result of the civil war in China" but we did everything we could, short of arming and leading the Yen-an Reds to give the decision to them. And for this result two men are more responsible than any other Americans, and their names, as you have guessed, are George Catlett Marshall and Dean Gooderham Acheson.

What occasioned Acheson's duplicity in the white paper, his continuing duplicity before the Russell committee?

I say it is fear of their being found out, exposed and taken out of control of our foreign policy before the betrayal is completely done. It is one thing to betray China and the United States and the free world in secret and by the lofty language of diplomatic double talk when the attention of the people is otherwise directed. It is another to face the plain, bare, and ugly record in light of day and be forced to "give an account of thy stewardship."

THE WEDEMEYER REPORT

And so we come to another attempt to hide, to prevaricate, and deceive. This concerns the Wedemeyer mission to China. Already in 1947 the public was stirring in curiosity over the deplorable and dangerous trend of events in China. Already, the friends of China were asking why, if we could so munificently assume the British burden, we could not take care of our equally important interest in China? So Wedemeyer, originally a protégé of Marshall until later events awakened this man of vision and fractured their friendship, was sent to China in the summer of 1947.

He returned in September and rendered to the President his report, a report which I cannot commend too highly for objectivity, for candor and, above all, for its sound realization that Russia was on the march in China to our potential disaster. The Republic of China still had, you will remember, the upper hand militarily when Wedemeyer was there, although the problem of supply was growing more acute day by day and he recommended measures to relieve it.

The Wedemeyer report utterly displeased General Marshall for reasons we shall come to later. At first, he thought it might be modified and doctored up so that it would suit his long-range purpose—the defeat of the Republic of China. A crew of State Department officials was put to the task of rewriting the report. I would like to know if it included Hiss and Vincent. Wedemeyer declined to sign a distorted report. And so Marshall pocketed the whole thing, keeping it suppressed for nearly 2 years until selected parts of it were inserted among the annexes of the white paper.

Why did Marshall bottle up the Wedemeyer report? The true answer is found in the nature and language of that report, which is a plain repudiation of the intent of his policy and mission. Two pretexts were put forward by Mar-

shall. One, which was given to satisfy a request for publication by our late and lamented colleague, the Senator from Michigan, who was then chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, was utterly and in toto false. The second answer was ambiguous but indicative of the goal and purpose of Marshall's China policy.

I have in my hand photostatic copies of two letters addressed by Senator Vandenberg to Alfred Kohlberg, a staunch American, without whose indefatigable efforts to expose the truth we might already have been totally lost in Asia. The first Vandenberg letter, dated November 24, 1947, said, and I read it:

It is my opinion that there is nothing to be gained for China by it (the Wedemeyer report's) publication—and I think I speak as a proven friend of China. I give you one example—confidentially. The report is replete with quotations of many prominent people (both Chinese and Americans) whose opinions were obtained under the seal of confidence. I am advised on what I consider to be unimpeachable authority that this is the fact.

Kohlberg replied, expressing his fears that "a conspiratorial group in the State Department, and possibly in the administrative office of the President, and possibly in the Bureau of the Budget, have objectives in the Far East that conflict with our proclaimed open-door policy," and further stated that he was under the impression that "the so-called bipartisan foreign policy is being used as a shield to cover objectives which are hidden from the Republicans, like yourself, concerned with that policy."

On December 31, 1947, Senator Vandenberg again wrote Kohlberg in reassurance concerning the Wedemeyer report, referring to his previous letter and saying, and I quote:

My statement to you in my letter of November 24 regarding the Wedemeyer report was based upon a direct and specific statement to me by Secretary of State Marshall. This, however, is a confidential comment to you because I do not care to involve in any controversy on a point of this nature.

But the Wedemeyer report finally saw the light of day despite Marshall's and Acheson's opposition. You all have read it and are thus in a position to bear witness concerning it. Did you find in it any confidential statements ascribed to any Chinese or Americans such as the first Vandenberg letter relates? Certainly not, because there are none. What can you make of this clear and explicit declaration from beyond the grave? Only this, that Marshall manufactured this excuse out of whole cloth. That, in short, he lied; as he lied on the witness stand in September 1950 about the authorship of the China policy; as he lied about his whereabouts on the morning of Pearl Harbor Day, saying first that he was horseback riding, then that he was at home at Fort Myer, when, in Arthur Upham Pope's book on Litvinov, Marshall's name appears as one of those Americans who met the Russian Ambassador when he arrived by plane in Washington on that morning. This latter incident I have already placed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. Whether he was with a horse, his wife, or Litvinov, I do not know. But it is an inter-

esting speculation about a morning upon which every American knew exactly where he was and what he was doing when he heard that the bombs were falling.

What can we make of this succession of blatant untruths? What of the character of their author? There was a time when the word of an officer of the United States Army or Navy was as good as his bond. Veracity was bred in the bone and fiber of our officer corps, at their academies and throughout their careers. We honored them for it and took pride in their honor. What has become of the code of the officer and gentlemen, and I say this without the sneer that usually accompanies this phrase on the lips of the leftist-phony "liberals"? I ask this in all seriousness. General Marshall is at the head of our armed services. Quite apart from the destructive nature of his public acts since the beginning of World War II, I ask in all gravity, whether a man so steeped in falsehood, who has recourse to the lie whenever it suits his convenience, is fit to hold so exalted a place, a place where he must be a model to the officers and men and women of our armed services?

How can we believe General Marshall under oath or otherwise? On this ground alone what value can his counsel have to us regarding our public course? I leave this consideration to the Congress and the people of the United States for prayerful meditation on the degeneration of public figures if they would maintain favor with and position in this administration.

The second reason given for suppressing the Wedemeyer report was that in it Wedemeyer recommended a trusteeship for Manchuria as a cure for the intolerable bloodshed and turbulence that grew, originally, out of Yalta. It is true that Wedemeyer does so recommend. The implication of this excuse was that its publication would have been offensive to the Republic of China. The disingenuousness of that excuse is at once apparent if we refer to China's position in 1947, with its continued possession of Manchuria touch and go in any case, and to the brusque and contemptuous treatment which had been meted to Chiang Kai-shek by Truman and Marshall since December of 1945. Since when were we considering the feelings of the Republic of China? You need not seek far to find the real reason lurking behind this avowed one. Who would such a proposal really offend? Not China, but Russia—the Russia which had, as a result of the Yalta deal, a hammerlock on Manchuria which it proposed not to relax, sharing it, if at all, nominally only, with its creatures of Yen-an.

So we see that the excuse based upon the trusteeship proposal was a species of deceit also. The genuine reason fits perfectly into the whole pattern of the China policy, being part and parcel of the scheme hatched in the fall of 1945 with Marshall as its chief exponent to deliver China, and with it all Asia, to the Soviet empire.

We come to the bona fide reason for the suppression of the Wedemeyer report in the fall of 1947, when, I bid you note, China still had a chance to fight off

the Red imperialists with our assistance. By 1949, when the report found its way into public attention, that hope had vanished and the Marshall plan for China was, to all intents and purposes, crowned with success. The overwhelming reason for the suppression was that the Wedemeyer report in almost every line, directly and indirectly, repudiated the Marshall policy.

Wedemeyer did point out need for reform in the Chinese Government, but the need for reform in the Chinese Government was infinitely less than the need for reform within our own Government, as evidenced by the odorous 5-per-center investigation, the deep freezes, the mink coats, the fixes in criminal cases and in RFC loans, the combine of gamblers and Government officials. No one in this Nation has urged, as Marshall did in China, that because this Government is corrupt, we should turn it over to the Communists. Incidentally, Acheson, before the Russell committee, dealt almost exclusively with the small section of the Wedemeyer report dealing with corruption in China.

Why was the Wedemeyer report really suppressed?

Marshall wholly ignored the question of Russia, omitting any reference to it in his valedictory.

The whole of Wedemeyer's general statement to the President is instinct with the urgency of that question. I shall quote passages illustrating this point, resisting the temptation to quote all. I read from the Wedemeyer report:

The goals and the lofty aims of freedom-loving peoples are jeopardized today by forces as sinister as those that operated in Europe and Asia during the 10 years leading to World War II. The pattern is familiar—employment of subversive agents; infiltration tactics; incitement to disorder, and chaos to disrupt normal economy and thereby to undermine popular confidence in government and leaders; seizure of authority without reference to the will of the people—all the techniques skillfully designed and ruthlessly implemented in order to create favorable conditions for the imposition of totalitarian ideologies. This pattern is present in the Far East, particularly in the areas contiguous to Siberia.

In other words, Manchuria.

Why did Wedemeyer propose a trusteeship for Manchuria? Was it against the interest of China? I quote further from his report:

The situation in Manchuria has deteriorated to such a degree that prompt action is necessary to prevent that area becoming a Soviet satellite. . . . This would create a difficult situation for China, the United States, and the United Nations. Ultimately it could lead to a Communist-dominated China.

Do you now see why Marshall suppressed that for 2 years?

What can be done in general to meet the threat to the peace contained in Soviet imperialism?

Events of the past 2 years demonstrate the futility of appeasement based on the hope that the strongly consolidated forces of the Soviet Union will adopt either a conciliatory or a cooperative attitude except as tactical expedients. Soviet practice in the countries already occupied or dominated completes the mosaic of aggressive expansion through ruthless secret police methods and through an

increasing political and economic enslavement of peoples. Soviet literature, confirmed repeatedly by Communist leaders, reveals a definite plan for expansion far exceeding that of nazism in its ambitious scope and dangerous implications.

Therefore in attempting a solution to the problem presented in the Far East . . . every possible opportunity must be used to seize the initiative in order to create bulwarks of freedom.

How did our difficulties arise in the Far East?

Indirectly the United States facilitated the Soviet program in the Far East by agreeing at the Yalta Conference to Russian reentry into Manchuria and later by withholding aid from the Nationalist Government.

Marshall read Wedemeyer's eloquent indictment of Soviet imperialism, although denying it to the people, who paid for the Wedemeyer mission. Wedemeyer proposed after a moving and sincere statement of the case of China, which I do earnestly bid you study anew, that we make a fresh start there advising Nanking, and I quote from page 774:

That the United States is favorably disposed to continue aid designed to protect China's territorial integrity and to facilitate her recovery.

He proposed that the whole problem be referred to the United Nations; that the United Nations set up a trusteeship over Manchuria; that China give continuing evidence of a will to reform her governmental structure; and that, to put it in language different from Wedemeyer's but containing the same meaning, the United States supply official advisers, military and civilian, to assist China in those reforms.

What evidence does General Wedemeyer's report offer on whether or not we supplied China? In his testimony of June 4, before the Russell committee, Dean Acheson said, and I quote:

Although his [Wedemeyer's] actual recommendations do not call for a grant of military aid, it is possible to read that in.

Although in September 1947 the forces of the Republic of China had invaded and captured Yenan, the situation in Manchuria had reached a point where, said Wedemeyer on page 808 of the white paper, "prompt action is necessary to prevent Manchuria from becoming a Soviet satellite." Elsewhere the Nationalist forces faced severe stringencies and suffered from poor strategical leadership. Said Wedemeyer:

It is doubtful if Gen. Chen Cheng [the new Nationalist commander in Manchuria] can wield a strong unified force in view of the continued serious shortages of both supplies and capable subordinates.

The Yenan Reds had no shortages of supplies and trained captains, both being furnished by Russia.

What did Wedemeyer think of the importance of China to the American position in the Far East? I quote from page 809 of the white paper:

Any further spread of Soviet influence and power would be inimical to United States strategic interests. In time of war the existence of an unfriendly China would result in denying us important air bases for use as staging areas for bombing attacks as well as important naval bases along the Chinese coast. Its control by the Soviet Union or a

regime friendly to the Soviet Union would make available for hostile use a number of warm-water ports and air bases. Our own air and naval bases in Japan, [the] Ryukyus and the Philippines would be subject to relatively short range neutralizing air attacks. Furthermore, industrial and military developments of Siberia east of Lake Baikal would probably make the Manchurian area more or less self-sufficient.

On the other hand, a unified China friendly or allied to the United States would not only provide important air and naval bases, but also from the standpoint of its size and manpower, be an important ally to the United States.

These strategic lessons are elementary to any consideration of the relationship of the United States to the Far East. Recognizing them, Wedemeyer's advice, explicit and implicit, is that we hold and preserve China as an ally. If General Wedemeyer understood matters in this sense, were they not understandable also to General Marshall? No one ever has described him as a dunce. He, like Wedemeyer, is a professional soldier, trained to the understanding of strategy.

What did Wedemeyer recommend that we do in detail to bolster China in its civil war on the Yenan Reds? He had a six-point program.

First, China had 16,000 motor vehicles which it could not use, chiefly trucks, because of the lack of spare parts which we had agreed to supply but hadn't.

The United States—

Said Wedemeyer—

is morally obligated to complete this program.

Secondly, the United States should enable the Chinese to buy military equipment. He said, and I quote from page 811:

Since completion of the 39-division program nearly 2 years ago very little has been supplied. Thus there are many shortages in military equipment which react to the disadvantage of Nationalist military efforts. Credits should be established for China to purchase the necessary military equipment needed to effect a supervised revitalization of her ground and air forces. Without such aid American equipment purchased during and subsequent to the war is, or soon will be, valueless since maintenance parts will not be available to keep the equipment in use.

What does that do to the false story of Acheson concerning the billion dollars in military aid furnished China between VJ-day and 1949? What a monstrous deception that has been. The Secretary of State has repeatedly declared that the Republic of China lost no battles because of a lack of equipment and ammunition. What did Wedemeyer say bearing upon the future of the civil war in September 1947? I read:

In July the Navy abandoned 335 tons of ammunition in Tsingtao, which was recovered by Nationalists. However, Nationalist armies continue to complain of shortages of ammunition of all types and calibers. There will be severe shortages in the near future unless replenishment from foreign sources is accomplished.

There is an implied moral obligation to assist the Chinese Government to obtain ammunition.

What did Marshall do about this moral obligation? That fall 1947 he recommended a grant of \$570,000,000 to

China—not one cent for military supplies. We shall see later what he did to forestall and delay any military supply to China.

In conclusion, Wedemeyer recommended, and I read from page 814:

That the United States provide as early as practicable moral, advisory, and material support to China in order to prevent Manchuria from becoming a Soviet satellite, to bolster opposition to Communist expansion, and to contribute to the gradual development of stability in China.

Could you ask for a more forthrightly American program? Can you wonder that Marshall, bent on other aims, suppressed this report?

Did Marshall act upon Wedemeyer's advice? Did he reverse himself? You know the answer.

CONFUSION COMPOUNDED

Six months later, on March 10, 1948, months during which the situation in China had gone, from the American viewpoint, from bad to worse, Marshall was asked at a press conference whether the directive of December 1945, demanding a unified government of China, was still our policy. He said that it was, an answer which threw the State Department into a dither. No one but Marshall was openly supporting that policy by the spring of 1948. So the Department sought to extricate him, issuing a statement the next day which made it appear that Marshall had been confused. They said that he had thought the question had to do with the President's statement of December 15, 1945, which it, of course, did. Supplier minds in the Department of State then edited what the Secretary had said to make it appear that what he really said was that, the Communists being in open rebellion in China, the matter of their inclusion in the Government was for the Chinese, not the American Government, to decide.

The President, too, was utterly confused at this point. On March 11, at a White House press conference, he was asked the same question, "Do you still insist upon Communists in the Chinese Government?" The statement of December 15, 1945, "still stood," replied Truman. He confounded his American interviewers by adding the contradictory explanation that, however, "we did not want Communists in the Government of China or anywhere else if we could help it." The Tass correspondent was perhaps not confused at all.

The questions of March 10th and 11th had been prompted by public discussion of aid to China. Such demands were rising. We were then in the Eightieth Congress. The friends of China had friends in this court. And so, the Congress, rejecting Marshall's nonmilitary \$780,000,000 bill, appropriated \$275,000,000 for economic aid and \$125,000,000 for arms to help Chiang Kai-shek at that late hour stand against Soviet imperialism. This sum, inadequate though it was, might have been effective had it been immediately translated into the ammunition for lack of which the armies of the Republic of China were being beaten, were defecting, or fading away.

SABOTAGING THE WILL OF CONGRESS

What ensued is one of the most shocking subversions of the will of the Con-

gress by an administration that our history will show. If proof were needed that the State Department, under Marshall and Acheson, and sheltered by a wholly uncomprehending and pliant President, were intent upon delivering China to Russia, that proof was afforded by their administration of the China-aid bill of 1948.

Nothing was done for 2 months. The Chinese Ambassador had been pleading in vain for implementation. On June 2 the Senator from New Hampshire, having sent a strong note to the White House concerning this delay, the President wrote the State and Treasury Departments, in effect, authorizing them to move. But the President, relying upon his State Department advisers, had gummed up the works. I am sure this was intentional on their part. He had authorized the executive agencies to buy only military supplies from commercial suppliers. No supplies were available from those sources. Not until July 28, 4 months after the act was passed, was the Defense Department empowered to issue matériel from its own stocks.

Not until November 9, more than 7 months after Congress spoke, did the first shipment clear from Seattle for China. China was finally lost during those months. This is not the end of this wretched story. Not only was the will of Congress frustrated for more than half a year, but China got only half as much in the way of military supplies as Congress had supposed she would. The prices fixed upon the supplies by the Army were exorbitant. Congress had expected China to be treated as had all other countries which drew from our stores, that is, that she would be charged the cheap, surplus price charged the others. Instead of that, and I am taking the figures from Miss Utley's book, *The China Story*, China paid for bazookas \$162 apiece, the surplus price being \$3.65; for .30-caliber rifles she paid \$51 each, the surplus price being \$5.10; for thousand rounds of rifle ammunition \$85, the surplus price being \$4.55; and for machine-gun ammunition per thousand rounds \$95, the surplus price being \$4.58. Those figures appear in Miss Utley's book. I have not myself checked them; therefore, I ask the Department of the Army to come forward and submit to the appropriate committee of this House the price lists that it charged the Chinese.

I shall not take more of your time to dwell on this appalling chapter in the betrayal of China. As it demonstrates, Marshall was still implacably against the Republic of China. He has never relented even up to this moment. Only a few weeks before he resigned as Secretary of State, Marshall was attending the Assembly of the United Nations in Paris. There he was approached by Dr. T. S. Tsiang, the Chinese delegate, who, and I find this on page 387 of the white paper, implored Marshall for assistance. Tsiang asked that the United States recognize the need for expert military leadership by sending United States officers to actual command of the republican armies; that the United States expedite the supply of munitions, and he asked Marshall's advice about laying China's plight before the United Nations, as Wedemeyer had proposed.

In his report on the incident to Under Secretary Lovett at Washington, Marshall said, and I quote:

I did not offer encouragement beyond present efforts.

Respecting Tsiang's United Nations inquiry, Marshall reported:

I said I would have to consult my colleagues of the United States delegation to develop various possibilities; that offhand I thought it an inadvisable procedure and discussed possible Soviet moves to take advantage rather than to counter such a move.

The sense of the foregoing is difficult to arrive at. What can be easily gathered is that Marshall was, as usual, sensitive to Russia's plans, aims, and prospects.

"LET THEM FALL BUT DON'T LET IT APPEAR WE PUSHED THEM"

The final, definitive word was given on the Marshall China policy in July 1947. By then the friends of the Yen-an Reds, who are, of course, by definition, the enemies of America and the West, were jubilant. Marshall's policy was a success. There remained the task of explaining to the faithful how it had been accomplished. There remained a bit of crowing to do over the corpse of China and the decline of America's position in the Far East. This task was assumed by, or delegated to, Owen Lattimore. There has been a controversy over whether Owen Lattimore is a conscious agent of Soviet imperialism. I know that he is and I know that in the fullness of time that fact will be established for all to see and hear.

I have here a photostatic copy of the editorial page of the Sunday Compass of New York, dated July 17, 1949. Displayed thereon is an article by Owen Lattimore, with the exultant, and, I hope, premature heading, "South Korea—another China." In the body of the article, Lattimore is discussing the proposals, then before Congress, for a grant to South Korea of \$150,000,000. Dean Acheson had made what Lattimore called a "strong appeal" for that appropriation before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Lattimore went on to point out that at this same time we were withdrawing our troops from South Korea. The conjunction of these events was to Lattimore, and he was so explaining them to the faithful who read the Compass, a demonstration of the Communist-planned duplicity of American policy, a policy which he said "is now conducted under rules of protocol which have become as rigid as tribal taboos." If we may paraphrase Lattimore's words, the United States was then pursuing one policy with two contradictory horns. Upon the one horn, we were appearing to be standing in friendly sponsorship of South Korea; on the other we were preparing to let her fall into the maw of Russian imperialism. I shall let him describe George Marshall's part in this conspiracy in Lattimore's own words, quoting him—

There is logic to the course of action advocated by Secretary Acheson. It is, moreover, a perfectly convincing logic. . . .

For the logic we must go back to the sad precedent of China. The truth is that Gen. George C. Marshall, on his mission to China in 1946 . . . became convinced of sev-

eral unpleasant things which, because of the state of political opinion in America, could not be stated out loud.

I invite you to note that Lattimore is interpreting the secret mind of George Marshall as one having authority. I read:

First, he was convinced that the Kuomintang would not be able to triumph over the Chinese Communists unless it took American advice. Second, he was convinced that politically and militarily America could not handle the situation in China by taking the Kuomintang by the scruff of the neck and the seat of the pants and making it behave. Yet he could not, as a statesman, advise what seemed sensible to him as a general—that the United States simply pull out and abandon an untenable position.

I come to the operative part of this astounding recital of the problem of China, reading:

As a compromise, American policy took a course of relative inaction, but not complete inaction. As it became more and more obvious that Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang were doomed, the conduct of American policy became increasingly delicate. The problem—

And here we have reached the inner chamber, the arcanum, of the Marshall plan for China—

was how to allow them to fall without making it look as if the United States had pushed them. Such a policy never succeeds completely (that is, it cannot be wholly concealed) and critics have done their best to make the public believe that the United States did push Chiang and the Kuomintang over the cliff.

There you have the complete, sinister, treacherous, traitorous picture—here is the modus operandi written to instruct the Communists and Communist sympathizers which, alone, read the Compass. This is a secret communication, in effect, letting the faithful in on the secret of how the Marshall policy worked.

Can anyone in this Chamber doubt, after the lengthy documentation from the pens of Marshall's own friends, that Lattimore was speaking the truth?

So, he went on, it was to be with Korea.

The thing to do—

And I am reading from Lattimore—therefore, is to let South Korea fall—but not to let it look as though we pushed it. Hence, the recommendation of a parting grant of \$150,000,000.

Can you doubt the veracity of that explanation of our Korean policy until Truman ordered Korea defended?

It was so true. I am grateful to Lattimore for his graphic exposition.

The next appearance of Marshall in a position of supreme influence over our affairs came only last September. It was a black day for America when this Senate voted to set aside a law it had passed to guard against lesser calamities to allow Marshall to become Secretary of Defense. We were not on guard, we were not vigilant. We fell short on that day and I accept my share of the blame with sorrow and repentance. I was recorded against the bill but opposition was hopeless then because Marshall was still wearing the false halo placed

upon his head by the alchemy of false propaganda.

I wondered then why this venerable soldier, who had received the world's honors, who had served as the first man in the President's Cabinet, should be willing to return to the wars. I no longer wonder.

AMERICAN STRATEGY

What is our strategy now?

It is to fight a pointless war in Korea, hoping against hope that the enemy in Peiping and Moscow will sue for peace so that we may ignominiously yield and depart, leaving them to enjoy peaceably what the Marshall policy gave them?

It is to abandon American interests in the Far East, surrendering Formosa to the grasp of a United Nations strewn with our enemies and wanting nothing so much, under the leadership of the temporary Socialist Government of Britain and the Communist-loving present Government of India, as to thrust the United States out of the Far East.

It is because he differed with that policy that General MacArthur was recalled from the Far East. He stood as a barrier to the final fulfillment of the Marshall-Acheson policy for China. That is why, when Marshall took office, Eisenhower was rushed to Europe and the great debate over the extent of our participation in the defense of Europe was provoked. That was the diversionary trick of a carnival prestidigitator. What had changed in Europe during last summer and early fall? What sign was there that we faced attack from Russia in that quarter? The whole procedure was without meaning in any realistic sense, yet it had meaning in the mind of the man referred to by the Democrats at Denver as "a master of global strategy."

In order to more completely round out the history of Marshall over the past decade, let me cite three unconnected documented examples of his activities all of which follow the same pattern as those given: The Senate will recall that Russia was given the plates so they might print allied currency. On page 16 of the hearings held in June 1947 before the Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Banking and Currency, the following testimony of Mr. Howard Peterson, Assistant Secretary of War, is found:

On April 18, 1944, the Soviet Ambassador was furnished with glass negatives and positives of plates for the use of the Soviet Government in the printing of allied military marks, together with technical information on inks.

On pages 20 and 21, Senator Tydings is questioning the Assistant Secretary of War to find out who approved the plan to give Russia our currency plates. The following questions and answers are significant in that respect:

Senator Tydings. It did clear the Joint Chiefs of Staff before it reached the civilian branches of our Government?

Mr. Peterson. That is correct.

Senator Tydings. And ostensibly, I suppose it is fair to ask that they approved it before it went to these others, otherwise, it would never have gone any further?

Mr. Peterson. I certainly would assume so, Senator.

The hearings also quote from a letter written by Marshall on April 13, 1944, in which he advises when the plates should be made available to Russia.

Much has been said in the past about the assistance which Marshall gave to China in furnishing Chiang a 1,500-man military mission. In that connection, it is important to have some picture of the type of military mission Marshall furnished Chiang. On pages 41 and 42 of Freda Utley's book, *The China Story*, the following is found:

As his authority for the statement that the Chinese Nationalist forces did not lose a battle in 1948 through lack of adequate arms, Mr. Acheson cited our military observers on the spot. But our military observers, meaning the United States military mission, were not in fact on the spot; they were sitting in Nanking, thanks to Mr. Acheson.

On August 24, 1949, in a statement to the press, he said that United States military advisers in China were not permitted to give advice in the field because Congress refused to include the Greek-Turkey proviso in the 1948 China Aid Act. In fact, however, it was the State Department which caused this proviso to be removed from the act. The House had included it, but the Senate removed it at the State Department's request, and upon assurances given by the State Department that the act would in fact be implemented as if the Greek-Turkey proviso were included.

Having induced the Senate to withdraw the House proviso for diplomatic reasons, but with the promise that military advice would nevertheless be given to the Chinese Nationalist forces, the State Department proceeded to act within the limits set by the letter of the law, thus ignoring its promise to the Senate. In the fall of 1948, William C. Bullitt, on his return from a visit to China, reported that the so-called mission sent to aid Chiang had been instructed not to advise him with regard to the operation of his forces.

The former Ambassador and confidant of Franklin D. Roosevelt further stated that "nearly half of the 1,500-man military mission was composed of fellow travelers and Communist sympathizers."

Whatever the exact figures, it would seem that the military mission to China was never intended to be more than window dressing to satisfy the opposition in Congress. Since it was forbidden to give strategic or tactical advice to the Nationalist forces, it had no valid function.

WARNING OF SUBCOMMITTEE OF SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE

Another document which also sheds some light upon the activities of Marshall and Acheson is a confidential report from a Senate Appropriations Committee to Secretary of State Marshall, dated June 10, 1947. I quote parts of that document:

It becomes necessary due to the gravity of the situation to call your attention to a condition that developed and still flourishes in the State Department under the administration of Dean Acheson.

It is evident that there is a deliberate, calculated program being carried out not only to protect Communist personnel in high places but to reduce security and intelligence protection to a nullity.

Regarding the much-publicized Marzani case, the evidence brought out at his trial was well known to State Department officers, who ignored it and refused to act for a full year.

Marzani and several other Department officials, with full knowledge of the State Department, and with Government time and

money, promoted a scheme called Presentations, Inc., which contracted with a Communist-dominated organization to disseminate propaganda.

Security objections to these and other even more dangerous developments were rebuffed by high administrative officials, and there followed the substitution of unqualified men for these competent, highly respected personnel who theretofore held the intelligence and security assignments in the Department. The new chief of controls is a man utterly devoid of background and experience for the job, who is, and at the time of his appointment was known to those who appointed him to be, a cousin and close associate of a suspected Soviet espionage agent. * * *

On the file in the Department is a copy of a preliminary report of the FBI on Soviet espionage activities in the United States, which involves a large number of State Department employees, some in high official positions. This report has been challenged and ignored by those charged with the responsibility of administering the Department with the apparent tacit approval of Mr. Acheson. Should this case break before the State Department acts, it will be a national disgrace.

Voluminous files are on hand in the Department proving the connection of the State Department employees and officials with this Soviet espionage ring. Despite this, only two persons, one of whom is Marzani, were released under the McCarran rider because of their subversive activity (I omit the names) are only a few of the hundreds now employed in varying capacities who are protected and allowed to remain despite the fact that their presence is an obvious hazard to national security. There is also the extensive employment in highly classified positions of admitted homosexuals, who are historically known to be security risks.

The War and Navy Departments have been thwarted for a year in their efforts to carry out the German scientist program. They are blocked by one man in the State Department, a protégé of Acheson (I omit the name) who is also the chief instrument in the subverting of the over-all security program.

This deplorable condition runs all the way up and down the line. Assistant Secretary Braden also surrounded himself with men like * * * and with * * * who has a notorious international reputation. The network also extends into the office of Assistant Secretary Benton.

This report to Marshall was completely ignored and I understand not even answered by him.

PLANNED DISASTER FOR EUROPE

But let us explain Marshall's strategy in Europe. I realize that some of my good friends feel that the problem there can be settled merely by the decision of whether we shall send an additional 6 or 8 or 10 American divisions to Western Europe. Would that it were that simple. Keep in mind that the group which is doing the planning for Western Europe is the identical group which has been doing the disastrous planning for Asia—the same group that did the planning for the sell-out of Poland and China. Let us look at the unquestioned facts in that area. Those facts speak for themselves. The planning has been disastrous for America and good for Soviet Russia.

The Senate will recall that when General Eisenhower appeared before the joint session of the Congress, he said he was unable to discuss the use of German manpower until the politics of the situation were cleared up by the diplomats. And for 5 years those diplomats

have done nothing to clear up the situation. Periodically, our State Department has talked of rearming Western Germany to counter the powerful "peoples" army built up by the Russians in East Germany. But it is nothing but talk—words apparently planted to lull the American people into a sense of security that we are going to do something in West Germany to counter the threat of what Russia has been doing in East Germany. Clever administration of sleeping tablets, if you please.

When Eisenhower went to Europe to plan the defense of Western Europe, he was not even allowed to visit the greatest potential source of manpower for a Western European army—a country that has long been dedicated to fighting communism—Spain. I am not going to argue that Spain has or has not the kind of government of which we should approve. The point is we cannot make over the Spanish Government. I am not going to argue that we should or should not love the 48,000,000 people of Western Germany. But it takes no argument, it follows as the night follows the day, that there is no way on God's earth to defend the richest prize for which Communist Russia is aiming—the industrial heart of Europe—unless we use those two great wells of tough anti-Communist manpower, Western Germany and Spain. The talk of doing otherwise is either the talk of those who know not what they say or the talk of traitors planning a phony defense.

When I hear administration spokesmen urging that the solution to the whole problem lies in drafting and sending to Europe another 6, 8, or 10 American divisions, there is called vividly to my mind an article which I just discussed which appeared in the *Compass* on July 17, 1949, in which the State Department adviser said:

The problem is to let them [our allies] fall but don't let it appear that we pushed them.

PLANNED DEFEAT IN EUROPE

Why have we apparently adopted the suicidal strategy of opposing American and Allied flesh to the Russian on the undefended plains of central Europe? Are we inviting defeat there as well as in Asia? Why has our strategy, under Marshall, ignored the Mediterranean theater, as he scorned it in World War II; an area where we alone have potential bastions that can be held and from which we can launch counterattack by air and land against Russia? Why have we slighted the two nations in Europe—one with an organized and effective army that is on our side; the other with a vast potential army. Spain has an organized army. The warlike quality of the Spanish is not challenged.

They have 35 divisions which they would throw into the pool. France has a half dozen at most, and who could rely completely upon French conscripts in a war against the Communist motherland? The British have no more. The loyalty of the Spanish to the cause we serve cannot be questioned. Why have we shunned Spain? Why have we shunned organizing any army from Western Germany's 48,000,000 anti-Communist peo-

ple? Why have we slighted heroic Greece and the Turks whose valor in Korea has won our respect and forged ties of gratitude which should last as long as this Republic itself?

IN WHOSE NAME DOES ACHESON MAKE PROMISES?

We have embraced Yugoslavia. Dean Acheson has served notice upon the Kremlin that an attack upon Communist Yugoslavia will mean war with us. At whose bidding and by whose authority did Acheson speak—Acheson so meek in the Far East, so willing to surrender Formosa, to make peace on the thirty-eighth parallel and admit Communist China into the United Nations? Whose bidding was he following. Was it the British Socialist Government which, pursuing what Winston Churchill has called a sectarian and isolationist policy, has sought to strengthen all left-wing governments this side of the Iron Curtain and weaken all others? Acheson's friends in London have steadfastly opposed the strategy of a united Europe since they came to power in 1945. They have sought to put themselves at the head of what their leftist apologists call a third force, a Socialist force, between the massive weight of Russia on the one hand and the United States on the other. Their behavior has insulted the long-standing, unexpressed, and unwritten alliance between the English-speaking powers which has ranged them for generations against all others arising from the outside. Was it the British Labor Party's desire for a socialized Europe that prompted Acheson to give his guaranty to Tito?

THE PATH OF APPEASEMENT AGAIN

The policy of the United States with reference to the global pressures of Russia was ambiguous enough even before Marshall reentered the picture last September. With Marshall again at Acheson's side, their captive President between them, there has been little doubt that we were treading the old downward path of appeasement of Russia.

Marshall's old friends, the liberals of Yenan, shouldered their way into the war in Korea last December. In January this Government agreed to the most abject politeness, the cease-fire offer to Peiping which, had it been accepted, would have resulted in our departure from Korea, the seating of the Chinese Reds in the United Nations and placing the disposition of Formosa at the hazard of a commission weighted three to one against us. What saved us then I do not know. I can only thank God for our salvation.

Our escape was, however, only temporary.

ANOTHER SELL-OUT

Acheson testified the other day that he is ready to make peace now on the basis of the thirty-eighth parallel. I awake each morning in the fear that overnight, in some secret chamber of the United Nations, the enemies of the United States, with Britain and India at their head, have made a secret deal—a new Yalta—to do us out of the last vestige of our position in the Far East, to dishonor the dead we shall have to leave in Korea, and to advance the

world-wide interests of Russia. They are capable of it on their record.

The point that I want to make with all emphasis is this: Since Marshall resumed his place as mayor of the palace last September, with Acheson as captain of the palace guard and that weak, fitful, bad-tempered and usable Merovingian in their custody, the outlines of the defeat they meditate have grown plainer. The weakness of the United States in relation to the growing power of Soviet imperialism has become clearer. Our weakness has become plain to the simplest citizen, the farthest removed from the seat of Government in Washington, and would have been evident even without the shameless doubts of the President that we could win a war with Russia and the self-satisfied shocking revelations of Marshall and his place men, in their testimony before the Russell committee.

The feeling of America's weakness is in the very air we breathe in Washington. It derives not only from the moral debility of the highest echelons of the administration, from the flabbiness and lack of resolve upon the part of the palace guard and their minions. It comes from the objective facts of the situation.

**FROM THE MOST POWERFUL NATION TO A NATION
THAT CRINGES IN FEAR**

Six years ago this summer America stood at what Churchill described as the "highest pinnacle of her power and fame." The President and the man who is now Secretary of Defense commanded the greatest military instrumentality on land, sea and in the air that the world had ever seen. Our forces had fought victoriously on every continent except the American—in Africa, in Europe, in Asia, and above, on and over the seven seas. The Soviet empire, which would have fallen before the Nazis but for our assistance, was nursing its wounds, but glowering, self-confident and on the march from its own weakness. Britain had declined into the incompetent, self-righteous and doctrinaire hands of its Labor Party. Britain was economically prostrated, its empire was dwindling and was to dwindle further.

Only the United States among the great powers found its economic strength undiminished, its Territories uninvaded and unswept by war, its full powers still unflexed. Everywhere America had friends, everywhere its power suggested friendship to others. In terms of the division of the world into spheres of interest, the United States, at the head of the coalition of the West, exercised friendly influence over nearly all the masses of the earth. The Soviet Union's own people and the few millions in the bordering satellites upon which it was already laying its hands constituted a small minority of the earth's peoples.

What do we find in the summer of 1951? The writs of Moscow run to lands which, with its own, number upward of 900 millions of people—a good 40 percent of all men living. The fear of Russia or the subservience that power inspires inclines many hundreds of other millions, as in India, toward Moscow. The fear of Russia, plus other reasons,

the chief of which is the supine and treacherous folly of our own policies, places other hundreds of millions in a twilight zone between the great poles of Moscow and Washington.

THE UNITED STATES STANDS ALONE

The United States stands today virtually alone as it faces its greatest trials. Where have we loyal allies? In Britain? I would not stake a shilling on the reliability of a Government which, while enjoying billions in American munificence, rushed to the recognition of the Chinese Red regime, traded exorbitantly with the enemy through Hong Kong and has sought to frustrate American interest in the Far East at every turn. Let us not blame our long-time friends, the British people. They have their Attlee and Morrison directing their foreign policy. We have our Acheson. Or perhaps, I should say, their Acheson. They will survive their curse even as we will ours.

The case of Australia and New Zealand is a brighter story. Their ox is gored, like ours, by the Peiping Reds.

What of Western Europe generally? Have we a constant friend in that quarter? The Marshall plan has mystified and alienated while it enriched them; the Marshall strategy, which threatens to turn Western Europe into another devastated Korea, has rightfully terrified them and encouraged among them a neutralism, which sees the coming world struggle as one between two reeling giants, Russia and the United States, in which they have little or no part.

In Europe we have snubbed our friends, the heroic Greeks and Turks and the thoroughly indoctrinated anti-Communists of Spain; and because of our servility toward Russia in Eastern Europe we have discouraged the gallant souls behind the Iron Curtain who might have waited upon our deliverance of them, as the peoples oppressed by the Nazis did only to find themselves betrayed to an equal tyranny by our appeasement. What do we find in Asia? Our former enemies, the Japanese, are our friends, but they are disarmed friends, and the State Department says they must stay disarmed and defenseless. We reject the friendship of the free Chinese of Formosa and the millions on the mainland struggling to be free of the monstrous usurpation that overwhelms them. The Government of India, like the Socialist Government of Britain, is in alliance with the crimson clique at the head of our affairs who want to deprive us of our strategic interests in the western Pacific. They are not in alliance with the American people.

The will to resist Russia here at home is vitiated. Gone is the zeal with which we marched forth in 1941 to crush the dictatorship. The leftist-liberals who preached a holy war against Hitler and Tojo are today seeking accommodation with the senior totalitarianism of Moscow. Is this because we are today arrayed against, to recall the phrase of General Bradley, "the wrong enemy" in the "wrong war"? We were on Russia's side in the last war—our strategy after the first Quebec conference might as well

have been dictated in the Kremlin and teletyped to the Pentagon—and is that why the Marshall who prosecuted World War II with bloodthirsty zeal, eager to order Americans to storm fortified shores, is sitting this one out?

General Vandenberg, who added no luster to an illustrious name thereby, proclaimed to the world that we lacked the air force to execute the moderate and minimum strategic recommendations of General MacArthur. The Congress voted a 70-group air force 3 years ago. Truman cut it down to 48. Who was the mayor of the palace then? The same as now: Marshall.

Where have the billions gone that the Congress poured into the Armed Services between VJ-day and the outbreak of the war in Korea? Marshall told us that when the North Koreans attacked we had one battle-ready division in the United States. What has the Department of Defense done to put us since then in a posture of defense? Of that, Mr. President, we know very little. We are told in Life magazine of last week that our airplane industry is still on a one-shift basis. We hear alarming reports from industry that the overwhelming emphasis in procurement is upon building new plants which will be ready 2 or 3 years from now to turn out what? Even when ready they will turn out not munitions but chemicals and yarn and steel sheets, all valuable materials but not in themselves fighting weapons. What of the strategic materials stockpiles? Is the State Department still maintaining, as in the case of the sands embargoed by India, that it would be ungentlemanly to insist upon requiring what we need in those categories in exchange for the bounty we have poured by the hundreds of shiploads upon alien shores?

THE GOSPEL OF FEAR

During all this time the administration preaches a gospel of fear and Acheson and Marshall expound a foreign policy in the East based upon craven, whimpering appeasement. The President and his palace guard go on a Nation-wide broadcast and threaten the American people with Russian-made atomic bombs. What is the purpose of such craven actions and utterances? Is it to condition us to defeat in the Far East, to soften us up so that we shall accept a peace upon the Soviet empire's terms in Korea; a peace which would put the enemy one step nearer to Alaska? And how, may I ask, did Russia acquire the technical secrets, the blueprints, the know-how to make the bombs with which the administration seeks to terrify us? I have yet to hear a single administration spokesman raise his voice against the policy of suppression, deceit, and false witness with which this administration has protected the Soviet agents who have abstracted those secrets from us.

THEY PLANNED IT THAT WAY

The people, Mr. President, recognize the weakness with which the administration has replaced what was so recently our great strength. They are troubled by it. And they do not think it accidental. They do not believe that the

decline in our strength from 1945 to 1951 just happened. They are coming to believe that it was brought about, step by step, by will and intention. They are beginning to believe that the surrender of China to Russia, the administration's indecently hasty desire to turn Formosa over to the enemy and arrive at a cease-fire in Korea instead of following the manly, American course prescribed by MacArthur, point to something more than ineptitude and folly. They witness the conviction of Hiss, which would not have happened had he not brought a private suit for damages against Whittaker Chambers; they follow the revelations in the Remington case, the Marzani case, and the others which have disclosed at the heart of Government active Soviet agents influencing policy and pilfering secrets; they note the policy of retreat before Soviet assertion from Yalta to this day, and they say: this is not because these men are incompetents, there is a deeper reason.

INFAMY SO BLACK

How can we account for our present situation unless we believe that men high in this Government are concerting to deliver us to disaster? This must be the product of a great conspiracy, a conspiracy on a scale so immense as to dwarf any previous such venture in the history of man. A conspiracy of infamy so black that, when it is finally exposed, its principals shall be forever deserving of the maledictions of all honest men.

Who constitutes the highest circles of this conspiracy? About that we cannot be sure. We are convinced that Dean Acheson, who steadfastly serves the interests of nations other than his own, the friend of Alger Hiss, who supported him in his hour of retribution, who contributed to his defense fund, must be high on the roster. The President? He is their captive. I have wondered, as have you, why he did not dispense with so great a liability as Acheson to his own and his party's interests. It is now clear to me. In the relationship of master and man, did you ever hear of man firing master? Truman is a satisfactory front. He is only dimly aware of what is going on.

I do not believe that Mr. Truman is a conscious party to the great conspiracy, although it is being conducted in his name. I believe that if Mr. Truman had the ability to associate good Americans around him, he would have behaved as a good American in this most dire of all our crises.

REVIEW OF MARSHALL'S ACTIVITIES

It is when we return to an examination of General Marshall's record since the spring of 1942 that we approach an explanation of the carefully planned retreat from victory. Let us again review the Marshall record, as I have disclosed it from all the sources available and all of them friendly. This grim and solitary man it was who, early in World War II, determined to put his impress upon our global strategy, political and military.

It was Marshall who, amid the din for a "second front now" from every voice of Soviet inspiration, sought to compel the British to invade across the Channel

in the fall of 1942 upon penalty of our quitting the war in Europe.

It was Marshall who, after North Africa had been secured, took the strategic direction of the war out of Roosevelt's hands and who fought the British desire, shared by Mark Clark, to advance from Italy into the eastern plains of Europe ahead of the Russians.

It was a Marshall-sponsored memorandum, advising appeasement of Russia in Europe and the enticement of Russia into the far-eastern war, circulated at Quebec, which foreshadowed our whole course at Tehran, at Yalta, and until now in the Far East.

It was Marshall who, at Tehran, made common cause with Stalin on the strategy of the war in Europe and marched side by side with him thereafter.

It was Marshall who enjoined his chief of military mission in Moscow under no circumstances to "irritate" the Russians by asking them questions about their forces, their weapons, and their plans, while at the same time opening our schools, factories, and gradually our secrets to them in this count.

It was Marshall who, as Hanson Baldwin asserts, himself referring only to the "military authorities," prevented us having a corridor to Berlin. So it was with the capture and occupation of Berlin and Prague ahead of the Russians.

It was Marshall who sent Deane to Moscow to collaborate with Harriman in drafting the terms of the wholly unnecessary bribe paid to Stalin at Yalta. It was Marshall, with Hiss at his elbow and doing the physical drafting of agreements at Yalta, who ignored the contrary advice of his senior, Admiral Leahy, and of MacArthur and Nimitz in regard to the folly of a major land invasion of Japan; who submitted intelligence reports which suppressed more truthful estimates in order to support his argument, and who finally induced Roosevelt to bring Russia into the Japanese war with a bribe that reinstated Russia in its pre-1904 imperialistic position in Manchuria—an act which, in effect, signed the death warrant of the Republic of China.

It was Marshall, with Acheson and Vincent eagerly assisting, who created the China policy which, destroying China, robbed us of a great and friendly ally, a buffer against the Soviet imperialism with which we are now at war.

It was Marshall, who, after long conferences with Acheson and Vincent, went to China to execute the criminal folly of the disastrous Marshall mission.

It was Marshall who, upon returning from a diplomatic defeat for the United States at Moscow, besought the reinstatement of forty millions in lend-lease for Russia.

It was Marshall who, for 2 years suppressed General Wedemeyer's report, which is a direct and comprehensive repudiation of the Marshall policy.

It was Marshall who, disregarding Wedemeyer's advices on the urgent need for military supplies, the likelihood of China's defeat without ammunition and equipment, and our "moral obligation" to furnish them, proposed instead a relief bill bare of military support.

It was the State Department under Marshall, with the wholehearted support of Michael Lee and Remington in the Commerce Department, that sabotaged the \$125,000,000 military-aid bill to China in 1948.

It was Marshall who fixed the dividing line for Korea along the thirty-eighth parallel, a line historically chosen by Russia to mark its sphere of interest in Korea.

It is Marshall's strategy for Korea which has turned that war into a pointless slaughter, reversing the dictum of Von Clausewitz and every military theorist since him that the object of a war is not merely to kill but to impose your will on the enemy.

It is Marshall-Acheson strategy for Europe to build the defense of Europe solely around the Atlantic Pact nations, excluding the two great wells of anti-Communist manpower in Western Germany and Spain and spurning the organized armies of Greece and Turkey—another case of following the Lattimore advice of "let them fall but don't let it appear that we pushed them."

It is Marshall who, advocating timidity as a policy so as not to annoy the forces of Soviet imperialism in Asia, had admittedly put a brake on the preparations to fight, rationalizing his reluctance on the ground that the people are fickle and if war does not come, will hold him to account for excessive zeal.

What can be made of this unbroken series of decisions and acts contributing to the strategy of defeat? They cannot be attributed to incompetence. If Marshall were merely stupid, the laws of probability would dictate that part of his decisions would serve this country's interest. If Marshall is innocent of guilty intention, how could he be trusted to guide the defense of this country further? We have declined so precipitously in relation to the Soviet Union in the last 6 years. How much swifter may be our fall into disaster with Marshall at the helm? Where will all this stop? That is not a rhetorical question: Ours is not a rhetorical danger. Where next will Marshall carry us? It is useless to suppose that his nominal superior will ask him to resign. He cannot even dispense with Acheson.

GREAT CONSPIRACY

What is the objective of the great conspiracy? I think it is clear from what has occurred and is now occurring: to diminish the United States in world affairs, to weaken us militarily, to confuse our spirit with talk of surrender in the Far East and to impair our will to resist evil. To what end? To the end that we shall be contained, frustrated and finally fall victim to Soviet intrigue from within and Russian military might from without. Is that farfetched? There have been many examples in history of rich and powerful states which have been corrupted from within, enfeebled and deceived until they were unable to resist aggression.

The United States first ventured into world affairs a bare half century ago. Its rise to world leadership was almost unprecedentedly sudden. We call this a

young country. It is in terms of the tenure of the settlement by Europeans on these lands. It is also in terms of the spirit and daring of its people. Yet the United States belongs to, is the last great example of, the farthest projection of an old culture. The vast and complicated culture of the west, which bloomed with the spread of the Gothic cathedrals and the universities which has carried science and technology and art and the humane values to lengths nowhere else dreamed of and whose sway covered the earth only a few years ago, is in manifest decay. We see the symptoms of decay in Western Europe. We find evidences of it here.

There is a rising power, not yet a culture; a power barbarous to us which has attracted many followers and devotees in the heart of the west. Why these men and women of the west are so attracted lies outside our interest at this moment. We know that these enemies of the west are here, we know they are at work among us, burrowing, mining, sapping ceaselessly; seeking to destroy our civilization. We know principally because we see the results of their work. We cannot always detect them at it. That is not an easy task as we have seen with the notorious case of Alger Hiss.

The enemies of our civilization, whether alien or native, whether of high or low degree, work in the dark. They are that way more effective. It is easy to single out, identify and isolate a frank and open Communist. The Communists openly among us are scarcely a problem at all. They have the aversion and contempt of all honest Americans. It is the clandestine enemy which taxes our ingenuity.

THE KREMLIN'S EXECUTIONERS

It is the great crime of the Truman administration that it has refused to undertake the job of ferreting the enemy from its ranks. I once puzzled over that refusal. The President, I said, is a loyal American; why does he not lead in this enterprise? I think that I know why he does not. The President is not master in his own house. Those who are master there not only have a desire to protect the sappers and miners—they could not do otherwise. They themselves are not free. They belong to a larger conspiracy, the world-wide web of which has been spun from Moscow. It was Moscow, for example, which decreed that the United States should execute its loyal friend, the Republic of China. The executioners were that well-identified group headed by Acheson and George Catlett Marshall.

How, if they would, can they break these ties, how return to simple allegiance to their native land? Can men sullied by their long and dreadful record afford us leadership in the world struggle with the enemy? How can a man whose every important act for years had contributed to the prosperity of the enemy reverse himself? The reasons for his past actions are immaterial. Regardless of why he has done what he did, he has done it and the momentum

of that course bears him onward. This is his plight:

I am in blood,
Stepped in so far, that should I wade no more.

Returning were as tedious as go o'er.

Can we foretell the next move on the timetable of the great conspiracy? It seems clearly indicated. Dean Acheson foreshadowed it the other day before the Russell committee when he expressed his desire to have a cease-fire negotiated with the Peiping Reds on the basis of the thirty-eighth parallel. A cease-fire leaving the enemy in command of Korea north of that imaginary line that has occasioned the spilling of so much blood. And then, after the cease-fire, to have our friends on Formosa delivered behind the iron curtain by a jury stacked with the friends of international communism and then have the question of the admission of Red China decided by the United Nations. While Acheson publicly proclaims he is opposed to the sell-out, but privately continues to encourage our "friends" in the United Nations to prepare to not only bury the Republic of China, but to heap refuse on its grave. If that is the best that the perfidious Red Dean can offer us, I say let him come again. After all, we need not take what he or the mayor of the palace or the weak Merovingian himself brings us.

The time has come to halt this tepid, milk-and-water acquiescence which a discredited administration, ruled by disloyalty, sends down to us. The American may belong to an old culture, he may be beset by enemies here and abroad, he may be distracted by the many words of counsel that assail him by day and night, but he is nobody's fool. The time has come for us to realize that the people who sent us here expect more than time-serving from us. The American who has never known defeat in war, does not expect to be again sold down the river in Asia. He does not want that kind of betrayal. He has had betrayal enough. He has never failed to fight for his liberties since George Washington rode to Boston in 1775 to put himself at the head of a band of rebels unversed in war. He is fighting tonight, fighting gloriously in a war on a distant American frontier made inglorious by the men he can no longer trust at the head of our affairs.

The America that I know, and that other Senators know, this vast and teeming and beautiful land, this hopeful society where the poor share the table of the rich as never before in history, where men of all colors, of all faiths, are brothers as never before in history, where great deeds have been done and great deeds are yet to do, that America deserves to be led not to humiliation or defeat, but to victory.

The Congress of the United States is the people's last hope, a free and open forum of the people's representatives. We felt the pulse of the people's response to the return of MacArthur. We know what it meant. The people, no longer trusting their executive, turn to us, asking that we reassert the constitutional

prerogative of the Congress to declare the policy for the United States.

The time has come to reassert that prerogative, to oversee the conduct of this war, to declare that this body must have the final word on the disposition of Formosa and Korea. They fell from the grasp of the Japanese empire through our military endeavors, pursuant to a declaration of war made by the Congress of the United States on December 8, 1941. If the Senate speaks, as is its right, the disposal of Korea and Formosa can be made only by a treaty which must be ratified by this body. Should the administration dare to defy such a declaration, the Congress has abundant recourses which I need not spell out.

SOURCE LIST

for

"THE HISTORY OF GEORGE CATLETT MARSHALL"

Winston Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate*.
Adm. William Leahy, *I Was There*.
Cordell Hull, *Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, vol. II.
Henry L. Stimson, *On Active Service*.
James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*.
Sumner Welles, *Seven Decisions That Shaped History*.
Edward Stettinius, Jr., *Roosevelt and the Russians*.
Robert Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*.
Hanson Baldwin, *Great Mistakes of the War*.
Gen. H. H. Arnold, *Global Mission*.
Gen. Claire Chennault, *Way of a Fighter*.
Gen. Lucius Clay, *Decision in Germany*.
Gen. Mark Clark, *Calculated Risk*.
Gen. John R. Deane, *Strange Alliance*.
Gen. Omar Bradley, "The War America Fought," *Life* magazine, April 30, 1951.
Edward Ansel Mowrer, *The Nightmare of American Foreign Policy*.
Jonathan Daniels, *The Man of Independence*.
Freda Utley, *The China Story*.
Henry Wallace, *Soviet Asia Mission*.
Robert Payne, *Mao Tse Tung—Ruler of Red China*.
U. S. Relations with China (State Department White Paper).
Hearings before Senate Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Banking and Currency, June 17, 1947.
Hearings before Subcommittee of Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Tydings Committee), April 27, 1950.
William C. Bullitt, General Patrick Hurley, and others, as quoted in above books.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

Mr. McFARLAND. I move that the Senate proceed to the consideration of executive business.

The motion was agreed to; and the Senate proceeded to the consideration of executive business.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CLEMENTS in the chair) laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States submitting several nominations, which were referred to the appropriate committees.

(For nominations this day received, see the end of Senate proceedings.)

CONVENTION WITH SWITZERLAND, RELATING TO DOUBLE TAXATION—REMOVAL OF INJUNCTION OF SECRETY

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair lays before the Senate Executive N. Eighty-second Congress, first session, a convention between the United States of America and Switzerland, signed at Washington on May 24, 1951, for the

avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes on income. Without objection, the injunction of secrecy will be removed from the convention, and the convention, together with the message from the President will be referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the President's message will be printed in the RECORD. The Chair hears no objection.

The President's message is as follows:

To the Senate of the United States:

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith the convention between the United States of America and Switzerland, signed at Washington on May 24, 1951, for the avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes on income.

I also transmit for the information of the Senate the report by the Secretary of State with respect to the convention. The convention has the approval of the Department of State and the Treasury Department.

Particular attention is invited to the concluding two paragraphs of the report by the Secretary of State, indicating that in view of the provisions of article XX (1) of the convention it is hoped that the convention can be brought into force prior to October 1, 1951. This, of course, would entail the making of arrangements between the Governments of the two countries for the exchange of instruments of ratification.

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

THE WHITE HOUSE, June 14, 1951.

(Enclosures: (1) Report by the Secretary of State; (2) convention of May 24, 1951, with Switzerland with respect to taxes on income.)

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Reports of committees are in order. If there be no reports of committees, the clerk will state the nominations on the Executive Calendar.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION

The legislative clerk read the nomination of Wayne Coy to be a member of the Federal Communications Commission.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nomination is confirmed.

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

The legislative clerk proceeded to read sundry nominations in the United States Coast Guard.

Mr. McFARLAND. I ask unanimous consent that the nominations in the United States Coast Guard be confirmed en bloc.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nominations in the United States Coast Guard are confirmed en bloc.

Mr. McFARLAND. I ask that the President be notified immediately of all nominations confirmed today.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the President will be notified immediately.

That completes the Executive Calendar.

RECESS

Mr. McFARLAND. As in legislative session, I move that the Senate stand in recess until 12 o'clock noon tomorrow.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 5 o'clock and 46 minutes p. m.) the Senate took a recess until tomorrow, Friday, June 15, 1951, at 12 o'clock meridian.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate June 14 (legislative day of May 17), 1951:

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

James Joseph Reynolds, Jr., of New Jersey, to be a member of the National Labor Relations Board for a term of 5 years from August 27, 1951. (Reappointment.)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Rear Adm. Calvin M. Bolster, United States Navy, to be Chief of Naval Research in the Department of the Navy for a term of 3 years.

CONFIRMATIONS

Executive nominations confirmed by the Senate June 14 (legislative day of May 11), 1951:

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

Wayne Coy, of Indiana, to be a member of the Federal Communications Commission for a term of 7 years from July 1, 1951. (Reappointment.)

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

The following-named persons for appointment in the United States Coast Guard to the positions indicated:

To be Lieutenant (junior grade)

Franklin J. Miller

To be chief boatswains

Joseph E. Sherwood

Edward L. Masters

To be chief radio electrician

Freddie G. Bookout

To be chief machinists

William B. Lupton

Oskar Johansen

To be chief pay clerks

Bernard S. Keffler

Frank A. Mattson

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

THURSDAY, JUNE 14, 1951

The House met at 12 o'clock noon.

The Chaplain, Rev. Bernard Braskamp, D. D., offered the following prayer:

O Thou who art the great God of men and of nations, we rejoice that in the calendar of our national life there are many special days which stir our minds and hearts with feelings of patriotism and pride.

Grant that this day, which we call Flag Day, may inspire and kindle within us a greater loyalty and love for our country for Thou hast given us a goodly heritage and hast not dealt so bountifully and graciously with any nation.

We pray that we may reverence and obey Thy laws and the laws of our land

and do all in our power to preserve and perpetuate the free institutions under which we are privileged to live.

Help us to appreciate and understand our duties and rights as citizens. May we strive to elevate the moral and spiritual character of our beloved country. Wherever the flag is carried may it be the emblem of peace and righteousness and the glorious herald proclaiming a new era of liberty and happiness for all mankind.

In Christ's name we pray. Amen.

The Journal of the proceedings of yesterday was read and approved.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

A message in writing from the President of the United States was communicated to the House by Mr. Miller, one of his secretaries, who also informed the House that on the following dates the President approved and signed bills and a joint resolution of the House of the following titles:

On May 25, 1951:

H. R. 2685. An act to authorize the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs to reconvey to Tuskegee Institute a tract of land in Macon County, Ala.

On May 28, 1951:

H. R. 2952. An act to authorize the attendance of the United States Navy Band at the final reunion of the United Confederate Veterans to be held in Norfolk, Va., May 30, through June 2, 1951.

On May 29, 1951:

H. R. 3939. An act to amend the act of June 23, 1949, with respect to telephone and telegraph service for Members of the House of Representatives.

On May 31, 1951:

H. R. 3842. An act making supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1951, and for other purposes.

On June 1, 1951:

H. R. 593. An act for the relief of Cleo C. Reeves, Floyd L. Murphy, and Fabian P. Durand.

On June 2, 1951:

H. R. 3587. An act making supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1951, and for other purposes.

On June 12, 1951:

H. J. Res. 253. Joint resolution to permit articles imported from foreign countries for the purpose of exhibition at the Japanese Trade Fair, Seattle, Wash., to be admitted without payment of tariff, and for other purposes.

On June 14, 1951:

H. R. 652. An act for the relief of the estate of Mattie Mashaw.

THE FLAG

Mr. SCRIVNER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute and revise and extend my remarks.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Kansas?

There was no objection.

Mr. SCRIVNER. Mr. Speaker, as the Chaplain has so properly pointed out, today is Flag Day. As we especially honor our national emblem we realize that it is more than just red and white and blue threads.

Woven into it is all of the glorious history, the hopes, and the aspirations of a great Republic.